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Abstract 
 
 
 The problem of mental causation results from some 
unwarranted metaphysical assumption: the Principle of 
Nomological Character of Causality (NCC). However, there 
is little reason to understand causation in the manner 
required to make NCC work. The motivation for the demand 
for laws in action explanations stems at least in part 
from the fact that the laws cited in explanations are the 
laws that subsume events in naturalistic causal relations. 
By rejecting the idea that causal explanation is causal 
because it is grounded in natural causal relations, the 
motivation for requiring laws in explanations disappears. 
I claim that this is the reason why we need to pay 
attention to our practice and explanatory strategies. By 
rejecting NCC we can in fact arrive at a sustainable, 
defensible and rewarding account of mental causation. The 
primacy of explanatory practice over the ontological 
commitment reverses such that an explanation is causal if 
we accept it as such. By reinterpreting the notion of 
causation we regain the causal efficacy of the mental.  
 We look to a theory of intentional action for help 
in answering the problem of mental causation. In this 
work I provide a novel conception of intentional action 
by distinguishing normative reasons from motivating 
reasons. The proposal recommends itself as being capable 
of dealing with many problems, including the problems 
raised by unintended side effects and lucky actions. More 
importantly, the proposal is able to deal with the 
problem of causal deviance and consequently is promising 
in that it avoids epiphenomenalism of mental properties. 
I conclude the criteria for intentional action must be 
wide enough to include the normative perspectives of a 
third-point of view as well as the psychological 
perspectives. 
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 1
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 The concept of intentional action is connected with 
that of reasons. Some philosophers define a purposeful, 
intentional action as one which is done for a reason. But 
the problem is that there are intentional actions that 
are not done for a reason and there are actions done for 
reasons that still are not intentional. In this work I 
provide a novel conception of intentional action by 
distinguishing normative reasons from motivating reasons. 
The conception is as follows:  
 
[Intentional action] An agent’s Φ–ing is intentional 
iff either (i) it is done for her motivating reason 
(if it is not the case of luck or causal deviance) 
or (ii) the fact that certain consequences would 
occur was a justifying reason not to perform the 
action. 
 
 
The definition should be reflected on both reasons. The 
proposal recommends itself as being capable of dealing 
with many problems, including the problems raised by 
unintended side effects and lucky actions. More 
importantly, the proposal is able to deal with the 
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problem of causal deviance and consequently is promising 
in that it avoids epiphenomenalism of mental properties. 
 The problem of mental causation emerges when we want 
to confer some kind of primacy to the physical without 
abandoning the autonomy of the mental. The nonreductive 
physicalist who holds that the mental is causally 
efficacious needs to show how it is that mental 
properties themselves can make a causal difference 
without at the same time rendering themselves reducible 
to physical properties. 
 Chapter One discusses a problem of mental causation 
by exploring Donald Davidson’s Anomalous Monism (AM). I 
show that Davidson runs into difficulties when it comes 
to accommodating our commonsense intuitions about the 
nature of mental causation. So long as Davidson holds the 
Principle of Nomological Character of Causality (NCC), I 
argue, he is left with the following dilemma: either he 
treats the mental as causally efficacious and therefore 
gives up our commitment to the idea that the mental realm 
is irreducible, sui generis, or he holds onto that latter 
notion, but jettisons the intuition that our mental 
states are causally efficacious. (Either Reduction or 
Epiphenomenalism.) I claim that we should accept both the 
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intuition that the mental is anomalous and that it is 
causally efficacious. I will claim that NCC is not 
something that we can tolerate. 
 In Chapter Two I will deal with a tension that 
arises from content externalism. This is the problem, 
resulting from the seeming conflict between the two 
claims, one that ordinary psychological states play 
causal roles in psychology in virtue of their contents, 
and the other that their contents are, in part, 
individuated by the nature of their referents. I will 
examine a debate between Davidson and Burge. Considering 
that debate both will strengthen my claim in Chapter One, 
that AM is committed to the epiphenomenalism of the 
mental, and therefore that NCC should be rejected, and 
will help to elucidate content externalism in general. By 
examining a debate between Burge and Fodor, I argue that 
that there is no a priori reason why the so-called “wide” 
contents do not or cannot play causal roles in 
psychological explanations of behavior, and show how they 
might do so by noting that wide contents are among the 
properties we ordinarily cite to explain our behavior.  
 The result we elicit from both debates, one between 
Burge and Fodor (the issue of the compatibility of 
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externalism with the causal efficacy of the mental) and 
the other between Burge and Davidson (the issue of the 
compatibility of externalism with the token identity 
thesis) is that we have good reasons for rejecting NCC. 
 A general solution to the problem of mental 
causation arising from content externalism can enable us 
to see how such a solution helps to solve the problem of 
the Exclusion Argument, which is the subject of Chapter 
Three. The Exclusion Argument is designed to show that 
nonreductive conceptions of the mental face the serious 
problem of producing an account of mental causation which 
does not render the mental epiphenomenal. I argue that 
the Exclusion Argument is not successful. The rejection 
of the argument is reached by the rejection of the Causal 
Inheritance Principle (CIP), which says that a mental 
property, realized in virtue of a physical realization 
base, has no new causal powers beyond the causal powers 
of its physical base. This is important because the 
rejection of CIP entails the rejection of NCC. 
 In the previous chapters I argued that a particular 
unanalyzed assumption, NCC, is responsible for a 
philosophical impasse. In Chapter Four, I will describe 
the new conception of causation that emerges as a result 
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of rejecting NCC. In this chapter I will first explain 
commonsense psychology (CP), and then argue against the 
claim that CP is a kind of a scientific theory. The 
alternative to regarding CP as a scientific theory is to 
regard it as a practice. Secondly, I will argue that our 
explanatory practice should guide our ontological 
commitment. And, finally, I will defend my position 
against what I see to be a number of serious challenges. 
 The new conception of causation that emerges as a 
result is strengthened by a theory of intentional action 
that I will endorse in the final two chapters. In Chapter 
Five I will provide a theoretical ground to include 
normative perspectives in dealing with the concept of 
intentional actions. I will claim that our ordinary 
practice in attributing intentional action in particular 
cases, and our practice of attributing reason 
explanations, can actually be influenced by normative 
considerations. I set the stage by examining some of the 
problems associated with the concepts of intentional 
action that are frequently discussed in the literature in 
the philosophy of action. I will provide an explanation 
of understanding intentional action by invoking the 
concepts of motivating reason and justifying reason. 
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 In the final chapter I provide a necessary and 
sufficient condition for intentional action by developing 
the idea of the previous chapter. The definition pays 
close attention to normative considerations as well as 
motivating reasons. The definition proves itself capable 
of solving a number of other problems related to 
intentional actions, including the problems of unintended 
side effects, deviant causal chains, and skill. Most 
importantly, it provides a way of understanding the 
problem of mental causation. Because normative 
considerations play a role in determining whether an 
action was performed intentionally, I claim that it is 
difficult to see how NCC can be true. 
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CHAPTER 1  
ANOMALOUS MONISM AND THE THREAT OF 
EPIPHENOMENALISM 
 
 
 
The traditional problem of mental causation, the so-
called Cartesian problem, is a conflict between the 
intuition that the mind and the body are radically 
different things and the intuition that the mind and the 
body causally interact. If the mind and the body are two 
distinct kinds of substances that can exist independently 
of each other, it is hard to explain how the mind and the 
body interact causally. 
The contemporary problem of mental causation, though 
different from the Cartesian one, emerges from related 
intuitions. It is different because the nature of the 
mental and its relation to our bodies is discussed 
nowadays in terms of mental properties of physical 
organisms. However, the problem of mental causation is 
not abolished by eliminating substances; it reappears 
when we want to confer some kind of primacy to the 
physical without abandoning the autonomy of the mental. 
We could, some would, claim that we have to get rid of 
the mental or to identify it with the physical. In this 
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case we don’t need a further account of the mental and, 
in particular, we don’t need to deal with the issue of 
how the mental causally interacts with the physical. 
Nevertheless, as it happens, a vast majority of 
contemporary views want it both ways: the physical is 
primary but the mental is real and distinct from it. And 
this is the arena in which problems similar to the 
Cartesian one emerge. 
 This chapter discusses a problem of mental causation. 
With Donald Davidson’s well known theory of the mind, 
Anomalous Monism (hereafter AM) as my concrete example of 
nonreductive physicalism, I shall devote the remainder of 
the chapter to showing that nonreductive physicalism runs 
into difficulties when it comes to accommodating our 
common sense intuitions about the nature of mental 
causation.  
 I use Donald Davidson’s anomalous monism as an 
example of nonreductive physicalism for a couple of 
reasons. First of all, Davidson is the philosopher who 
has made famous both the idea that mental and physical 
vocabulary operate with different constitutive standards, 
and the idea that the best way to make sense of the idea 
that one’s beliefs and desires can explain one’s behavior 
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is to recognize that they caused that behavior. Second, 
and more important, Davidson’s theory stands as one of 
the most worked out attempts to accommodate both of these 
ideas in one comprehensive account of the mental. 
 Therefore, this chapter is devoted to an explication 
of Donald Davidson’s AM in detail and discusses its 
problems with regard to the charge of epiphenomenalism. 
Many critics argue that AM does not save causal efficacy 
for mental events as mental. In the subsequent sections 
of the chapter I will present Davidson’s responses to the 
objections that his view makes the mental causally 
inefficacious.  
In his 1993 paper “Thinking Causes,” Davidson, for 
the first time, addresses the worries expressed by Kim 
and others. In so doing, Davidson claims that his 
critics’ talk of mental properties making or not making a 
causal difference is at odds with the extensionalist 
conception of causal relations that he advocates. Given 
the clearly Quinean ontological framework within which he 
works, Davidson does not admit properties into his 
ontology, and, therefore, claims that the objections rest 
on a fundamental misunderstanding of some aspect of his 
view. Second, Davidson finally explains how, according to 
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AM, the mental can in fact be causally relevant1. I will 
discuss Davidson’s point and claim that Davidson’s 
explanation is unsuccessful. I will argue that the 
epiphenomenalist objection succeeds in identifying a 
serious problem for AM.2  
 
1.1 ARGUMENT FOR ANOMALOUS MONISM 
 
 
In this section I will focus on Donald Davidson’s AM 
as presented in a series of influential articles 
reprinted in his Essays on Actions and Events. I will 
present Davidson’s argument for AM as the identity theory 
which is entailed by the consistency of the three 
principles. I will explain how Davidson thinks the three 
principles are to be reconciled and why he thinks they 
                                                 
1 I will call a thing causally efficacious if it is able to cause 
another thing to occur, and causally relevant if it is able to 
explain why something has happened due to some cause. For example, 
if c causes e, then we say c is causally efficacious in regard to e; 
if c can explain why f has occurred or what has caused f to occur, 
then we say c is causally relevant in regard to (the causing of) f. 
But we cannot say c is causally relevant simpliciter. The expression 
“in regard to (the causing of) f,” is indispensable with causal 
relevance. In light of this usage, causal efficacy is a metaphysical 
or ontological notion while causal relevance is an explanatory one. 
This usage implies that causal efficacy and causal relevance are 
different in at least one significant sense: causal efficacy may 
ground a causal relation and causal relevance is grounded by a 
causal relation.  
2 In Chapter Three I shall deal with the so-called Exclusion Argument. 
I contend, following critics, that AM succumbs to the Exclusion 
Argument. 
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imply the token identity3 of mental events with physical 
events.  
Davidson finds each of the following principles 
(Davidson 1970: 208) to be plausible and very likely to 
be true: 
 
[The Principle of Causal Interaction]: At least some 
mental events interact causally with physical events.  
 
[The Nomological Character of Causality]: Events 
related as cause and effect fall under strict, 
deterministic laws.  
 
[The Anomalism of the Mental]: There can be no 
strict deterministic laws on the basis of which 
mental events can be predicted and explained.  
 
 
If one were to accept all three principles as true, 
one would be faced with explaining their apparent 
inconsistency. For it is natural to read the first two 
principles as entailing the denial of the third. If at 
least some mental events are related as cause or effect 
with physical events, and where there is causation there 
is subsumption by law, then it seems there must be a law 
which subsumes the mental and physical events. 
                                                 
3 Davidson’s version of the identity thesis does not entail that all 
mental properties are also physical properties; only causal 
properties of events, however else described, enter the proper 
domain of physical explanations. MacDonald says a similar point: 
“[T]he argument works to establish token identity of the mental and 
the physical only for those mental events which … interact causally 
with physical events” (MacDonald 1989: 87). 
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Since Davidson holds that the three principles are 
indeed true, their incompatibility must be only apparent. 
Briefly, the solution to the apparent inconsistency is as 
follows: Causality and identity are relations that obtain 
between individual events independently of descriptions. 
The Principle of Causal Interaction (hereafter CI) 
applies to events in extension and so is independent of 
whether they have physicalistic or mentalistic 
descriptions (Davidson 1970: 215). Thus if e causes f 
then those two events are in that causal relation whether 
we say so by describing e as Jack’s fall and f as a 
disaster or by describing e and f using different 
descriptions. Thus, CI concerns events in extension and 
“is therefore blind to the mental-physical dichotomy” 
(Davidson 1970: 215).  
The Anomalousness of the Mental (hereafter AME) 
concerns events described as either mental or physical; 
it does not concern events per se, i.e., individual 
events or event-tokens. AME ensures the anomalousness of 
the mental by denying that strict laws under which an 
event can fall are formulable when that event is 
described in mental terms. AME, therefore, should be read 
as saying that there are no strict laws which connect 
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events under mental descriptions with other events. That 
is to say, no singular causal statement which refers to 
an event via a mental description instantiates a strict 
law, and no generalization which makes essential use of 
mental descriptions to refer to events can ever be a law. 
Consider the Principle of the Nomological Character 
of Causality (hereafter NCC). What might Davidson mean in 
saying that two events “fall under a strict law”? We can 
think of falling under a law as the same thing as being 
“covered” or “subsumed” by a law. But laws, as Davidson 
points out, are linguistic in that they necessarily refer 
to events via descriptions. Thus, if laws are linguistic, 
to say that two causally connected events “fall under” or 
are subsumed by a law is to say that they have 
descriptions (whether or not we can pick those 
descriptions out) such that the singular causal statement 
connecting them under those descriptions instantiates a 
law. On this interpretation, then, Davidson’s NCC does 
not imply that every singular causal statement 
instantiates a law, but is consistent with there being 
true singular causal statements that do not instantiate 
any laws. 
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Now we should be able to see that CI, NCC and AME 
are consistent with one another. CI and NCC do not entail 
that there are strict laws which connect mental events 
under mental descriptions with physical events under 
physical descriptions, which would be the denial of AME. 
Rather, together they imply only that when a mental event 
is causally connected with a physical event, there will 
be descriptions of those two events such that the 
singular causal statement connecting those two events 
under those descriptions instantiates a strict law. 
Now we can see that given AME, those descriptions 
cannot be mental descriptions. It follows, then, that 
those descriptions must be physical descriptions. Thus, 
given Davidson’s account of what it is for an event to be 
a mental event or physical event, those events subsumed 
by strict law are physical events. Thus, we have the 
token identity of mental events (at least those which 
causally interact with other events, either mental or 
physical) with physical events. The view which results 
from this reconciliation of the three principles is what 
Davidson calls Anomalous Monism (AM). This is the view 
that although mental events are physical events, there 
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are no laws strictly correlating the mental with the 
physical. 
 
1.2 THE THREAT OF EPIPHENOMENALISM 
 
 
In this section I examine the charge that AM is 
committed to epiphenomenalism. The charge questions the 
consistency of CI and the other two principles, NCC and 
AME. I demonstrate how AM face difficulty in making 
adequate sense of causal efficacy of the mental. I will 
present critics’ attack offered by Honderich and Kim, and 
will show that the criticisms do make sense in charging 
AM with epiphenomenalism. I will then explain why I think 
AM necessarily renders the mental causally inert. This 
insight will point us in the direction of a solution to 
the epiphenomenalist attack. 
In recent discussion of AM there has been some 
question as to whether the view is committed to the 
epiphenomenalism of the mental. The worry is not that AM 
renders mental events causally inert, for mental events 
are token-identical with some physical events on 
Davidson’s account; the charge is rather that mental 
properties of mental events have no causal role to play 
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under AM. It is the physical properties in question that 
the causal work is being performed. 
I examine Honderich’s argument in detail. His 
argument is that when one event causes another event, it 
makes sense to ask which properties of the two events 
were relevant to their being in causal relation. That is, 
it is always acceptable to ask which properties of the 
former are causally relevant to its being the effect of 
the latter event. With respect to the relation between 
the mental and the physical, the question is whether it 
is the mental or the physical properties of a mental 
event which are causally relevant. That is, is it the 
mental as mental or the mental as physical which is 
causally efficacious? If it is answered by saying that it 
is the mental as mental which is causally relevant, then 
AM must reject AME – there must be psychophysical laws. 
If it is answered by saying that it is the mental as 
physical which has causal power, then CI comes into 
question since our initial acceptance of it was based on 
the natural understanding of it as saying that the mental 
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as mental causally interacts with the physical, and AM 
seems to be committed to Type-Epiphenomenalism.4 
Let me take a look at Honderich’s argument in detail. 
Honderich (1982) argues that the three principles on 
which AM is grounded are incompatible when it is 
recognized that there are indefinite numbers of ways to 
express an event and therefore only certain properties of 
events are causally relevant to their being the causes or 
effects that they are. He argues that the recognition of 
causally relevant properties raises a question of the 
                                                 
4 There are two kinds of epiphenomenalism that mental might be 
causally inert. According to the first, while certain events have 
both mental and physical characteristics, those events never cause 
other events in virtue of having those mental characteristics but 
only in virtue of having the physical characteristics they do. Brian 
McLaughlin calls this Type Epiphenomenalism (Type-E) and defines it 
as follows:  
 
[Type-E](a) Events can be causes in virtue of their physical 
properties, but (b) events cannot be causes in virtue of their 
mental properties. (McLaughlin 1989: 108).  
 
  The second kind of epiphenomenalism is the view that no single 
event has both mental and physical characteristics (i.e., no single 
event is both a mental and a physical event), and that while every 
mental event is caused by some physical event no mental event is 
ever a cause of any other event, either mental or physical. 
McLaughlin identifies this view as Token Epiphenomenalism (Token-E) 
and defines it as follows:  
 
[Token-E](i) Physical events can cause mental events, but (ii) 
mental events have no causal powers; they cannot cause mental 
events, nor can they cause physical events. (McLaughlin, 1989: 
110).  
 
Davidson is able to deny Token-E. Critics, however, have argued that 
AM is committed to Type-E. 
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legitimacy of AM. The unhappy results come when we 
realize that it does make sense to ask whether it is a 
mental event as mental that causes a physical event or 
the mental event as physical causes the event. If the 
first route is the route that anomalous monists take, 
then they have the denial of AME and therefore the denial 
of AM itself. If, on the other hand they take the second 
route in order to keep AME, then they must give up CI 
that there is causal connection between the mental as 
mental and the physical. 
Honderich points out that it does make sense to talk 
of something’s being such and such under a description. 
He says, “To talk this way is to speak of certain 
properties of a thing rather than others. To say two 
things are not in lawlike connection under certain 
descriptions is to say that certain of their properties 
are not in lawlike connection, or, perhaps, that the 
things are not in lawlike connection in virtue of certain 
of their properties.” (60-61) It is clear that it is 
certain properties of the event which are relevant to its 
being the cause it is. Honderich gives an example of 
moving the scale to the two-pound mark by putting green 
and French pears on the scale. The event of putting 
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something that is green and French did cause the event of 
moving the pointer to the two-pound mark. In this case, 
however, it does not make sense to say that because of 
the pears’ greenness and Frenchness the pointer moves to 
the two-pound mark. There is in fact no entailed law 
connecting the event in virtue of its being of something 
green and French with the pointer’s so moving. 
In the above example of pears, neither the greenness 
nor the Frenchness of the pear does not cause the 
pointer’s movement, rather the weight of the pears does 
cause it. Then, there is no difficulty in saying that it 
is in virtue of certain of its properties rather than 
others that an event is the cause it is. The causal 
connection holds between the weight of the pears and the 
movement of the scale. Even though the greenness and 
Frenchness of the pears make the event what it is, those 
properties are not necessary to the event’s being the 
cause it was. From the above consideration, Honderich 
elicit the following principles: 
 
[The Nomological Character of Causally Relevant 
Properties]: It does follow from the fact that E1 
caused E2 in virtue of a property f of E1 and 
property g of E2 that E1 and E2 are in lawlike 
connection partly or wholly in virtue of properties 
f and g. ] 
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So given that not all properties of an event are 
relevant to its being the cause or effect of another 
event, the question arises what properties are relevant. 
Namely, the question is whether it is the mental or the 
physical properties of a mental event which are causally 
relevant. That is, is it the mental as mental or the 
mental as physical which is causally efficacious? If it 
is answered by saying that it is the mental as mental 
which is causally relevant, then AM must reject AME – 
there must be psychophysical laws. If it is answered by 
saying that it is the mental as physical which has causal 
power, then CI comes into question since our initial 
acceptance of it was based on the natural understanding 
of it as saying that the mental as mental causally 
interacts with the physical, and AM seems to be committed 
to Type-Epiphenomenalism. 
 
 
1.3 DAVIDSON’S RESPONSE 
 
 Davidson Have defended AM by essentially claiming 
that these criticisms are based on an assumption about 
the relation among descriptions, events, and causal laws 
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which Davidson does not and should not accept. 
Specifically, it rests on the assumption that events have 
descriptions and are thereby subsumed by causal laws in 
virtue of having certain properties. Given Davidson’s 
ontological framework that the relata of causation are 
events and his concept of events is purely extensional, 
it would be unfair to attack AM on the grounds that it 
makes mental properties epiphenomenal: it is unfair to 
ask whether events are subsumed by causal laws in virtue 
of their properties because in Davidson’s ontology he 
does not assume the existence of properties, therefore it 
is events in extension which are in lawlike connection 
and not events under certain descriptions. 
 Davidson does argue that he does not accept this 
assumption and is actually committed to its denial. 
However, since such an assumption is necessary if the 
charge of epiphenomenalism is to apply to AM and Davidson 
does not make that assumption in arguing for AM, he 
claims that AME and NCC cannot be shown to be 
inconsistent with CI.  
 Honderich argued it is always an appropriate 
question to ask which properties of events are properties 
in virtue of which they are causally related, and hence 
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events related as cause and effect are in lawlike 
connection in virtue of certain of their properties. Can 
he make this same move without assuming the existence of 
properties? Davidson thinks not. For Honderich would have 
to be able to show that it is always a relevant question 
either to ask which events are events in virtue of which 
two events are causally related, or to ask which 
descriptions of events are descriptions in virtue of 
which they are causally related. But the answer to the 
first question is trivial, since clearly it is just those 
two events which are causally related which are relevant 
to their being so related. And the second question makes 
no sense, since it is events in extension which are in 
causal connection and not events under certain 
descriptions. 
 This point becomes clear when we examine the debate 
between Davidson and Kim. If one holds, as Kim suggests 
Davidson ought to, that NCC entails that it is only in 
virtue of falling under a physical law that an event 
causes, then one would seem to be in the position of 
having to admit that an event’s mental properties can’t 
make a causal difference. It would follow then that NCC 
does imply that the mental is not causally efficacious. 
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However, if one resists Kim’s interpretation of NCC then 
perhaps the situation won’t seem too dire. Or at least, 
this is what Davidson wants to argue. Why would someone 
be led to believe, Davidson asks, that NCC entails that 
it is only in virtue of falling under a physical law that 
an event can cause? According to Davidson, one can only 
arrive at such a conclusion if one makes the mistake of 
reading him as saying that, on AM, “events are causes or 
effects only as they instantiate physical laws” (Davidson 
1993: 13).5 But, Davidson now reminds us, on his account 
events are non-abstract particulars, which means that 
causal relations are extensional. To say that a 
relationship is extensional is to leave no room for the 
concept of “cause as,” a concept which would make 
causality an intensional relation. For Davidson causal 
relation holds between events no matter how they are 
described:  
 
It is events that have the power to change things, 
not our various ways of describing them. Since the 
fact that an event is a mental event, i.e. that it 
can be described in a psychological vocabulary, can 
make no difference to the causes and effects of that 
event, it makes no sense to suppose that describing 
it in the psychological vocabulary might deprive the 
event of its potency. (Davidson 1993: 12)  
                                                 
5 As we saw, Kim (1989) attributes this position to Davidson. 
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Redescribing an event therefore cannot, Davidson says, 
change its causal efficacy: 
  
If causal relations and causal powers inhere in 
particular events and objects, then the way those 
events and objects are described, and the properties 
we happen to employ to pick them out or characterize 
them, cannot affect what they cause. (Davidson 
1993:8)  
 
 
This means that Kim is wrong to suggest that NCC entails 
that events cause in virtue of their physical properties, 
but not in virtue of their mental properties. Strictly 
speaking, on Davidson’s view it is “events that have 
causes and effects” (Davidson 1993: 13). The fact that 
events stand in causal relations does not, therefore, 
depend on any properties, mental or physical, which can 
be ascribed to them. We are now in a position to see why 
Davidson claims that Kim’s charges rest upon a confusion 
concerning the nature of causation and causal explanation. 
For Davidson causation is an extensional relation that 
holds between events, regardless of how they are 
described. On the other hand, causal explanation involves 
describing an event in such a way that it fits into some 
larger pattern of events; such a pattern might be 
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physical (nomological) or mental (rational). By 
conflating causation and causal explanation Kim has 
imposed an unjustifiable restriction on Davidson’s 
account.  
 
 
1.4 OBJECTIONS TO DAVIDSON’S RESPONSE 
 
 As we saw, Davidson makes the claim that no event 
can cause anything in virtue of its mental properties or 
its physical properties. It is not at all clear that such 
a view is consistent with NCC6, which itself seems to 
implicate the physical properties of an event. However, 
there are some problems that Davidson’s AM faces. 
 McLaughlin examines Davidson’s extensional view of 
causal relations, according to which it makes no literal 
sense to speak of causing an event in virtue of their 
properties. McLaughlin claims that Davidson is mistaken 
in holding that C1 incompatible with C2: 
 
(C1) The relata of the causal relation are non-
abstract, particular events; and if event c caused 
event e, and c=d, then d caused e; and if c caused e, 
then there is something that caused e. (1993: 30-31) 
 
 
                                                 
6 I will discuss NCC in full in Chapter Three. 
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(C2) If event c caused event e, then c caused e in 
virtue of certain of c’s properties. (1993: 31) 
 
 
McLaughlin wants to argue first, that C1 and C2 are in 
fact consistent, and second, that C2 can be literally 
true. If McLaughlin can support both of these claims then 
he will have succeeded in demonstrating that Davidson is 
not justified in claiming that events do not cause in 
virtue of their properties. 
 Davidson’s own example in “Thinking Causes” to 
support the claim that C1 and C2 are inconsistent is the 
extensional relation between non-abstract particulars, 
the weighs-less-than relation. Davidson would think that 
the following two claims are inconsistent, but McLaughlin 
claims that they are not:  
 
(W1) The relata of the weights-less-than relation 
are non-abstract, particular substances; and if a 
weighs less than b, and a=c, then c weighs less than 
b; and if a weights less than b, then there is 
something that weighs less than b. (1993: 31) 
 
 
(W2) If substance a weighs less than substance b, 
then a weighs less than b in virtue of certain of 
a’s properties. (1993: 32) 
 
 
McLaughlin think that the two claims in (W1) and (W2) can 
be consistent, namely the extensional view of weighs-
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less-than relation between non-abstract particular 
substances holds in virtue of certain of something about 
each, namely, their weights. 
 This point carries over to the “causes” relation as 
well: there is no inconsistency in holding that (i) the 
“causes” relation is an extensional one holding between 
non-abstract particular events, and (ii) that if one 
event causes another event, it does so in virtue of 
certain of its properties (McLaughlin 1993: 31). 
 Why would Davidson think that C1 and C2 are 
inconsistent? Davidson seems to argue that if one 
believes that one event causes another event in virtue of 
one of its properties, or in virtue of belonging to a 
certain type commits one to the view that in order to be 
true a singular causal statement relating those events 
must describe them in terms of those very same properties 
or types. But this is not the case. Acceptance of the 
fact that C1 and C2 are consistent does not commit one to 
holding that singular causal statements are only true if 
they themselves specify the relevant causal properties, a 
view that Davidson clearly cannot allow. It is Davidson’s 
failure to recognize this point, McLaughlin contends, 
which leads him to argue that C1 and C2 are inconsistent.  
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 Even if we can show that C1 and C2 are consistent, 
it might still be possible to argue that C2 is 
nevertheless false. This would salvage Davidson’s 
position, but is this route available to him? One reason 
we have for thinking that Davidson might want to adopt 
such a strategy is that, according to McLaughlin, 
Davidson appears to think that if c causes e in virtue of 
c’s having F, then it would follow that “c’s having F 
causes e (or that c causes e under the description ‘the 
F’)” (McLaughlin 1993: 33). Such a scenario would indeed 
be problematic on Davidson’s account because “c’s having 
F” is a state of affairs rather than an event, which 
means that the causal relation would no longer be an 
extensional one.7 But, according to McLaughlin, such an 
implication does not follow. Saying that an event causes 
something in virtue of one of its properties actually 
implies that the event itself is a cause (McLaughlin 
                                                 
7 Relations between states of affairs are not extensional because the 
truth-value of such sentences can change depending on how such 
states of affairs are described. For example, while it may be true 
that Oedipus’s having the attitude of wanting to marry Jocasta 
caused him to marry a particular woman, it would not be correct to 
say that Oedipus’s having the attitude of wanting to marry his 
mother caused him to marry a particular woman, even though in his 
case the terms ‘Jocasta’ and ‘his mother’ are co-referential. Such 
contexts are referred to as opaque (as opposed to transparent) 
contexts. 
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1993: 33). Again McLaughlin uses Davidson’s “weighs-less-
than” example to demonstrate his point: 
 
That a weighs less than b in virtue of weighing 10 
pounds, does not imply that a’s weighing less than 
10 pounds weighs less than b. (McLaughlin 1993: 33-
4) 
 
 
Just as there is no danger in this example that objects, 
a, and states of affairs, a’s weighing less than 10 
pounds, will be confused with each other, there is no 
danger, when it comes to causation, that events and 
states of affairs will get confused with each other. To 
be more specific: 
 
The claim that event c caused event e in virtue of 
c’s having F does not imply that the state of 
affairs consisting of c’s having F caused e. 
(McLaughlin 1993: 34) 
 
 
So it turns out that C2 is not false, and that C1 and C2 
are in fact consistent with each other. Davidson is 
therefore not justified when he argues that it makes no 
sense to speak of an event’s properties making a causal 
difference.  
 
 
1.5 CONCLUSION 
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 I believe McLaughlin’s claim is persuasive. The 
Nomological Character of Causality (NCC) leads to 
epiphenomenalism because it stipulates that the only way 
something can be causally relevant is for it to be a 
physical property. Davidson denies this, but only because 
he mistakenly thinks that an extensionalist view of 
causation precludes properties from themselves playing a 
causal role. But McLaughlin shows why Davidson is 
incorrect. Indeed, this causes so much difficulty for 
Davidson that he is forced into the counterintuitive 
position of having to argue that properties can make a 
difference even though events don’t cause in virtue of 
their properties.  
 McLaughlin thinks that NCC is the culprit, since it 
holds that the only way something can be causally 
relevant is by falling under a physical type. Kim clearly 
holds on to NCC, or at least to the view that causation 
always involves the notion of kinds of events being in 
relation to each other. Thus he claims that questions of 
the form “What is it about events c and e that makes it 
the case that c is a cause of e?” can be answered by 
saying that “c is an event of kind F and e is one of kind 
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G (and, you may add if you favour a nomic conception of 
causality, there is a law of an appropriate form 
connecting F-events with G-events)” (Kim 1993a: 22). We 
do so because, according to Kim, we need to acknowledge 
that “the causal relation obtains between a pair of 
events because they are events of certain kinds, or have 
certain properties” (Kim 1993a: 22).  
 It now seems as if we are confronted with the 
following. The nonreductive physicalist who also holds 
that the mental is causally efficacious needs to show how 
it is that mental properties themselves can make a causal 
difference without at the same time rendering themselves 
reducible to physical properties. But so long as we hold 
onto NCC it will appear that this can’t be done. So if we 
hold onto NCC we are left with the following dilemma: 
either we treat the mental as causally efficacious and 
therefore give up our commitment to the idea that the 
mental realm is irreducible, sui generis, or we hold onto 
that latter notion, but jettison the intuition that our 
mental states are causally efficacious. Since both 
commitments are powerful ones, we are left with an 
intolerable situation. Whichever way we lean, it appears 
that we must sacrifice part of our commonsense conception 
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of the mental. I claim that we should accept both the 
intuitions that the mental is anomalous and that it is 
causally efficacious, but not in the Davidsonian way.  
I will take up the issue of NCC in detail by dealing with 
the problem of mental causation generated by the 
extrinsic nature of mental content and the one generated 
by the Exclusion Argument. I will claim that NCC is not 
something that we can tolerate in the course of dealing 
with the two problems. 
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CHAPTER 2 
The PROBLEM OF MENTAL CAUSATION ARISING FROM 
CONTENT EXTERNALISM 
 
 
 The central idea of content externalism is that the 
contents of mental states are not determined exclusively 
by what occurs in us but are determined in part by 
external states of affairs. Although there is still a 
debate whether externalism itself is true, a number of 
recent investigations have begun to explore the question 
of what follows if it is true. In this chapter I will 
deal with a tension that arises from content externalism. 
This is the problem resulting from the seeming conflict 
between the two claims, one that ordinary psychological 
states play causal roles in psychology in virtue of their 
contents, and the other, content externalism, that their 
contents are, in part, individuated by the nature of 
their referents: what causes me to drink water, it might 
be maintained, is some neurophysiological property of me; 
the fact that I am environmentally related to water and 
not to T-water bears no lawlike relationship with my 
action; if content properties enter into no genuine laws 
governing the causation of action, it may be argued, then 
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content-based explanations are not causal in nature. I 
will support the claim that beliefs and other mental 
states with widely individuated intentional contents play 
genuine causal roles in virtue of their contents in 
psychological causal explanations of behavior.  
 In section 2.1, I discuss Burge’s famous Twin-Earth 
thought experiment, the central aim of which is to show 
that content externalism is a metaphysical view about the 
nature of certain mental states — what having such states 
necessarily presupposes. In Chapter One I chose AM as an 
example of nonreductive physicalism. One of the reasons I 
chose AM is that it stands as one of the most worked out 
attempts to accommodate both of the ideas, the physical 
is primary but the mental is real and distinct from it, 
in one comprehensive account of the mental. As we saw, 
however, critics showed that the three principles 
Davidson used to elicit AM are not consistent; they 
showed AM to be committed to a version of 
epiphenomenalism. Those, like me, comfortable with the 
rejection of AM, however, still want to confer some kind 
of primacy to the physical without abandoning the 
autonomy of the mental. Because Davidson’s AM is a monism, 
claiming an identity between mental and physical events, 
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someone like Burge may view Davidson’s position as 
presupposing something against externalism.8 
 Before dealing with the issue between externalism 
and nonreductive physicalism, in section 2.2 I will 
present Davidson’s own brand of externalism and his 
rejection of Burge’s Twin-Earth thought experiment in 
general. In section 2.3 I will examine the debate between 
Davidson and Burge for the following reasons: (1) the 
result of the debate will strengthen my claim in Chapter 
One, that AM is committed to the epiphenomenalism of the 
mental, and therefore that NCC should be rejected; and 
(2) the debate helps to elucidate content externalism in 
general. I present Burge’s argument against the token 
identity thesis (1993; 1979). Burge attacks Davidson by 
arguing that Davidson cannot consistently hold both AM 
and content externalism. Davidson attempts to show that 
this is not the case by introducing his so-called Sunburn 
Argument. In this section I will argue that the Sunburn 
Argument does not work. As a result of the argument 
against the token identity thesis, Burge rejects NCC. 
                                                 
8 As I will mention in section 2.2 Davidson’s own brand of 
externalism differs in relevant ways from what has been generally 
called “externalism,” particularly that of Tyler Burge. It is indeed 
an interesting matter to see whether Davidson’s externalism is 
compatible with content externalism. The issue is complex, and 
requires more development than I can undertake in this work. 
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Burge claims that we do not know and cannot know a priori 
that causal statements entail the existence of strict 
laws. There is no reason to think that unless mental 
causation is just physical causation it would interfere 
with physical processes. 
 Section 2.4 is the main section of this chapter. It 
contains debates between Burge and Fodor. By examining 
the debates I argue that there is no a priori reason why 
so-called “wide” contents do not or cannot play causal 
roles in psychological explanations of behavior, and show 
how they might do so by noting that wide contents are 
among the properties we ordinarily cite to explain our 
behavior.  
The final section, section 2.5, presents one 
interesting result I elicit from both debates, one 
between Burge and Fodor and the other between Burge and 
Davidson. It is the rejection of the Principle of the 
Nomological Character of Causality, one of three premises 
Davidson takes to be true to argue for AM. In fact if 
there is no good reason to accept NCC, it follows, I 
argue, that content externalism is compatible with the 
causal efficacy of the mental. In Chapter Three I will 
show that the solution to the Exclusion Argument can be 
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reached by rejecting the Causal Inheritance Principle 
(CIP). We will see that the rejection of CIP actually 
implies that NCC is in fact wrong. 
 
2.1 BURGE’S EXTERNALISM 
 
 
 Burge’s thought experiment is designed to show that 
so-called “anti-individualism”9 is a metaphysical view 
about the nature of certain mental states — what having 
such states necessarily presupposes. Burge’s conclusion 
rests on a three-step thought experiment. In this section 
I will deal with each of these steps in detail in order 
to better understand two issues, implicit in externalism: 
the issue of the compatibility of externalism with the 
token identity thesis (section 2.3); and the 
compatibility of externalism with the causal efficacy of 
the mental (section 2.4). After introducing the thought 
experiment, I will deal with the criticism of it, the 
reinterpretation strategy, but I contend that it does not 
succeed in rebuking the thought experiment.  
 In order to establish anti-individualism, Burge 
employs the following three-step thought experiment. To 
                                                 
9 I use “externalism” and “anti-individualism” interchangeably. 
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begin, Burge asks us to imagine a case of incomplete 
understanding in which an individual misconstrues 
(incompletely or partially understands) some notion 
putatively involved in the contents of some of his 
thoughts (step 1). In the next step (step 2), we consider 
a counterfactual supposition. We hold the actual 
individual’s life history (asocially, non-relationally 
and non-intentionally described) and physiology constant, 
and suppose that the linguistic practices of the counter-
factual community are such that the individual’s actual 
incomplete understanding of the particular notion now 
reflects complete understanding, as determined by his 
(counterfactual) linguistic community (i.e., his use of 
the relevant term accords with the counterfactual 
community’s linguistic conventions). The final step (step 
3) involves an interpretation of the thought experiment. 
 In the first step of the thought experiment, Burge 
asks us to imagine Bert, in our actual world, whose 
understanding of the concept arthritis is partially 
ignorant or mistaken about the application conditions of 
the concept. He takes the concept to refer to 
inflammations of bones as well as joints. In other words 
his understanding of the concept is incomplete. Even if 
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this is so, Bert has many true beliefs about arthritis, 
which are correctly attributed by means of “that” clauses 
containing the term “arthritis.” For instance, Bert 
believes that he has had arthritis for many years; that 
the arthritis in his wrists and fingers is more painful 
than the arthritis in his ankles, and so on. When 
suffering pain in his thigh, though, Bert sincerely 
complains to his doctor at a certain time t, “I have 
arthritis in my thigh.” The doctor corrects him and 
informs him that he cannot have arthritis in his thigh, 
because arthritis is, by definition, a disease of the 
joints only. Although the belief is false, it seems that 
we can truly describe Bert’s propositional attitude as 
the belief that he has arthritis in his thigh.10 
 In the second step Burge asks us to imagine a 
counterfactual situation in which Bert’s physical history 
and intentional phenomena, individualistically described, 
are assumed to be the same up through the time t, but in 
which the term “arthritis” also applies to inflammations 
of the thigh. Let’s call him T-Bert. The counterfactual 
situation differs only in that the correct, standard use 
                                                 
10 The correct understanding of the issue is important to understand 
the debate between Burge and Davidson and I will take up the issue  
in detail when I am dealing with the debate.  
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of “arthritis” encompasses Bert’s misuse. The twins have 
the same dispositions to assent to, or deny, the 
sentences “I have arthritis in my thigh.” 
 Burge claims that in the counterfactual case we 
cannot correctly ascribe a belief to T-Bert with a that-
clause containing our term “arthritis,” because the 
counterfactual expression “arthritis” differs both in 
dictionary definition and in extension from “arthritis” 
as we use it. That is, “arthritis” in the counterfactual 
situation is not extensionally equivalent to “arthritis” 
in the actual situation (Burge 1979: 79). This difference, 
Burge claims, stems from social factors that are 
independent of the individual. The individual has the 
same physical history and intentional phenomena, 
individualistically described, in the actual situation as 
his twin does in the counterfactual situation, yet the 
contents of the twin’s attitudes differ. T-Bert would 
lack beliefs involving the concept of arthritis; his 
belief would be said to involve the concept of, say, T-
arthritis.  
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 Given the non-indexical nature11 of the twins’ 
concepts, they have different concepts about these 
referents. Taken in isolation from the linguistic 
community, there is no way to distinguish Burt’s belief 
and T-Burt’s belief. Yet, we seem to be committed to the 
claim that the beliefs are different, simply in virtue of 
the fact that the beliefs are about different things – 
arthritis and T-arthritis. Given that sameness of truth-
value is a necessary condition for whether beliefs are 
identical, the belief expressed by “I have arthritis in 
my thigh” in the actual situation is different from the 
belief expressed by a token of the same sentence type in 
the counterfactual community. For in the actual community 
the belief expressed is false, whereas in the 
counterfactual community it is true. 
 Let me explain this in detail. We ordinarily 
identify the contents of mental states semantically by 
using a complex sentence of the form “Subject A Φ-es that 
p,” where “Φ” stands for a psychological verb, and “p” 
                                                 
11 If the concepts are indexical in nature, the twins’ concepts may 
shift from actual situation to counterfactual situation since an 
indexical’s referent is determined, in part, by extra-linguistic 
context, and therefore vary from context to context; indexicals are 
context-sensitive. However since the relevant concept in question is 
non-indexical, the difference in referents in the two circumstances 
entails that the twins have different concepts about these referents. 
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stands for a that-clause. The that-clause specifies what 
the mental state is about; it gives the content of the 
state. Thus, mental states are ordinarily understood to 
be content-individuated states. If beliefs and other 
propositional attitudes are identified and individuated 
by semantic content, and if semantic content is 
individuated in terms of their referents or truth 
conditions, then mental states must also be individuated 
in terms of their referents or truth conditions. 
 The specific issue of importance to us concerns the 
individuation of mental states, or the conditions under 
which mental states should count as the same or different 
in kind. On a very rough and practical level, mental 
state individuation would seem to be relatively 
unproblematic. Your belief that it is raining is 
different from my belief that I am going to play tennis, 
whereas your belief that 2 plus 2 is four and my belief 
that 2 plus 2 is four are clearly, in some intuitive 
sense, the same belief. The difficulties arise when we 
try to articulate the general conditions for beliefs 
being the same or different. At the most general level, 
there are two opposed positions with respect to the 
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individuation of psychological states: individualism and 
anti-individualism. 
Now Burge’s argument begins with the widely-held 
assumption that content clauses do not freely admit 
substitution of co-referring or co-extensive expressions 
without the possibility of changing the truth value of 
the containing sentence. Content clauses of propositional 
attitude ascriptions have traditionally been taken as a 
primary means of identifying a subject’s intentional 
mental states. The motivation for this assumption is that 
we cannot, in general, substitute co-referring or co-
extensive expressions within embedded content clauses so 
as to preserve the truth value of the containing sentence. 
Burge’s line of reasoning exploits this assumption. 
Surely, he says, if ever co-referring expressions in 
oblique position12 can indicate different thoughts, then 
it is simply undeniable that obliquely occurring 
expressions that are not extensionally equivalent 
indicate different thoughts. Burge says:  
 
It is normal to suppose that those content clauses 
correctly ascribable to a person that are not in 
                                                 
12 I will speak of a belief attribution’s being “oblique” when the 
terms in a that-clause are not open to substitution by co-
referential expressions salva veritate. 
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general intersubstitutable salva veritate – and 
certainly those that involve extensionally 
nonequivalent counterpart expressions – identify 
different mental states or events.(1979: 76) 
 
 
This claim figures in Burge’s thought experiments in that 
content clauses that are taken to give the attitudes of 
the individual, actually and counterfactually described, 
contain obliquely occurring expressions that are non-co-
extensive in the languages in the respective communities. 
Burge puts this point as follows:  
 
On any systematic theory, differences in the 
extension - the actual denotation, referent, or 
application - of counterpart expressions in that-
clauses will be semantically represented, and will, 
in our terms, make for differences in content. 
(1979: 75) 
 
 
On Burge’s view, extensionally non-equivalent component 
parts of obliquely occurring content clauses clearly call 
for attribution of different attitudes.13 
 Let us now return to the thought experiment. In the 
final step the interpretation of the thought experiments 
is presented. The twins’ having different mental states 
clearly comes from differences in their respective social 
                                                 
13 According to Fodor’s psychological taxonomy, mental states of the 
twins are the same. The psychological taxonomy should individuate 
the attitudes non-relationally. See Fodor 1987. We will deal with 
this important issue in section 2.4. 
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circumstances. The different social environments 
connecting the twins to different syndromes of disease 
necessitate that they have different beliefs with 
different conceptual contents. The important point to 
bear in mind is that even though Bert in the actual 
situation does not have complete linguistic mastery of a 
word “arthritis,” he can employ the concept it expresses 
in his thought. Burge does not think that Bert fails to 
grasp the concept of arthritis. Burge writes, “[S]uch 
errors do not always or automatically prevent attribution 
of mental content provided by the very terms that are 
incompletely understood or misapplied” (1979: 90).14 
 According to Burge, “The argument can get under way 
in any case where it is intuitively possible to attribute 
a mental state or event whose content involves a notion 
that the subject incompletely understands … This 
possibility is the key to the thought experiment” (1979: 
32). In oblique position, an attitude attribution 
containing the term “arthritis” in the content clause can 
be made to Bert despite the fact that he has an 
incomplete understanding of the concept of arthritis. On 
                                                 
14 Davidson clearly rejects this interpretation. This will be 
examined in section 2.3 in detail.  
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Burge’s view, even though the individual only 
incompletely understands the concept of arthritis, it is 
still proper to say that he possesses the concept of 
arthritis. He is taken to have a grasp, even though it 
may be incomplete, of the concept of arthritis.  
 Of course Burge acknowledges that there are some 
situations in which we do not accord a subject’s words 
their customary interpretation.15 A subject, however, can 
be said to possess a concept just in case his use of (and 
dispositions to use) a term which expresses that concept 
are not too deviant, relative to the linguistic 
conventions of his community, so as to force 
reinterpretation of the sentences he utters (or would be 
disposed to utter) which contain that term. The range of 
“too deviant” depends on a subject’s attitude; whether he 
is willing to have his words construed according to the 
socially accepted meaning, even though this requires him, 
in the situation in question, to accept that he said and 
                                                 
15 The cases he mentions include those in which the speaker is a 
child, a foreigner, a speaker of a dialect, or the victim of a slip 
of the tongue. Here the subject either does not have full command of 
our standards of usage (child, foreigner), is not bound by them 
(dialect), or has full command but fails to manifest it because of a 
performance error (slip of the tongue). In each case the subject is 
excused from being taken at his or her word; it is assumed that the 
speaker did not say what they meant, or did not mean what they said 
except in the dialect case, where the subject did not say what we 
thought he said. 
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believed something wrong. Burge argues that the appeal to 
reinterpretation in the case we are discussing is not 
supported by the ordinary practice of mentalistic 
attributions. Common practice and our ordinary linguistic 
intuitions, he says, reveal that incomplete understanding 
of the meaning of a term in the common language is not 
incompatible with ascription of mental contents involving 
that term, literally interpreted, which is to say 
interpreted in accordance with common linguistic practice. 
 Burge considers two general strategies for 
reinterpreting the thought experiments, and criticizes 
these methods of reinterpretation. The first strategy he 
considers for reinterpreting the thought experiments is 
the attempt to motivate a non-literal reading of the 
sentence that the individual uses to express his belief, 
which directly displays the subject’s incomplete 
understanding. The second general strategy16 for 
                                                 
16 In his 1979 Burge deals with four methods that are supposed to 
provide an alternative interpretation of the thought experiments. 
The first method for reinterpreting the thought experiment that 
Burge considers involves an appeal to de re beliefs. On Burge’s view, 
a de re belief is a belief which relates an individual to an actual 
object. The second method of reinterpreting the thought experiment 
holds that in cases of incomplete understanding, the content of the 
individual’s attitude is indefinite. The third method is called 
“object-level” method of reinterpretation, of which Burge says, “One 
is to attribute a notion that just captures the misconception, thus 
replacing contents that are apparently false on account of the 
misconception, by true contents” (1979: 93). The last, closely 
 48
reinterpreting the thought experiments that Burge 
considers attempts to sever the connection between the 
contents of the subject’s attitudes and the proposition 
expressed by the sentences which are used to attribute 
the contents. 
 The problem these reinterpretation strategies 
present for Burge’s argument is that if the sentence the 
subject uses contains words that we know he doesn’t fully 
understand, then that sentence should not be understood 
literally. If this were the case, it would not be correct 
to say that the subject’s belief is false. And recall, 
Burge’s grounds for distinguishing the actual 
individual’s belief from the counterfactual individual’s 
belief is that they differ in truth value.  
 Burge’s criticism of these methods of 
reinterpretation is based on two general claims. First, 
Burge says, the methods fail to account for the practice 
of ordinary mentalistic attributions (what we typically 
say and do when we catch others using words incorrectly). 
And second, the reinterpretations urged by the methods 
                                                                                                                                           
related, method of reinterpreting the thought experiments, the 
“metalinguistic” method, proceeds from the claim that the 
individual’s incomplete understanding is more accurately described 
as a metalinguistic error. This method attempts to account for the 
individual’s misuse of the particular term. 
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are not supported by what the individual would say and do 
when he realizes that he had been using the particular 
term incorrectly. 
 To begin with the first of these claims, Burge’s 
view is that we do not typically (in ordinary practice) 
search for true object-level contents, nor do we 
ordinarily suppose that all of the individual’s attitudes 
involving the misconstrued term involve reference to 
expression at the metalinguistic level. Burge’s second 
general claim is that the metalinguistic and the object-
level methods of reinterpretation are committed to a 
highly implausible account of how the individual would 
react when he discovers that he had been using a term 
incorrectly. When, for example, the subject learns what 
arthritis is, he does not, Burge contends, typically 
respond by saying that his views have been misunderstood. 
Rather, the individual is typically willing to revise his 
use of the term on the authority of an expert or a 
reliable source. Moreover, the individual typically 
admits that the belief he had expressed by saying “I have 
arthritis in my thigh” was false. This suggests that the 
individual intended to have his words taken literally. 
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2.2 DAVIDSON’S EXTERNALISM 
 
 In this section I will introduce Davidson’s so-
called triangular externalism in order to clearly see the 
debate between Burge and Davidson in the next section.   
 Davidson’s own brand of externalism differs in 
relevant ways from what has been generally called 
“externalism,” particularly that of Tyler Burge. Davidson 
does not rely on Twin-Earth thought experiments to 
establish his variety of externalism. Rather, Davidson 
motivates his triangular externalism by appealing 
directly to facts about language learning and 
considerations about how we interpret words and languages 
with which we are unfamiliar. Davidson thus thinks that 
the thesis of the external individuation and constitution 
of thoughts is a direct consequence of the way the basic 
connection between words and things or thoughts and world 
is established. 
 Davidson agrees with Burge that externalism is not 
restricted to natural kind terms, but extends to language 
and thought generally. Davidson also accepts the 
externalist thesis that our mental contents are 
externally determined. He concurs with Burge that two 
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thinkers may be alike in all relevant physical respects 
and yet differ in their ordinary psychological states, 
for instance, they may mean quite different things with 
the word “water” (Davidson 1988).17 
 Davidson, however, doesn’t accept the particular way 
in which Burge thinks external factors are relevant to 
the individuation of content. Davidson provides three 
main reasons why he rejects Burge’s social externalism 
(1991: 198-9): first, it seems to be unintuitive to 
elicit speaker’s meaning from an elite usage; second, if 
speaker’s meaning is determined in terms of what other 
people in the community would mean by the same words, 
then first person authority necessarily lapses; third, 
Davidson distrusts thought experiments because they are 
impractical. 
 Davidson thinks it is wrong to hold the idea that as 
speakers we have an obligation to the language, or the 
community, or our audience, to speak according to some 
standard. Whether or not Burge actually holds this idea, 
this is the way Davidson interprets Burge. Within the 
                                                 
17 Davidson has not explicitly argued why he would not allow local 
supervenience. He seems to reject local supervenience after taking 
Burge’s thought experiments seriously; the explicit expression that 
he does not allow local supervenience first appeared in his 1987. 
This important issue will be emphasized when I deal with the Sunburn 
Argument.  
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Davidsonian picture, such obligations, though they 
sometimes exist, are irrelevant to communication, because 
the crucial point for Davidson is for the speaker 
necessarily to intend to speak in a way that will be 
understood along the intention. For Davidson the only 
interesting concept of meaning must derive from cases of 
successful communication. Successful communication, 
Davidson claims, cannot be defined in terms of shared 
meanings, practices or conventions. 
 The problem with Burge’s social externalism, 
according to Davidson, is that it allows public 
conventions to determine content. This seems to make 
content independent of the speaker’s intentions. 
Davidson’s claim is that intentional states, such as 
belief and desires, are individuated by causal relations 
to objects in the world. In determining the concepts and 
thoughts of an individual, Davidson rejects Burge’s 
externalism and the normative role of the linguistic 
community. His reason for this is that what determines 
the possession of a concept is not membership in a 
particular linguistic community, but the acquisition of a 
disposition through causal contact with objects and 
events in a social setting. On Davidson’s view the 
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differences in meanings and psychological states, 
discussed by Burge, result from the history of causal 
relations between the individual thinker, others with 
whom he communicates, and the natural environment 
(Davidson 1991: 203-204). 
The triangle between teacher, learner, and 
environment is basic to learning a language and to 
interpreting the thoughts and meanings of others.18 While 
Davidson agrees that two thinkers may be in type-
identical physical states and still think different 
“water” thoughts, he emphasizes that there is a 
difference in the causal history of the respective 
thoughts, e.g., the two thinkers learned the word form 
“water” in different natural and social settings.  
 
[The basic connection between words and things] is 
established by causal interactions between people 
and parts and aspects of the world. The disposition 
to react differentially to objects and events thus 
set up are central to the correct interpretation of 
a person’s thoughts and speech. If this were not the 
case, we would have no way of discovering what 
others think, or what they mean by their words. The 
principle is as obvious and simple as this; a 
sentence someone is inspired (caused) to hold true 
                                                 
18 The social and non-social aspects of Davidson’s externalism are 
not independent of one another in that both result from the way the 
basic connection between words and things and thoughts and speech is 
established in the triangulation of speaker, others with whom she 
interacts, and objects and events in the environment. 
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by and only by sightings of the moon is apt to mean 
something like ‘There’s the moon’; the thought 
expressed is apt to be that the moon is there; the 
thought inspired by and only by sightings of the 
moon is apt to be the thought that the moon is 
there … Not that all words and sentences are this 
directly conditioned to what they are about; we can 
perfectly well learn to use the word ‘moon’ without 
ever seeing it. The claim is that all thought and 
language must have a foundation in such direct 
historical connections, and these connections 
constrain the interpretation of thoughts and speech. 
Perhaps I should stress that the argument for this 
claim does not rest on intuitions concerning what we 
would say if certain counterfactuals were true. No 
science fiction or thought experiments are required. 
(Davidson 1987: 29) 
 
 
Davidson thus traces the individuation of meanings, 
concepts and mental states like beliefs to patterns of 
causal interactions in the triangulation of the 
individual, other speakers with whom he or she interacts, 
and objects and events in the world. These patterns of 
causal interactions are not determined by the world 
itself or by the norms of a linguistic community, but by 
the contextual and social use of words to apply to 
objects and events.  
Davidson’s triangular externalism differs from 
Burge’s anti-individualism with respect to how the 
contents of propositional attitudes are externally 
individuated. While Davidson agrees with Burge that 
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social factors play a role in the external individuation 
of mental contents, he locates the social factors 
involved in “the causal nexus that includes the interplay 
between persons and the rest of nature” (Davison 1991: 
201).  
 
 
2.3 EXTERNALISM AND TOKEN IDENTITY: BURGE AND 
DAVIDSON 
 
 
 Some philosophers give an argument, claiming that if 
our mental states do not supervene on properties 
intrinsic to our bodies, then all versions of psycho-
physical identity theory seem to be threatened. This was 
first pointed out by Burge (1979), among others. Davidson 
does not think that his AM is open to the threat from 
externalism. In this section I will examine the debate 
between Davidson and Burge on the issue whether 
Davidson’s AM is compatible with content externalism. The 
purpose for looking at the debate is, first, to 
strengthen the claim that AM is wrong, and therefore that 
NCC should be rejected, and second, to help elucidate 
content externalism in general which has a lot of 
implications on the issues in the following chapters. 
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 I will present Burge’s argument against the token 
identity thesis and Davidson’s response, the so-called 
Sunburn Argument, to Burge. Burge’s strategy is to show 
that AM is incompatible with content externalism. I argue 
that Davidson does not succeed in showing that AM is 
compatible with content externalism. 
 The following is Burge’s argument against the token 
identity thesis. Take any physical event-token p 
correlated with a subject while she thinks that arthritis 
is a painful disease: p is a plausible candidate for 
identification with a mental event m, thinking that 
arthritis is a painful disease, and is specifiable by 
physical sciences such as physics, chemistry, and 
neurophysiology. Burge’s thought experiment shows that it 
is possible for a subject to think a thought with 
different contents, m*, even though the same event-token 
p occur in the subject’s body: for example, in the 
counterfactual situation the same event-token p occurs 
without her having any thought, m, that arthritis is a 
painful disease; p could occurs with her having the 
thought, m*, that T-arthritis is a painful disease.19 
                                                 
19 Burge says that this possibility is not entailed by his thought 
experiments, even though it is strongly suggested (Burge 1993: 105). 
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However any occurrence of thought could not have a 
different content and be the very same token event: a 
thought with the intentional content m and a thought with 
the intentional content m* cannot be the very same event-
token. Therefore it is not the case that p is m because p 
could occur without m occurring: the same event-token p 
is not the subject’s thought that arthritis is a painful 
disease (1993: 104-113; 1979: 110-111).20 
 From the argument against the token identity thesis, 
Burge rejects NCC. Burge claims that we do not know and 
cannot know a priori that causal statements entail the 
existence of strict laws. Unless mental causation is just 
physical causation there is no reason to think that it 
would interfere with physical processes. To think this is 
already to think of mental causation on a physical model, 
                                                                                                                                           
The reason for Burge to say that it’s not entailed can be seen in 
his 1989 paper:  
 
[The anti-individualistic] conception does not entail that two 
individuals’ mental kinds might differ while relevantly 
corresponding brain states and events remain type-identical. 
Failure of supervenience of an individual’s mental kinds on 
his neural kinds follows only if relevant differences in the 
environment do not necessitate differences in the individual’s 
underlying brain states. (1989: 305) 
 
Now we can conceive that Burge’s arthritis thought experiment is the 
case that the relevant social difference does not necessitate 
differences in the individual’s underlying brain states. 
20 Here one of the premises was that p is a plausible candidate for 
identification with a mental event m, but we found that the premise 
is false: p cannot be m.  
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which there is no reason to do. Interference would be 
surprising. So non-interference is in no need of 
explanation in ontological terms. 
In the face of Burge’s attack on this matter, 
Davidson presents the Sunburn Argument. The argument 
tries to show that there is no incompatibility between 
externalism and AM. The argument goes as follows: 
 
[The Sunburn Argument]  
I Two individuals’ mental kinds might differ 
while relevantly corresponding brain states and 
events remain type-identical. 
II Identifying a condition as sunburn does not 
mean that a sunburn is not a state of the skin. 
III Mental states are like sunburn in the above 
respect. 
Therefore, 
IV Mental states can be token-identical with 
physical states with a person. 
 
 
Just as identifying a condition as a sunburn does not 
mean that a sunburn is not a state of the skin, so 
identifying mental states by external factors does not 
entail that they are not states of the head. Davidson 
claims that though the sunburned skin and the skin burned 
by a sunlamp may be indistinguishable, still it does not 
follow that two states (sunburn and sunlamp-burn) are the 
same. It is because one state is from the sun and the 
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other sunlamp. With regard to this, mental states are 
just like sunburn. He writes: 
 
There may be no physical difference between being 
 sunburned and being burned by a sunlamp, but there 
 is a difference, since one state was and the other 
 was not caused by the sun. Psychological states are 
 in this respect like sunburn. (1988: 49) 
 
Even if we need to appeal to the extrinsic causes of the 
respective skin conditions in order to individuate them 
as being sunburn and sunlamp-burn, this doesn’t mean that 
they aren’t conditions of the skin. To say that a 
condition of one’s skin – say, a sunburn – supervenes on 
what caused it, does not entail that the condition is not 
“in” one’s skin. This point is the gist of the Sunburn 
Argument. Davidson claims that the alleged difficulty 
stems from unquestioned assumptions, namely, “If a 
thought is identified by a relation to something outside 
the head, it isn't wholly in the head. (It ain't in the 
head.)” (1987: 31) Mental states can be regarded to be 
physical states of a person, yet to be causally dependent 
on factors external to that person’s body. The 
externalist, Davidson says, can thus claim that mental 
states are identical with physical states of a person, 
but that they are causally dependent on factors outside 
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the person’s body. Davidson writes, “This is enough to 
show that an appreciation of the external factors that 
enter into our common ways of identifying mental states 
does not discredit an identity theory of the mental and 
the physical” (1987: 31-2). 
 Now I attack Davidson’s Sunburn Argument for the 
following reasons, which are closely interrelated with 
each other. First, it is not clear why Davidson claims 
the first premise, the failure of local supervenience in 
the Sunburn Argument. Second, the analogy does not work, 
therefore, the third premise is wrong. Third, and the 
most important, if the Sunburn Argument works we lose 
global supervenience. Before we turn to the discussion of 
the three reasons, let me emphasize on three points. 
First, Davidson does not use counterfactual situations to 
establish his externalism. Second, Davidson rejects 
Burge’s first step of thought experiment. And third, 
Davidson rejects Burge’s Twin-Earth thought experiments 
in general. I will mention the last two points in detail. 
Let me explain the last point first. It is clear 
that Davidson does not (and of course, need not) follow, 
in a step-by-step way, Burge’s argument against the token 
identity thesis in order to show that AM is compatible 
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with content externalism. For example, Davidson says, “I 
have a general distrust of thought experiments that 
pretend to reveal what we would say under conditions that 
in fact never arise” (1991: 199). He does not buy the 
specific procedure that Burge takes, though he favors 
some kind of externalism as we saw in the previous 
section. The following passage shows that Davidson 
rejects Burge’s Twin-Earth thought experiments in 
general:  
 
[I]f Burge is right, then whenever a person is wrong, 
confused, or partially misinformed, about the public 
meaning of a word, he is wrong, confused, or 
partially misinformed about any of his beliefs that 
are (or would be?) expressed by using that word. 
Since such ‘partial understanding’ is ‘common or 
even normal in the case of a large number of 
expressions in our vocabularies’ according to Burge, 
it must be equally common or normal for us to be 
wrong about what we believe … I must reject some 
premise of Burge’s21. I agree that what I mean and 
think is not ‘fixed’ (exclusively) by what goes on 
in me, so what I must reject is Burge’s account of 
                                                 
21 One of the reasons Davidson thinks he should reject Burge’s social 
externalism is that it is not compatible with the presumption that 
we have first person authority. So for example, Davidson claims in 
another place that “there is a conflict between Burge’s social 
externalism, which ties a speaker’s meaning to an elite usage he may 
not be aware of, and first person authority.” (1991: 199). However, 
this reason is not persuasive. Burge, in his 1988 paper, actually 
argues, I believe successfully, that there is no conflict between 
anti-individualism and first person authority. 
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how social and other external factors control the 
contents of a person’s mind. (Davidson 1987: 26-27) 
 
 
 Now let’s take a look at the second point that 
Davidson rejects Burge’s first step of thought experiment. 
In the “arthritis” thought experiment, Burge claims that 
Bert’s incomplete linguistic mastery of a word 
“arthritis” does not prevent him from employing the 
concept it expresses in his thought. As we already saw, 
Burge does not think that Bert fails to grasp the concept 
of arthritis. Burge believes that the doctor and patient 
can share beliefs like the belief that arthritis is a 
painful disease, and thus can share the concept of 
arthritis. They can do this even though the patient is 
mistaken about some fundamental features of arthritis and 
has vastly less background knowledge than the doctor. 
However, Davidson rejects this construal of Burge’s 
explanation about incomplete understanding. According to 
Davidson, there is a relevant difference in the thoughts 
between Bert and a doctor who has a full mastery of the 
concept arthritis (1987: 27). Davidson does not say very 
much on this except appealing to holism about belief and 
the uncontroversial point that Bert would associate 
arthritis with different background beliefs and 
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inferences from someone who knows that arthritis can 
occur only in joints. He holds that the error is a 
metalinguistic one about the dictionary meaning of the 
word “arthritis.” The point, however, is that there is a 
difference between the “concept” or its linguistic 
counterpart “translational meaning” and the “the 
conceptual explication” or “explicational meaning” (Burge 
1989: 180-7). The latter is subject to correction or 
confirmation by empirical consideration of the referents. 
Burge thinks that Davidson makes a mistake in failing to 
recognize the difference between being able to understand 
well enough (the former), and being able to give a 
correct explication (the latter). 
 Now we are in a position to attack the Sunburn 
Argument. In the previous section I mentioned that 
Davidson’s own brand of externalism differs from that of 
Burge. Davidson affirms the idea that mental states 
supervene globally on physical states of a person and 
factors in the environment. 
 
[S]ubjective states are not supervenient on the 
state of the brain or nervous system: two people may 
be in the same physical state and yet be in 
different psychological states. This does not mean, 
of course, that mental states are not supervenient 
on physical states, for there must be a difference 
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somewhere if psychological states are different. The 
interesting physical difference may not be in the 
person; like the difference between water and twater, 
it may be (we are supposing) elsewhere. (Davidson 
1989:61-62) 
 
Davidson’s point of using the “Sunburn” analogy is that 
the conditions such as sunburn similarly supervene on 
physical properties of the skin and the extrinsic causal 
conditions. However, he does not give an argument why he 
accepts the result of Burge’s thought experiment, namely 
the first premise of the Sunburn Argument. Davidson has 
not explained why he rejects local supervenience22. 
 In several places he says that two people may be in 
the same physical state but differ in what they think. 
This is the first premise of the Sunburn Argument. 
Davidson just accepts the result of Burge’s thought 
experiments. But what is Davidson’s argument for the 
failure of local supervenience since he generally 
distrusts Burge’s thought experiments? Without a 
counterfactual supposition, or a science fiction if I use 
Davidson’s terminology, we cannot imagine, practically 
speaking, again if I use Davidson’s terminology, the 
                                                 
22 Davidson’s triangular externalism is not enough to establish the 
failure of local supervenience.  
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situation that two people are the same in all physical 
respects. 
 The above discussion naturally leads to the second 
reason against the Sunburn Argument. The Sunburn Argument 
concentrates on the analogy of sunburned states with 
mental states. However, we don’t see any convincing 
reason to take the analogy. On the other hand we have 
every reason to reject the analogy. Burge thinks, I 
believe wrongly, that Davidson’s Sunburn Argument shows 
that the difference in causal histories between the twins 
would necessitate a difference in the physical states of 
the twins. Therefore Burge thinks that the Twin-Earth 
cases would never illustrate a case in which the internal 
physical states of the twins would be the same while the 
mental states differed. The following remark by Burge 
confirms my interpretation. After he asks whether it 
makes sense to individuate brain states depending on 
causal histories, he says: 
 
There certainly are physical differences between 
actual and counterfactual situations in the relevant 
thought experiments. The question is whether there 
are always physically different entities that are 
plausible candidates for being identical with the 
different mental events or state-instances. The 
different physical causal histories are not 
plausible candidates. These histories do not have 
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the same causes or effects that the relevant mental 
events (states) do. Moreover, it is doubtful that 
relevantly described causal histories instantiate 
explanatory natural kinds in any of the physical 
sciences. … What is objectionable about this view is 
that it makes the individuation of brain events 
depend on matters that are irrelevant to the 
physiology of the brain. (1993: 106-107) 
 
 
He wrongly believes Davidson claims that the different 
causal histories of sunburn and sunlamp-burn would make a 
difference in the physical entities. Even though Burge is 
wrong on this, his argument still works: The Sunburn 
Argument does not save Davidson’s AM.  
 Now let us return to the second reason again. If the 
case of sunburn and sunlamp-burn is a case that shows 
that local supervenience fails as Davidson thinks it does, 
then there is no physical difference in the persons that 
have sunburn and sunlamp-burn. Then the physical 
difference should be elsewhere. Davidson says, “The 
interesting physical difference may not be in the person; 
like the difference between water and twater, it may be 
(we are supposing) elsewhere” (Davidson 1989:62). However 
now it is difficult to imagine where is the interesting 
physical difference if not in the person in the case of 
sunburn and sunlamp-burn. If we accept Davidson’s Sunburn 
Argument, the difference in causal histories between the 
 67
twins would necessitate a difference in the twins’ mental 
states while physical states of the twins plus the 
physical world are the same. In order for the analogy to 
work the internal physical states between sunburned skin 
and the skin burned by a sunlamp would be the same while 
the interesting physical difference would be elsewhere, 
somewhere in the physical world: even though local 
supervenience fails, global supervenience should work. 
 This discussion now leads to the third reason to 
argue against the Sunburn Argument. How is the physical 
world somewhere else different? The difference in causal 
histories between sunburn and sunlamp-burn would never 
necessitate a difference in the physical world. A 
disastrous result! Even global supervenience fails in the 
Sunburn Argument. Let’s take a look the following remark 
of Davidson:  
 
People who are in all relevant physical respects 
similar can differ in what they mean or think, just 
as they can differ in being grandfathers or being 
sunburned. But of course there is something 
different about them, even in the physical world; 
their causal histories are different, and they are 
discrete physical objects. We are therefore free to 
hold that people can be in all relevant physical 
respects identical (identical in ‘necktie sense’) 
while differing psychologically. (1989) 
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Now this remark is very confusing. As I said without 
supposing the counterfactual situation there is no point 
of introducing two physically similar people. Davidson 
says that he is able to argue for the failure of local 
supervenience, i.e. the possibility that two thinkers may 
be in type-identical physical states and still think 
differently, without requiring the counterfactual thought 
experiment. However, the whole point is that we cannot 
just assume in this world that there are two people 
exactly in the same physical states. More importantly, in 
this world there is just one global supervenience base. 
Of course sunburn and sunlamp-burn have different causal 
histories, but sunburn and sunlamp-burn has the same, one, 
global supervenience base. Then global supervenience 
fails in the Sunburn Argument.  
 
2.4 CAUSAL EFFICACY OF EXTERNALLY INDIVIDUATED 
MENTAL CONTENT: BURGE VS. FODOR 
 
 In this section I begin examining specific arguments 
against the causal efficacy of externalistic mental 
states. This is a question about how propositional 
attitude states, externally individuated, can enter into 
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true causal explanations of action. I will support the 
claim that beliefs and other mental states with widely 
individuated intentional contents play genuine causal 
roles in virtue of their contents in psychological causal 
explanations of behavior. I present Fodor’s challenge, by 
examining his Cross-Context Argument, an argument that 
externalism eliminates the causal relevance of the mental, 
and I provide some possible responses for nonreductive 
physicalism. 
 The Cross-Context Argument is designed to show that 
externally individuated contents are not causally 
efficacious. In his 1987, Fodor argues that we would 
judge that the effects of distinct wide contents in the 
same context would be the same. He says, “[I]dentity of 
causal powers has to be assessed across contexts, not 
within contexts” (1987: 35). To individuate across 
contexts is to make judgments of sameness and difference 
while keeping contexts constant. The following is the 
good example to illustrate this point. It is true that as 
the effect of my utterance “water” I get water and the 
effect of my Twin’s saying “water” my Twin gets T-water. 
But, Fodor claims, these effects of our causal powers 
only differ because they occur in different contexts, and 
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we cannot conclude anything about the sameness or 
difference of our causal powers based on differences in 
effects that occur in different contexts. The criteria 
for determining the identity of causal powers are as 
follows: 
 
(a) if his utterance (/thought) had occurred in my 
context, it would have had the effects that my 
utterance (/thought) did have; and (b) if my 
utterance (/thought) had occurred in his context, it 
would have had the effects that his utterance 
(/thought) did have. For our utterances (/thoughts) 
to have the same causal powers, both of these 
counterfactuals have to be true. But both of these 
counterfactuals are true, since (for example) if I 
had said “Bring water!” on Twin-Earth, it’s XYZ that 
my interlocutors would have brought; and if he had 
said “Bring water!” here, his interlocutors would 
have brought him H2O. (Fodor 1987: 35)  
 
 
The above pair of counterfactuals is the tool for 
assessing across contexts. Wide content differences, 
Fodor argues, would not make a difference to causal 
powers, which means wide content would not count as 
causal powers in science. This is because what Fodor 
considers a general principle in science is that no 
property counts taxonomically unless it affects or makes 
a difference to causal powers. 
 Fodor concludes that externalistic contents do not 
pass this cross-context test. If we judge that our causal 
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powers would have the same effects in all the same 
contexts, then our causal powers are the same. If the 
cross-context test shows that causal powers are the same 
even when wide contents differ, then wide contents 
differences are causally irrelevant. 
 Burge responds to the argument by saying that The 
Cross-Context argument does not show that widely 
individuated properties do not have causal powers. Burge 
argues that the value of the test depends entirely on 
which contexts are considered relevant. We can only infer 
to sameness of causes from sameness of effects in 
contexts where a difference of causes could make a 
difference if there is one. Burge says: 
 
There could be a device that traced the histories of 
individuals, recording whether they had been in 
causal contact with [water]. Such a device could 
bring [water] to an individual with such a causal 
history when he made the sounds “Bring [water”] – 
and not otherwise. In such a context, A would have 
different effects from [Twin-A]. … [T]here is a 
possible context in which the twins’ acts produce 
different effects. Unless some restriction is placed 
on admissible contexts, Fodor’s test will count any 
two individuals with any differences at all in their 
physical histories as having different causal powers. 
(Burge 1989a: 311) 
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As Burge points out, ruling out contexts where causal-
historical properties might make a difference in effects 
is question-begging. 
 Burge’s second point is that Fodor’s Cross-Context 
test is insensitive to the environmental background 
against which the individuals’ psychological states are 
type-individuated. The individuals’ causal powers are 
relative to each science and its explanatory concerns. 
Let me explain this by using Burge’s cases of pumping 
blood and pumping waste. If a heart were to replace a 
physically homologous organ whose function is to pump 
waste, the heart would have the same physical effects as 
its physically homologous counterpart. But the heart and 
the homologous waste-pump would not have the same causal 
powers as typed by physiology. Burge says that it is 
ludicrous from this fact to argue that: 
 
[T]he heart and its counterpart have the same causal 
powers as typed by physiology and that there is no 
difference in kind. From the point of view of some 
sciences, the two entities would indeed count as 
type identical. But the physiological differences 
are patent. Physiology recognizes causal powers of 
the heart which are exercised in its functionally 
normal environment. … But these environments are 
irrelevant to the scheme of kind individuation that 
physiology actually uses. Fodor’s test is 
insensitive to this dependence of many special 
sciences on a normal environment for picking out 
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those causal powers that are relevant to an 
explanatory typology in those sciences. (Burge 
1989a: 312-313) 
 
 
Similarly, the conception of causal power in psychology 
is taken “not from some model drawn from the other 
sciences, but from the explanations that psychology 
provides” (1989a: 316). The example of the heart and the 
organ that pumps waste provides the case where they have 
same causal powers as typed by physics but they have 
different causal powers seen from psysiology. What this 
means is that the twins with the same causal powers as 
typed by, for example, neurophysiology have different 
causal powers seen from a higher-level special science. 
 In this section we saw that if we are to find a 
genuine explanatory role for content, we must accept the 
fact that widely individuated, relational properties can 
have causal relevance. We saw Burge’s solution as to how 
we may see widely individuated propositional attitude 
properties as playing crucial explanatory roles in 
genuinely causal explanations. 
 
2.5 CONCLUSION: REJECTING NCC 
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 In this chapter I have dealt with a tension that 
arises from content externalism. We also examined the 
debate between Burge and Davidson to strengthen the claim 
in Chapter One that AM is committed to the 
epiphenomenalism of the mental, and therefore that NCC 
should be rejected. By examining the debate between Burge 
and Fodor we saw that there is no a priori reason why the 
so-called “wide” contents do not or cannot play causal 
roles in psychological explanations of behavior, and 
showed how they might do so by noting that wide contents 
are among the properties we ordinarily cite to explain 
our behavior.  
 Fodor basically argues that individuals cannot have 
different causal powers without their having different 
brain states. The motivation for holding this, according 
to Burge, is that he believes “physiological processes 
are where the “real” causation in psychology goes on” 
(Burge 1989a: 306). Burge calls this a crude version. The 
most deeply imaginative version of this is executed, 
according to Burge, by Davidson’s Nomological Character 
of Causality. Burge says that: 
 
Davidson holds that attribution of causal relations 
entails commitment to a certain sort of explanatory 
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law, a sort of law that has properties … that one 
cannot reasonably expect the principles of 
psychology to exhibit. Mind-body causation is then 
interpreted in the light of this assumption. Such 
causation is held to fall under purely physical laws 
(Burge 1989a: 317-318). 
 
 
Burge claims that there is no a priori reason to think 
that way, therefore it is an empirical question. Burge 
claims that “One cannot know a priori that every causal 
relation, regardless of domain, must fall under laws that 
have any particular form,” and “what counts as a law is 
filled out partly through scientific practice” (1989a: 
318).  
 Widely individuated properties can have causal 
relevance in that the explananda of psychology are taken 
to be behavioral events under relational descriptions. An 
issue exists as to whether scientific psychology ought to 
take behavioral events under intentional descriptions as 
its explanada; but it seems perfectly clear that 
commonsense psychology is precisely in the business of 
explaining individual bits of behavior intentionally 
described. The question was whether explanations of 
intentionally (relationally) described behavior, 
explanations making use of relational propositional 
attitude properties, are genuinely causal explanations, 
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given the fact that wide content can vary without 
affecting causal powers. Burge shows how it works.  
 The manner in which propositional attitude 
properties manage to play non-superfluous 
causal/explanatory roles is just the following: adverting 
to such properties enables us to give causal explanations 
of facts (intentionally characterized facts) that we 
could not otherwise explain. The internal conceptions 
that causally explain our actions may be intrinsic to our 
brains in that such internal conceptions do supervene 
upon internal microstructure. But, in order to 
characterize those internal conceptions for purposes of 
explanation of action, namely in order to speak of mental 
content at all, we must ascribe relational properties to 
one another. According to Burge, mentalistic explanation 
is a key to understanding mental-physical causation. 
Burge claims: 
 
Understanding psychological causation is at least as 
dependent on what sorts of explanations we achieve 
in psychology, and how they are related to 
explanations in the biological sciences, as it is on 
any antecedent conception of causation. It is 
therefore an open question whether it will ever be 
illuminating and correct to count relations between 
neural events (tokens) as revealing the nature of 
causal relations involving intentional psychological 
events. (1989a: 318) 
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Causal explanations of action must, therefore, make 
reference to relational properties, properties which do 
not affect the causal powers of internal states, but 
which are nevertheless explanatorily indispensable. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE EXCLUSION ARGUMENT AND THE PRINCIPLE OF THE 
NOMOLOGICAL CHARACTER OF CAUSALITY 
 
 
The Exclusion Argument is designed to show that 
nonreductive conceptions of the mental face the serious 
problem of producing an account of mental causation which 
does not render the mental epiphenomenal.23 Recall that 
there is more than one problem of mental causation. One 
problem is the problem presented by Davidson’s AM. 
Another problem is one presented by the failure of mental 
content to supervene on the physical. A third is the 
problem presented by the Exclusion Argument. The 
exclusion problem is arguably the only one which applies 
to any kind of mental property or state. The problem of 
externalism just applies to representational or 
contentful states, since it is only regarding these 
states that local supervenience is supposed to fail. The 
same can be said about the problem of anomalism. As 
Davidson himself states, the thesis of mental anomalism 
                                                 
23 Kim sometimes focused exclusively on Davidson’s AM. Kim, however, 
thinks that all nonreductive accounts of the mental face serious 
problems when it comes to telling a coherent story about mental 
causation. See Kim (1998). 
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covers just those states governed by considerations of 
rationality, namely propositional attitudes. 
 In this chapter I will argue against the Exclusion 
Argument. The unsoundness of the Exclusion Argument, 
however, does not save Davidson’s Anomalous Monism. In 
section 3.1 I will show that NCC is a doctrine which can 
in fact be questioned. I mentioned in Chapter One that 
the assumption of NCC in AM is responsible for the 
problem of mental causation. I claim the root for the 
unsoundness in both the Exclusion Argument and AM results 
from the same incorrect intuitions: NCC. Since there is 
no a priori reason to accept NCC and there is plenty of 
evidence showing that NCC is actually a dubious principle, 
I argue against NCC.  
Before I advance the claim that dealing with the 
Exclusion Argument casts sufficient doubt on NCC to 
license its rejection, I will formulate, in section 3.2, 
what I consider to be the most plausible version of the 
Exclusion Argument, Kim’s argument, which seems to be an 
insurmountable problem for the causal efficacy of the 
mental for nonreductive physicalism and will outline the 
precise structure of the argument. In section 3.3 I will 
argue against the Exclusion Argument by showing that the 
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causal relations between mental properties do not depend 
on causal relations between microproperties that realize 
them. There is little reason to understand causation in 
the manner required to make the argument work.24  
One of the main principles that the Exclusion 
Argument is using is the Causal Inheritance Principle 
(CIP). I will show in section 3.4 that the rejection of 
the argument is followed by the rejection of CIP, which 
says that a mental property, realized in virtue of a 
physical realization base, has no new causal powers 
beyond the causal powers of the physical base. This is 
important because the rejection of CIP entails the 
rejection of NCC.25 If we take content externalism 
seriously, and of course we should, CIP is literally 
false. Contrary to the claim of CIP, mental properties do 
not inherit their causal powers from the properties that 
realize them. I will conclude this chapter by briefly 
considering our explanatory practice. 
 
 
                                                 
24 In Chapter Four I will respond to Kim’s challenge by using Baker 
and Burge’s proposal to think about the causal efficacy of specific 
properties in the context of established scientific and 
commonsensical explanatory practices. 
25 The close relation between CIP and NCC will be pursued fully in 
Chapter Six. 
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3.1 SOME INTUITIONS AGAINST NCC  
 
 
 The Exclusion Principle says that there is no more 
than one complete and independent cause of any event. 
However, I point out that it seems to be unjust to single 
out one level of description as the “real” explanatory 
level, leaving others out as pseudo-explanation. We do 
not need to view the options as an exclusive choice. For 
it is possible to have different descriptions of the same 
phenomena. Indeed, this is what Davidson has famously 
argued for in his AM. Mentalistic descriptions can refer 
to the very same phenomena picked out by physical 
descriptions. Mental explanations and neurophysiological 
explanations are not in competition, but are rather 
alternative modes of picking out the very same patterns 
of the world around us. What shows that these 
explanations are not in competition is the claim that 
mental events just are physical events and that causation 
is extensional in nature; that is, that how we describe 
things has no impact on their causal efficacy. The 
difference between mental and physical explanations has 
to do with how mental states are picked out. It is worth 
noting that, at the very least, it does answer the 
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question of how intentional and physical explanations 
relate to one another: they are different ways of looking 
at the same phenomena, for mental events are brain events 
on AM. 
 However, someone might object to this by arguing 
that we are left with a gap in our explanatory practices. 
We still need an answer to the following question: “What 
do neurophysiological explanations have to do with 
psychological explanations?” In other words, we are left 
with a mystery if we leave a sharp gap between 
intentional explanations and physical explanations. Why 
does anything that happens to the brain have any effect 
on the mind, and vice versa? Given the fact that mental 
explanations and neurophysiological explanations have 
proven themselves successful at picking out causal 
relations, how do such explanations relate to one 
another? 
 At this point I start to take a position against 
Davidson. The worry is that we don’t have any clear 
explanation of the gap between intentional explanations 
and physical explanations. However, the requirement that 
we have a clear explanation of the gap seems to follow 
from the Principle of the Nomological Character of 
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Causality. NCC states that events related as cause and 
effect fall under strict deterministic laws; if a 
singular causal statement connecting two events a and b 
is true, then there must be a causal law connecting them, 
namely, there must be physical descriptions of those 
mental and physical events such that the singular causal 
statement connecting those events under those 
descriptions instantiates a causal law. However, if we 
reject NCC, we don’t need to worry about finding some 
explanations relating intentional explanations to 
physical explanations, because commonsense psychology is 
precisely in the business of explaining individual bits 
of behavior intentionally described. 
There are reasons to doubt NCC. Our mental states 
can play a causal role without thereby being reducible to 
the language of a scientific theory. The central point is 
that the singular causal statements we invoke in action 
explanations are not in need of any appeal to regularity 
or law, but are themselves legitimate. The motivation for 
the demand for laws in action explanations stems at least 
in part from the fact that the laws cited in explanations 
are the laws that subsume events in naturalistic causal 
relations. By rejecting the idea that causal explanation 
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is causal because it is grounded in natural causal 
relations, the motivation for requiring laws in 
explanations disappears.  
It is by recognizing the legitimacy and importance 
of the sorts of singular causal statements that are 
involved in the attribution of mental states to ourselves 
and others that the epiphenomenalist worries about the 
mental can be ruled out. In addition to this fact, many 
accepted psychological causal explanations, like many 
explanations in general, do not cite laws. If the 
considerations outlined above are correct, then they seem 
to provide intuitive reasons to doubt NCC. 
 
3.2 THE EXCLUSION ARGUMENT  
 
 
In this section I will formulate what I consider to 
be the most plausible version of the Exclusion Argument, 
Kim’s argument, which seems to be an insurmountable 
problem for the causal efficacy of the mental, given 
nonreductive physicalism, and I outline the precise 
structure of the argument. 
What has been perhaps the most influential treatment 
of the exclusion problem, namely that in Jaegwon Kim’s 
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papers “Explanatory Realism, Causal Realism and 
Explanatory Exclusion” and “Mechanism, Purpose and 
Explanatory Exclusion”, is presented, as it is indicated 
by the titles, primarily in an explanatory way. Kim 
considers that both the explanatory and the causal 
considerations are roughly equivalent, probably the 
epistemological and ontological sides of the same coin. 
This is why he uses several times the expression 
“causal/explanatory exclusion” and also why, when he is 
using the explanatory principle, he refers in general to 
causal explanation. Thus, in contexts in which his main 
worries are related to causation he uses the causal 
formulation, and in contexts in which he deals with 
explanatory issues he prefers the explanatory one. Kim 
says: “It seems to me that the case for explanatory 
exclusion is most persuasively made for causal 
explanations of individual events” (1989a: 250), and 
proceeds to make his case accordingly. When it is argued 
that causal explanations exclude each other, reasons are 
given in terms of “sufficient causes”, “causal links” and 
“causal overdetermination.” This is particularly 
important since exclusion is defended by showing the 
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implausibility of alternative possibilities, and such 
possibilities are all causally formulated. 
Kim’s worry is whether the causal/explanatory role 
of mental properties can be regarded as truly autonomous 
and is not free-riding on the underlying physical 
mechanism. And he says it can’t be. Kim’s challenge to 
mental causation within the framework of nonreductive 
physicalism, Kim’s Exclusion Argument, can be 
reconstructed in the following manner. Let us assume the 
following: M1 causes M2, M1 and M2 are realized by 
physical states, P1 and P2, respectively; and M1 is not 
identical to P1 and M2 is not identical to P2. I am using 
the terms ‘the mental’ and ‘the physical’ to refer to 
particular instances of the mental and physical 
properties, respectively.26 Now the following is the 
reconstruction of Kim’s causal/explanatory Exclusion 
Argument:  
 
[Causal/Explanatory Exclusion Argument]  
I There is downward causation27 by irreducible 
mental properties. 
                                                 
26 I will talk of mental properties, like desiring that p, and their 
instantiations, James’ desiring that p at time t. I will speak about 
the instantiation of mental properties by persons. When I speak of 
properties, I will usually mean property instantiations, as the 
context will make clear.  
27 The case of mental-to-physical causation is an example of downward 
causation. According to his Supervenience Argument (Kim 1998), for 
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II If there is downward causation by irreducible 
mental properties, there are two distinct 
nomologically sufficient conditions of a single 
event. 
III For a single event, there are not two distinct 
nomologically sufficient conditions. 
Therefore, 
IV The irreducible mental properties are not 
causally efficacious. 
 
This is Kim’s famous Exclusion Argument. 
Suppose M1, which is not reducible to any physical 
properties, causes M2. Kim invites us to ask “Why is this 
instance of M2 present?” (Kim 1993b: 351) Kim says two 
answers can be given to the question: on the one hand, 
the instance of M2 is there because of the instance of 
M1’s causing the instance of M2; on the other hand, M2 is 
there because the instantiation of P2 realized M2. 
According to Kim, we need to explain this situation 
because it creates a tension. Kim says the only coherent 
answer to this tension is to suggest a kind of “downward 
causation” from the mental to the physical, from M1 to P2. 
In other words, M1 caused M2 by causing P2, M2’s physical 
realization base. From this consideration Kim elicits the 
following principle: 
 
                                                                                                                                           
example, mental-to-mental causation is possible only if mental-to-
physical causation is possible.  
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[The Causal Realization Principle]: If a given 
instance of S occurs by being realized by Q, then 
any cause of this instance of S must be a cause of 
this instance of Q (and of course any cause of this 
instance of Q is a cause of this instance of S). 
(Kim 1993b: 352) 
 
 
The gist of this principle is that whenever there is 
mental to mental causation, there is downward causation: 
“What these reflections show is that within the 
stratified world of nonreductive physicalism …, “same-
level” causation can occur only if “cross-level” 
causation can occur” (Kim 1993b: 353). Kim says that most 
nonreductive physicalists should accept this principle.  
 The next principles we need to see are Kim’s 
Nomological Sufficiency Conception of Causation and the 
Causal Closure Principle: The first says that A causes B 
only if A is nomologically sufficient for B (Kim 1993b: 
351); the second says that any physical event that has a 
cause at t has a complete physical cause at t (Kim 1989: 
43). If there is downward causation from M1 to P2, then, 
by the Nomological Sufficiency Conception, M1 is 
nomologically sufficient for P2. However, by the Causal 
Closure Principle, if M1 causes P2, then P2 has a complete 
physical cause P1. Now P1 is nomologically sufficient for 
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P2, according to the Nomological Sufficiency Conception 
of Causation.  
 On the assumption that M1 is not identical to P1, we 
have two distinct nomologically sufficient conditions for 
P2, namely, M1 and P1. However the instance of M1 is there 
because, according to Kim, it has its own physical 
realization base, P1, which is sufficient, non-causally, 
for M1. The Physical Realization Thesis claims exactly 
this: 
 
[The Physical Realization Thesis]: A mental property 
is instantiated only if it is realized by a physical 
property. If P realized M, then P is nomologically 
sufficient28 for M, and M supervenes on P. (Kim 
1993b: 347) 
 
Since P1, M1’s physical realization base, is non-causally 
sufficient for M1, it follows that P1 is sufficient for P2. 
 Now we face a serious difficulty, the problem of 
Causal/Explanatory Exclusion:  
 
[The Principle of Causal/Explanatory Exclusion]: 
There is no more than one complete and independent 
cause (or causal explanation) of any event. (Kim 
1989a: 250) 
 
 
                                                 
28 Here it should not be, of course, causally sufficient. 
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Kim claims that if M1 and P1 are distinct nomologically 
sufficient conditions for P2 and P1 is nomologically but 
non-causally sufficient for M1, then P1 is the only 
genuine cause of P2. Kim says, “The more basic causal 
relation obtains between the two physical properties, P1 
and P2, and M1’s causation of M2 is ultimately grounded in 
the causal relation between their respective physical 
realization bases” (1993b: 353). He further says that:  
 
All these considerations, I want to suggest, point 
to something like the following as the natural 
picture for the layered physicalist world: all 
causal relations are implemented at the physical 
level, and the causal relations we impute to higher-
level processes are derivative from and grounded in 
the fundamental nomic processes at the physical 
level. … [I]f, as the supervenience thesis claims, 
all the facts are determined by physical facts, then 
all causal relations involving mental events must be 
determined by physical facts (presumably including 
facts about physical causation). (Kim 1993b: 355) 
 
 
From this consideration Kim elicits the problematic 
principle, the Causal Inheritance Principle: 
 
[The Causal Inheritance Principle (CIP)]: If mental 
property M is realized in a system at t in virtue of 
physical realization base P, the causal powers of 
this instance of M are identical with the causal 
powers of P. (Kim 1993: 326) 
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This principle, which guarantees that no higher-level 
property-instance confers on its bearer any new causal 
powers, however, is the very principle that opens the 
door to an accusation of epiphenomenalism. If P1 is the 
only genuine cause of P2, and P1 is not identical to M1, 
then M1 does not cause P2. If M1 does not cause P2, then M1 
does not cause M2 because of the Causal Realization 
Principle. Therefore, M1 does not cause M2, and so, M1 is 
epiphenomenal. 
Kim thinks that this, taking P1 as the cause of P2 
and treating M1 as epiphenomenal, is a persuasive picture. 
Faced with the question, “Is there any reason for 
invoking M1 as a cause of P2 at all, given P1 is 
sufficient physical cause of P2?” Kim’s answer is clear: 
no causal powers over and beyond those of P1 are left for 
M1. The whole point is that if nonreductive physicalists 
accept downward causation by irreducible mental 
properties, they should accept a problematic principle, 
the Causal Inheritance Principle. And Kim claims that the 
exclusion problem raised from the persuasive picture of 
downward causation is the problem that nonreductive 
physicalism cannot deal with. 
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3.3 AGAINST THE EXCLUSION ARGUMENT   
 
 
 I, like every philosopher, do not believe that we 
can make sense of the world without supposing that the 
mental properties are causally efficacious. One of my 
strategies in dealing with the problem raised by the 
Exclusion Argument is to argue against the Causal 
Inheritance Principle (CIP), by showing the causal 
relations between mental properties M1 and M2 do not 
depend on causal relations between the properties that 
realize them.29 Before we turn to CIP, against which I 
will argue in the next section, let me suggest the claim 
that the causal relations between mental properties M1 
and M2 do not depend on causal relations between the 
properties that realize them. 
 Suppose that we want to explain James’ promising to 
his mother to go to church, and that the putative 
explanation is that James wanted to please his mother, 
and believed that James would do so by promising to his 
mother to go to church. The explanatory connection is 
between James’ belief/desire complex and James’ promise. 
                                                 
29 The claim that the causal relations between mental properties do 
not depend on causal relations between the properties that realize 
them is also developed in Baker (2001). 
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Suppose that as a result of James’ promising to his 
mother to go to church, his mother was happy. Suppose 
that James’ promising to his mother to go to church, M1, 
was realized by microproperties P1 and that his mother’s 
being happy, M2, was realized by microproperties P2. The 
mother’s being happy is causally explained by James’ 
promising to his mother to go to church. But it by no 
means follows that P1 causally explains P2. The assumption 
that P1 must causally explain P2 is an artifact of a 
reductive picture. 
 If we focus on mental properties, M1 and M2, that P1 
and P2 realize, then it is apparent that the causal 
relations between mental properties do not depend on 
causal relations between microproperties that realize 
them. Which microproperties realized James’ promising to 
his mother depends on how the promise was made (e.g., by 
making a phone call, or by writing a letter, etc.). But 
the effect of that promise – his mother’s being happy – 
is indifferent to how the promise was made (by making a 
phone call, by writing a letter) and thus indifferent to 
which microproperties realized the promise. James’ 
promise would have had the same effect no matter which 
microproperties realized it. 
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 Counterfactual conditions play a large role in our 
understanding of causation. The truth of a relevant 
counterfactual is a typical indication of causation. It 
is typical because not all counterfactuals are causal 
(Kim 1993c: 205-207). However, the truth of a relevant 
counterfactual is clearly a necessary condition for 
causation. If James had not wanted to please his mother, 
nor believed that by promising he would please her, James 
would not have promised to his mother to go to church 
(unless James had some other reason). There need be no 
relevant counterfactual, between the properties that 
realized James’ belief/desire complex and the properties 
that realized the promise. Let me explain this a little 
further. An instantiation, by James, of the property M1 
(e.g., James’ promising to his mother to go to church) 
causes an instantiation, by his mother, of the non-mental 
property, P2. It happens because M1 causes M2. The 
relevant counterfactual should be: if James had not 
promised to his mother, there would have been no 
instantiation of P2. 
 By contrast, there may be no relevant 
counterfactuals between the non-intentional properties 
that happened to constitute James’ promise and the 
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nonintentional properties P2. To see this, suppose that 
James’ promise was constituted by writing a letter to his 
mother, which, in turn, was constituted by a left-to-
right motion of James’ right hand. Now it is clearly 
wrong to say that if James’ hand had not moved left-to-
right in the circumstances, then there would have been no 
instantiation of P2. The relevant circumstances are the 
circumstances in which you were intending to make a 
promise. In those circumstances, even though James’ right 
hand had not moved left-to-right, James would have made 
the promise some other way – e.g., by making a phone call 
to his mother and saying he is going to church. The only 
relevance of his hand’s moving left to right was that the 
motion constituted James’ promise. 
 The effect of the promise is James’ mother’s being 
happy, and James’ mother’s being happy is realized by P2. 
What has the effects on her reaction is the promise, not 
what realizes the promise. The properties whose 
instantiations realize the promise are typically 
irrelevant to the mental effects of the promise. So we 
can account for the causal relations of James’ 
belief/desire complex causing James’ promising. We can 
also account for the causal relations of James’ promising 
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causing his mother’s being happy. In addition, we can 
account for causal relations between intentional 
properties and their non-intentional effects – James’ 
promising to go to church which caused his mother’s being 
happy, caused instantiation of the nonintentional 
properties, P2, that realized James’ mother being happy. 
But if mental property, M1, causes mental property, M2, 
and M1 is realized by non-intentional properties P1 and M2 
is realized by non-intentional properties P2, it does not 
follow that P1 causes P2. 
This provides a conclusive reason to reject CIP, the 
heart of the Exclusion Argument. The Causal Inheritance 
Principle is false, because the causal powers of 
particular instantiations of mental properties are not 
inherited from the non-intentional properties that 
realize them. As we assumed, M1 causes M2 and M1 and M2 
are realized by physical states, P1 and P2, respectively. 
According to CIP, the causal powers of the instance of M1 
are identical with the causal powers of P1. Then the 
relations between M1 and M2 do depend on causal relations 
between P1 and P2 that realize M1 and M2. However we saw 
that the causal relations between mental properties do 
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not depend on causal relations between the properties 
that realize them. Therefore, CIP is wrong.  
We should not accept CIP because which non-mental 
properties realized M1, depends on how it was made. The 
effect of M1, however, is not affected by how it was made. 
Whichever way M1 is realized, it has the same effect, M2. 
This is the subject of the next section.  
 
3.4 AN ARGUENT AGAINST CIP: CONSIDERATION 
FROM CONTENT EXTERNALISM30   
 
 
 CIP says that a mental property, realized in virtue 
of a physical realization base, has no new causal powers 
beyond the causal powers of physical base. It claims that 
the causal powers of higher-order properties can be 
explained through the implementing mechanism. Kim’s 
rationale to elicit CIP is the following consideration: 
each psychological explanation requires some physical 
implementing mechanism. Therefore, the psychological 
properties inherit their causal powers merely from the 
                                                 
30 What is strange, though, is that Kim has never tried to solve the 
problem raised from content externalism: it is strange because his 
Exclusion Argument cannot be used without solving the problem raised 
by content externalism. As his article “Psycho-physical 
Supervenience” (1982) reveals, he also seems to have strong 
sympathies for some notion of narrow content. This seems to be 
confirmed in that Kim tries to keep type-identity theory by using 
so-called local reduction. See his (1998). 
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physical properties of the implementing mechanism. Unlike 
the physical explanations considering only the lower-
level properties, however, we need to consider specific 
social and/or historical environments in order to explain 
an action. Mental explanation has a much broader context 
than physical natural explanation.  
 Rejecting CIP seems to imply that the causal powers 
of mental properties somehow magically emerge at a 
higher-level and there is no accounting of the new causal 
powers of mental properties in terms of lower-level 
properties and their causal powers and nomic connections. 
If we follow Kim’s distinction between micro-based 
higher-level properties and higher-order properties, we 
can see that the causal powers of micro-based properties 
emerge from their micro-structure, which means the 
seeming new causal powers are not magical. This is the 
reason that Kim thinks that CIP does not apply to micro-
based macro properties.31 However, unlike Kim, I don’t 
think we should see the new causal powers of higher-level 
properties as emerging magically, either. The reason, I 
think, that CIP does not work even in the case of higher-
                                                 
31 “[Micro-based properties] need not be, and are not likely to be, 
identical with the causal powers of these constituent properties and 
relations” (Kim 1998: 117).  
 99
order properties, is because social and/or physical 
environments that are constitutive for mental 
explanations involve essentially a mental dimension. In 
this case the supervenience base has wider base than just 
implementing physical states. Causal mechanisms 
considering only the lower-order properties in no way 
reflect this wider base. The implementing mechanism is 
not able to describe the causal powers of higher-order 
properties resulting from the interaction with social 
and/or physical environments. 
 In this section I will argue against CIP by using 
the lesson learned from content externalism. Before doing 
that, however, let me draw your attention to the 
difference between mental explanation and naturalistic 
explanation with regard to the why- and how-questions.32 
At a general level, we can characterize explanations as 
answers to certain kinds of questions. For example, in 
science and various mundane contexts, mechanistic 
explanations are taken to answer the questions, “why some 
events happen,” as well as “how some events come into 
existence.” Since it may appear initially plausible that 
why-questions about actions require causal answers, 
                                                 
32 This point will be examined and clarified in Chapter Six.  
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citing a mechanism is, therefore, often taken to give a 
causal explanation; they exist because they are caused by 
other events. In the case that the why-question is 
interpreted as a request for a mechanism which we may or 
may not be able to provide, any response (explanations) 
to the why-question also provides information 
(explanations) that can adequately answer the how-
question. In mental explanation, however, it is not the 
case that we expect the same pattern of 
interchangeability between why- and how-questions.33  
 Kim, unlike me, thinks that in mental causation 
mental explanations are answers to why-questions in the 
sense that they are using only the implementing, lower-
level physical bases that are grounded in objective 
relations. However, mental explanations in mental 
causation, which answer our why-questions, do not seem to 
describe objective relations. I insist that naturalistic 
explanations describe objective relations but do not 
answer why-questions. Therefore they neither adduce 
causal information nor provide the explanatory answers. 
This is the lesson we have learned from content 
                                                 
33 In the case of mental causation I take mental explanations as 
answers to why-questions and physical explanations as ones to how-
questions. 
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externalism. Mental explanations are interested in 
explaining phenomena interacting with a wider social and 
natural environment. Mental explanations are not in 
competition with explanations introducing lower-level 
implementing mechanisms since mental explanations take as 
their primary subject of explanation an action in so far 
as the action is interacting with a certain environment 
and is directed towards that environment. A physical 
implementing mechanism is not able to explain this 
interaction with environments. The new causal powers have 
not magically emerged; they arise from interaction with 
the environment to which we, as agents, are related. It 
is thus hardly surprising that the causal power of 
higher-level properties, interacting with the environment, 
cannot be described on the physical level.  
 Widely individuated content has different causal 
powers from those of implementing physical states. Even 
if mental explanations require certain lower-level 
physical implementing mechanisms, this does not show that 
mental properties do not have the causal powers beyond 
those of the lower-level physical properties. I argue 
from this consideration that NCC is the result of 
confusing a purely naturalistic explanation with mental 
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explanation. The rejection of CIP entails the rejection 
of NCC. As we saw, the causal relations between mental 
properties do not depend on causal relations between 
microproperties that realize them. Then, NCC, which says 
that all events related as cause and effect fall under 
strict law, is false. The causal pattern at mental levels, 
which can occur only in certain circumstances, is not 
governed by the causal patterns at the lower levels since 
they cannot be explained by the non-intentional realizing 
properties which do not consider matters interacting with 
the context or circumstances. I will defer further 
discussion of this issue until the final chapter, however, 
because the issue is closely related to the issue of 
intentional actions, which is the subject of the second 
part of this work.  
 
3.5 THE EXCLUSION ARGUMENT: CONSIDERATIONS 
FROM EXPLANATORY PRACTICE   
 
 
 It is possible that the events quantified over in 
the categories of the mental, the social, or the 
biological will turn out to be the very same events 
quantified over in one, very special and extraordinary, 
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explanatory theory; however, it isn’t likely. We can make 
this claim more secure by noting the different 
methodological commitments involved in the sciences; and, 
more significantly, how even within a science, 
convergence on one ontology is difficult to come by. Many 
disciplines possess methodologies and explanatory devices 
that researchers in other disciplines find highly suspect. 
Such difference makes it difficult to see how the objects 
of such diverse sciences could be identical. 
As Dupre (1993) has argued, convergence on a common 
ontology within a discipline cannot be assumed, even when 
the theoretical terminology, and the ontological 
commitment that follows from the employment of such 
concepts, appears to be unified. Dupre points out that 
“ … in some contexts species are treated as individuals, 
in others as kinds” (Dupre 1993: 42). What is 
particularly important about Dupre’s work is that it 
reveals how the ontology of one theory can be quite 
different from that of another theory in which the 
theoretical terminology is shared. The species concept 
may pick out an individual or a kind, depending on the 
explanatory context. It should come as no surprise that 
sciences that differ in methodology and in explanatory 
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goals or concerns should be committed to distinct 
ontologies. After all, the methods and explanatory goals 
have been formulated and developed in order to best suit 
the subject matter under scrutiny. Differences in 
methodology and explanatory concern are likely to reflect 
differences in the ontology that these methods and 
concerns have been brought to bear upon. 
There is some form of dependence between the mental 
and the physical. Global supervenience is such a 
dependence relation. Still we don’t know how those events 
are related. This is the reason why we need to pay 
attention to our practice and explanatory strategies. I 
don’t think the demand for strict laws is, as NCC claims, 
essential to causal relations. However, the motivation 
for the demand for laws in causal relations stems at 
least in part from the fact that the laws cited in 
explanation are the laws that subsume events in 
naturalistic causal relations. Many accepted 
psychological causal explanations, however, like many 
explanations in general, do not cite laws. There is no 
reason to accept the claim that psychological causal 
explanations cite causally relevant (or 
causal/explanatory) properties, but the only causally 
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efficacious properties (or “genuinely” or “robustly” 
causal properties) are those of physics (or those 
reducible to physics). 
I favor the view of intentional causation in which 
true intentional causal explanations are grounded in 
causal relations in which mental particulars play causal 
roles in virtue of their intentional properties. We do 
have a great deal of evidence for this: what we think 
affects what we do. We have an overwhelming amount of 
both scientific and non-scientific evidence about the 
causal relations between belief/desire complexes and 
actions. However, we have no evidence at all about the 
causal relations between the instantiations of the non-
intentional properties that realize belief/desire 
complexes and the instantiations of the non-intentional 
properties that realize actions. Our conviction that what 
we think affects what we do is more secure than any 
metaphysical argument against it.  
In Chapter Four I will respond to some challenges to 
this conviction, by using Baker and Burge’s proposal to 
think about the causal efficacy of specific properties in 
the context of established scientific and commonsensical 
explanatory practices. Burge’s point regarding causation 
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can be understood as asserting that we must formulate our 
metaphysics of causation against our background knowledge 
of actual causal/explanatory practice. We should not 
approach the nature of actual causal/explanatory practice 
with a priori assumptions regarding causation. We shall 
learn about the nature of causation by examining how 
causation features in our explanatory commitments. If we 
have informative and fruitful mentalistic explanation, 
then we have every reason to believe that mental events 
exist and interact.  
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CHAPTER 4 
COMMONSENSE PSYCHOLOGY AS AN EXPLANATORY PRACTICE 
 
 
The problem of mental causation appeared when we 
wanted to confer some kind of primacy to the physical 
without abandoning the autonomy of the mental. I argued 
in the previous chapters that a particular unanalyzed 
assumption, NCC, is responsible for a philosophical 
impasse. Modifying our conception of causation would, I 
suggest, leave us with a means of reconciling our various 
intuitions concerning the nature of the mental, and give 
us an adequate account of the causal relevance of 
psychological and other supervenient properties. 
Chapter One discussed a problem of mental causation 
by exploring Donald Davidson’s AM. We saw that AM is 
committed to the epiphenomenalism of the mental. I 
claimed that NCC is not something that we can tolerate. 
In Chapter Two I dealt with a tension that arises from 
content externalism. I examined debates, one between 
Burge and Fodor, the other between Burge and Davidson. 
From the first debate I argued that there is no a priori 
reason why the so-called “wide” contents do not or cannot 
play causal roles in psychological explanations of 
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behavior, and showed how they might do so by noting that 
wide contents are among the properties we ordinarily cite 
to explain our behavior. The result I elicited from both 
debates was that we have good reasons for rejecting NCC. 
Fodor basically argued that individuals cannot have 
different causal powers without different brain states. 
Davidson’s NCC, according to Burge, is a more imaginative 
version than Fodor’s claim, but claims the same point as 
Fodor: “physiological processes are where the “real” 
causation in psychology goes on” (Burge 1989a: 306). 
The Exclusion Argument is designed to show that 
nonreductive conceptions of the mental face the serious 
problem of producing an account of mental causation which 
does not render the mental epiphenomenal. In Chapter 
Three I showed that the solution to the Exclusion 
Argument was reached by rejecting the Causal Inheritance 
Principle (CIP). I argued that the rejection of CIP 
actually implies that NCC is in fact wrong.  
In the present chapter a new conception of causation 
starts to emerge as a result of rejecting NCC. In 
Chapters Five and Six this conception will be discussed 
with regard to intentional actions. In this chapter I 
will first explain commonsense psychology (hereafter CP), 
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and then argue against the claim that CP is a kind of a 
scientific theory.34 The alternative to regarding CP as a 
scientific theory is to regard it as a practice. Secondly, 
I will argue that our explanatory practice should guide 
our ontological commitment. And, finally, I will defend 
my position against what I see to be a number of serious 
challenges.   
The primacy of explanatory practice over the 
ontological commitment reverses the usual account in 
which causal explanations count as causal if they are 
grounded in causal relations. However, explanations come 
first, such that an explanation is causal if we accept it 
as such.35 By reinterpreting the notion of causation we 
regain the causal efficacy of the mental. The problem 
raised by the Exclusion Argument, I claim, takes a wrong 
point of departure when it begins with a metaphysical 
notion of causation instead of grounding the notion of 
causation on our explanatory practices. 
                                                 
34 I will use the word broadly in a sense that something is called a 
scientific theory when it can be falsified by a mature science. 
35 This position is similar to the one that I will explain with 
regard to intentional actions. The usual account of intentional 
actions takes an action as intentional if it is grounded in reason 
explanation. I will reverse the account, and that is the main issue 
of Chapters Five and Six.  
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This strategy has been defended by Baker (1993), 
Burge (1993), and van Gulick (1993). The mental, they 
argue, is causally relevant or efficacious only insofar 
as it figures in successful explanations. Baker, for 
example, explicitly rejects the metaphysical picture of 
physicalism, which “subordinates explanation to causation, 
where causation, in turn, is conceived as an ‘objective 
relation’ in nature” (1993: 93). In her terms, “causation 
becomes an explanatory concept” (1993:93): causes are the 
sorts of things that are cited in explanations of events. 
She would insist that the success of our explanatory 
practices is enough to ensure that any metaphysical 
assumptions that lead to an epiphenomenalist conclusion 
must be wrong. We have more confidence in the success of 
mentalistic explanation, typical commonsense 
psychological statements that refer to mental states as 
causes of behavior, than we do in the basic tenet of 
physicalism according to which causation involves 
physical events and properties as causes. 
There are some serious challenges that this 
conception appears to face. (1) It has not always been 
accepted that rationalizing explanations are causal 
explanations, so common practice does not obviously 
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assume causal relevance (Kim 1995; 1998). Many 
philosophers, such as Melden (1961) and Kenny (1963), 
between the late 1950s and early 1960s, influenced by the 
later work of Ludwig Wittgenstein, rejected the view that 
the relation between reasons and actions is a causal 
relation. The assumption, so the objection goes, that 
common explanatory practice assumes causal relevance may 
simply not be true, and is certainly not justified 
without additional argument. (2) Even if explanatory 
practice assumes that the mind is causally relevant, this 
fact does not explain how it is possible for the mind to 
be causally relevant. It does not provide an answer to 
the more philosophically important question of how mental 
causation may occur. (3) Explanatory practice is 
defeasible, and the Exclusion Argument may provide reason 
to defeat it. I will examine these challenges in turn, 
and reject them. In section 4.1 I claim that CP is not a 
kind of a scientific theory but a practice. After that I 
will deal with each of the three challenges. 
 
4.1 COMMONSENSE PSYCHOLOGY (CP) NOT AS A 
SCIENTIFIC THEORY BUT AS A PRACTICE 
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CP concerns the ordinary psychology of beliefs, 
desires, and emotions for accounting for each other and 
ourselves. It tries to explain behavior by reference to 
certain types of mental states, mental states with 
propositional content such as beliefs and desires. It is 
a tool for predicting and explaining behavior. For 
example, CP asserts that, if someone desires that p, and 
believes that Φ–ing will satisfy that desire, then, 
ceteris paribus, that person will Φ. 
Most critics and defenders of CP endorse the 
materialist assumption that intentional psychological 
phenomena – if they exist at all – are incarnated in the 
human brain. Most critics and defenders of CP also assume 
that CP explanations will not reduce to 
neurophysiological explanations. Critics of CP see this 
“failure” as a reason for rejecting the postulated 
ontology of CP, whereas defenders of CP see it as a 
reason for maintaining the autonomy of commonsense 
psychological explanation.36 
                                                 
36 The situation is similar to the problem of mental causation in 
that we want to confer some kind of primacy to the physical without 
abandoning the autonomy of the mental. A vast majority of 
contemporary views want it both ways: the physical is primary but 
the mental is real and distinct from it.  
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There are two basic ways in which CP may be 
approached by philosophers. First, it is considered as a 
sort of proto-science: CP is developing a scientific form 
of explanation. They consider it as a theory about the 
internal causes of our actions, potentially in 
competition with scientific ways of explaining behavior, 
and vulnerable to being shown false. Those who construe 
CP as a kind of a proto-science emphasize a metaphysical 
notion such that what happens is subject to integration 
into the physical sciences. The second way to see CP is 
to take it as a different sort of activity, not as 
scientific or proto-scientific theorizing. Philosophers 
who take this position see CP as an autonomous 
explanatory practice (Baker 1999), not in competition 
with science nor threatened by it. As Mele points out, 
any adequate philosophical analysis of intentional action 
should be anchored by commonsense judgments about 
particular cases (Mele 2001).  
I am attacking the first sort of view, and defending 
the second. I argue for the truth and legitimacy of 
commonsense, propositional-attitude-based explanations of 
behavior, but not on the grounds that a naturalistic 
explication or reduction of propositional attitudes is 
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likely to be forthcoming. Rather, I argue that there is 
no good reason not to accept the legitimacy of an 
autonomous rational psychology construed as explanatory 
practice.  
The following definition of CP as a practice will 
work for our purpose: 
 
Commonsense psychology [CP] is a practice iff groups 
of people engage in the activity of describing, 
explaining and predicting human thought and action 
in terms of propositional attitudes like belief, 
desire and intention. (Baker 1999: 4) 
 
 
Some of our practices involve giving causal explanations. 
I take CP as a causally-explanatory practice, a practice 
governed by rules or conventions that people engage in 
for a common purpose. Because of the success and wide 
acceptance of commonsense psychology, debates here 
instead focus on the criteria for specifically causal 
explanations and whether psychological explanations meet 
these criteria. 
Baker’s solution for the problem of mental causation 
is to rethink CP and the notion of causation that 
generates the problem of accounting for the causal 
efficacy of non-physical properties. She says, 
“Systematic explanatory success, in either science or 
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everyday life stands in no need of metaphysical 
underpinning” (1993: 94). The idea is to put aside 
worries about the causal efficacy of non-physical 
properties by uprooting the assumption that only physical 
properties can have a causal impact on the physical world. 
Geological, biological, meteorological, psychological 
properties, and so on, do figure into explanations that 
seem to rely on causal relations between them and 
physical events and properties. The idea that the most 
basic physical properties might somehow “gobble up” all 
causal efficacy of the macro-level, that they provide the 
“complete cause” of physical effects, seems to undermine 
common sense and scientific practice. Hence, according to 
Baker, we should not think that there is any problem with 
mental causation in particular, because our explanatory 
practices provide stronger confirmation of its reality 
than the claim that all causation involves physical 
properties. For as she points out, we don’t know much 
about the most basic physical properties of the world. 
However, we know a lot more about macro-properties and 
their relations. Our insistence that the bottom level 
provides all causality makes it seem as if we have 
betrayed commonsense in favor of a rather obscure 
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commitment to causality as an objective relation – one 
distinct from our explanatory practices and epistemology.  
Burge (1993) accepts that mental content does not 
supervene on the physical but does not see this failure 
as impacting the problem of mental causation. Burge 
relies on explanatory practice and our ordinary notion of 
causal powers to allow for mental causation. He argues 
that common explanatory practice picks out some 
regularities as causal, and since this explanatory 
practice assumes mental-to-mental causal relevance or 
mental-to-physical causal relevance, mental properties 
are causally relevant. Burge realizes that relying on 
regularities alone fails to distinguish epiphenomenal 
from causally relevant properties, but requires instead 
that common explanatory practice be our guide in picking 
out the causally relevant properties.  
Burge’s point regarding causation can be understood 
as asserting that we must formulate our metaphysics of 
causation against our background knowledge of actual 
causal-explanatory practice. We should not approach the 
nature of actual causal-explanatory practice with a 
priori assumptions regarding causation. Furthermore, we 
should not pronounce (metaphysical) judgment on the 
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status of explanations from disciplines such as 
psychology with such a priori assumptions. At the very 
least, we should not attempt revisionary theories and 
practices regarding such causal explanations and their 
prima facie ontological commitment. Rather, we shall 
learn about the nature of causation by examining how 
causation features in our explanatory commitments. If we 
have informative and fruitful mentalistic explanation37, 
then we have every reason to believe that mental events 
exist and causally interact. Again, our causal-
explanatory practice and the natural ontological 
commitment stemming from such practice should determine 
our metaphysical commitments. 
There are objections that appeals to explanatory 
practice alone are insufficient in solving the problem of 
mental causation. Thus Kim (1995) says, the assumption 
that common explanatory practice assumes causal relevance 
may simply not be true, and is certainly not justified 
without additional argument. Some substantive theory of 
mental causation that takes into account the Exclusion 
Argument is necessary to solve this problem of mental 
                                                 
37 By mentalistic explanation I mean typical folk psychological 
statements that refer to mental states as causes of behavior. 
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causation. In the following three sections I will deal 
with three objections directed toward the idea that we 
should appeal to explanatory practice. 
 
4.2 RESPONSE TO THE FIRST CHALLENGE 
 
 
In this section I deal with the first challenge, 
saying that it has not always been accepted that 
rationalizing explanations are causal explanations, so 
common practice does not obviously assume causal 
relevance. As Kim points out (Kim 1998: 63), the 
assumption that psychological explanation, like much 
scientific explanation, is causal in nature was itself a 
source of heated debate in philosophy during the 1960’s. 
For instance, philosophers thought that rationalizing 
explanations were not a variety of causal explanation at 
all. One cannot simply assume that the common practice of 
intentional and reason explanations is causal. A central 
thesis of many neo-Wittgensteinian accounts was that folk 
psychological references to intentional psychological 
states are not causally explanatory. It was Donald 
Davidson who managed to convince a majority of 
philosophers that reason-giving explanations are a form 
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of causal explanation (Davidson 1963). But that argument 
involved a theory of causation, events, and explanation. 
This shows that taking explanations as our starting point 
does, itself, require various metaphysical commitments. 
Why should we assume, with Baker, then, that such folk 
psychological explanations are causal? If we do, it seems 
we have already presupposed a lot of metaphysics. The 
problem of mental causation can be seen as the attempt to 
sort out those assumptions to help understand just what 
sort of “metaphysical underpinning” we have available. 
 The defenders of explanatory primacy might have an 
answer to Kim’s point, though. It may be said that the 
choice of making causation dependent on explanatory 
practices is itself a metaphysical choice. Kim does not 
have to be budged by this, because Kim and others can 
argue that what the defenders of explanatory primacy are 
doing is giving up a view according to which there has to 
be an objective relation grounding the relation between 
the explanandum and the explanans. And if they 
subordinate causation to explanatory practice, there will 
be a danger that we would do the same with other 
dependence relations such as supervenience. If what is 
real at least in part depends on what is involved in 
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causal or dependence relations, and causation and other 
dependence relations are dependent on explanatory 
practices, we may not be able to avoid the anti-realist 
consequence that Baker wants to avoid.38  
I doubt that the objection is successful. As we saw 
in Chapter Three, for the response to the Exclusion 
Argument I used an argument that has lots of metaphysical 
implication. The response does not have any anti-realist 
flavor, however. I just rejected CIP and paid attention 
to the implications of content externalism. Therefore it 
is not legitimate to say that the emphasis on explanatory 
practice has no metaphysical basis. I provided an 
argument against the Exclusion Argument over metaphysical 
commitment and I chose explanatory practice based on this 
argument. My choice is the result of serious metaphysical 
considerations. It is not the case that explanatory 
practice is a groundless idea without any metaphysical 
implication. I have not taken this view for granted. 
Let us look at the following causal explanation: 
James promises his mother to go to church because of 
                                                 
38 Baker says the following: “Although my proposal has a strong 
pragmatic cast, it is by no means an anti-realist suggestion. I am 
not equating what is real with what is needed for explanations and 
predictions” (Baker 1993: 95). 
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James’ wanting to please his mother. The promising to his 
mother to go to church is the kind of thing that we want 
to explain; in other words, we want to know why James 
promised his mother to go to church. The very existence 
of the explanandum, however depends on rules, practices, 
or conventions. In this example for instance, apart from 
the religious practice of going to church and the 
practice of performing a promise, there would be no such 
phenomenon as somebody’s promising to his mother to go to 
church. In the absence of rules, practices and 
conventions, what we want to explain would disappear. 
Therefore, a putative explanation of any of these things 
in terms of, say, physical motions, without reference to 
rules, practices and conventions, is no explanation of 
what we set out to explain at all – namely why James 
promised to his mother to go to the church. I take this 
as a lesson learned from content externalism, which means 
I have paid enough attention, metaphysically speaking. 
 
4.3 RESPONSE TO THE SECOND CHALLENGE 
 
 
The second objection is the claim that those who 
favor explanatory practice over metaphysics do not 
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provide an answer to the philosophically more important 
question of how mental causation may occur. As Kim points 
out, even if explanatory practice assumes that the mind 
is causally relevant, this fact does not explain how it 
is possible for the mind to be causally relevant. The 
problem of mental causation is not that we do not think 
the mind is causally relevant but that we do not have a 
metaphysical picture of the mind and the world that 
allows for the mind to be causally relevant. The question, 
then, is not so much whether the mind is causally 
relevant, but rather how it is possible for the mind to 
be causally relevant. And Burge’s appeal to common 
practice does not answer this question. The appeal to 
common practice misplaces the origin of the problem of 
mental causation. Unless we are ready to discard 
metaphysical questions as significant ones, we have to 
recognize that there is a conflict between different 
assumptions we make and that the problem will not go away 
if we don’t give up or reformulate some of these 
assumptions. Kim says: 
The issue is not metaphysics versus explanatory 
practice, as Burge would have it, nor metaphysics 
versus epistemology, as Baker would have it … The 
issue is how to make our metaphysics consistent with 
mental causation, and the choice we need to make is 
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between various metaphysical alternatives, not 
between some recondite metaphysical principle on the 
one hand and some cherished epistemological practice 
or principle on the other. (Kim 1998: 62) 
 
Kim seems to claim in the above passage that we need to 
provide an account that supports both our commitment to 
mental causation and the metaphysics behind it. 
Why do we expect a causal story that makes reference 
only to neurophysiological phenomena? And why would the 
success of neurophysiology provide good reason to take it 
seriously as a domain of legitimate causal explanation? 
Now, the objectors insist further that if 
neurophysiological explanations are distinct from 
intentional explanations, we are left with a mystery: the 
mystery of how they relate to one another. In order to 
solve the mystery an eliminativist, for example, argues 
that since all the causal linkages here are purely 
neurophysiological in nature, any alleged “mental causes” 
are unnecessary and hence should be sliced off with 
Ockham’s razor. 
 However, the requirement of our having a bottom-
level or neurophysiological process seems to follow from 
NCC. However, as we saw in the previous chapters, the 
requirement of there being an ontological grounding for 
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the intentional phenomena including mental causation is 
just the myth of physicalism.  
 The problem, if we are accepting NCC, can be 
expressed in the following way: how are causation and 
causal explanation related? The distinction between 
causation and causal explanation is that, while one 
relation holds between natural entities whether or not we 
exist, the other is a conceptual relation between 
linguistic entities (or perhaps propositions) when we 
find that the one illuminates the other.39 The most widely 
accepted view is that the former provides the ontological 
grounding for the latter; a true causal explanation 
counts as causal because there is, behind it, an instance 
of causation (Kim 1989a:254-260). In the best case, the 
causal relation that grounds a causal explanation holds 
between events in virtue of those properties denoted by 
the predicates that play the appropriate roles in the 
explanation.40 However, as the extensional view of 
causation shows, the features in virtue of which a 
                                                 
39 The extensional view of causation relies on a distinction between 
descriptions that can appear in singular causal claims and those 
that, in addition, denote causally efficacious properties of tokens. 
This is one way of expressing a certain relation between causation 
and causal explanation. 
40??In Chapter One we saw that Davidson argued against this view. I 
showed that his argument was not successful.  
 125
certain causal relation holds need not be mentioned. A 
causal explanation can be ontologically grounded in a 
causal relation even if it does not specify its 
ontological ground by referring to the property of the 
object that is causally efficacious in that relation. Now 
the issue is whether good causal explanations require 
laws. The view that they do, a position I have attacked, 
dovetails with the nomological account of causation: the 
causally related events stand in a causal relation in 
virtue of the fact that they can be subsumed under a law. 
 However, if we reject NCC, we don’t need to worry 
about finding some ontological ground relating 
intentional explanations to physical explanations. The 
central point is supposed to be that the singular causal 
statements we invoke in action explanations are not in 
need of any appeal to regularity or law, but are 
themselves legitimate. The motivation for the demand for 
laws in action explanations stems at least in part from 
the fact that the laws cited in explanations are the laws 
that subsume events in natural causal relations. By 
rejecting the idea that causal explanation is causal 
because it is grounded in natural causal relations, the 
motivation for requiring laws in explanations disappears. 
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In addition to this fact, many accepted psychological 
causal explanations, like many explanations in general, 
do not cite laws. We have another strong reason to reject 
NCC. Baker writes: 
 
For example, when Jill returns to the bookstore to 
retrieve her keys, what she thinks is that she left 
her keys on the counter and that she wants them back. 
What she thinks affects what she does in virtue of 
the following explanatory fact: if she hadn’t 
thought that she had left her keys, then, other 
things being equal, she wouldn’t have returned to 
the bookstore. (1993: 93) 
 
As we have seen in Chapter Three, the truth of a relevant 
counterfactual is a typical indication of causation, 
typical because not all counterfactuals are causal; 
however, the truth of a relevant counterfactual is 
clearly a necessary condition for causation. 
Now unless Kim and others are ready to discard a 
physicalistic picture as the only genuine one, they are 
not able to see where they are wrong. We already saw that 
the causal relations between mental properties do not 
depend on causal relations between the properties that 
realize them. I argued for this not as metaphysics versus 
epistemological practice or principle. I argued that the 
properties whose instantiations realize the mental are 
typically irrelevant to the effects of the mental. There 
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is no need, then, to expect a causal story that makes 
reference only to neurophysiological phenomena. There is 
no mystery between intentional explanations and 
neurophysiological explanations of how they are relate to 
one another. In some ways they are related, as in some 
form of mind-body supervenience, and we may not know the 
exact nature of the relation. However the ignorance is 
not a mystery. 
 
4.4 RESPONSE TO THE THIRD CHALLENGE 
 
 
 
Now let us look at the last objection. It claims 
that explanatory practice is defeasible, and the 
Exclusion Argument may provide reason to defeat it. Our 
common practice may be mistaken. In this case, we may 
mistakenly attribute causal relevance to mental 
properties. Scientific considerations have often overcome 
common practice. Perhaps the case of mental causation is 
another case in which scientific considerations, suitably 
informed by philosophy, should overcome our common 
practice. 
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I undertake my defense of CP as an autonomous 
explanatory practice by first undermining the opposing 
view, Eliminative Materialism (hereafter EM). EM is the 
view that CP is a theory, which is in competition with 
scientific theories, and likely to be proven false. EM 
does not consider CP as a viable theory and should 
therefore be rejected. According to Patricia Churchland, 
by EM, she means: 
(1) that folk psychology is a theory; (2) that it is 
a theory whose inadequacies entail that it must 
eventually be substantially revised or replaced 
outright (hence “eliminative”); and (3) that what 
will ultimately replace folk psychology will be the 
conceptual framework of a matured neuroscience 
(hence “materialism”). (1986: 396) 
 
Taken as applying to CP instead of to folk psychology,41 
Churchland’s definition of EM is highly questionable. 
First, is CP a theory? It seems that CP is used to 
                                                 
41 My concern on the usage of the term “folk psychology (FP)” is that 
there are at least two ways in which the term might be used. FP 
might be used to mean that pre-scientific psychological theory, 
implicitly held and used in everyday life, by “the folk,” namely 
ordinary, unsophisticated persons. Such a FP presumably would 
include pre-scientific speculations and preconceptions regarding the 
nature of all sorts of psychological phenomena: mental illness, 
sleep and dreams, motivation, problem-solving, perception, and so on. 
Psychologists might tend to use the term FP in this way and to take 
it as an empirical matter.  
  On the other hand, FP might be used as philosophers tend to use 
the term, to refer to the practice of predicting and explaining 
behavior by reference to propositional attitudes. However, if FP is 
just whatever the folk think about psychology, then CP is only one 
aspect of FP. Since I am primarily concerned with the legitimacy of 
CP, and not with the status of whatever else has been called FP, I 
will henceforth avoid the use of the confusing term FP and use the 
term CP instead. 
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describe rational capacities, which can function as an 
explanatory and predictive system by subsuming individual 
actions under generalizations involving the described 
capacities or properties of rational systems. For example, 
CP described persons as believing that p, perceiving that 
p, wanting that p, intending that p, and so on. 
Individual behavioral events can be explained by 
subsuming them under generalizations involving these 
properties, as in the following example: Users of CP 
implicitly know some such generalization as if X believes 
that there is poison in the glass in front of him, then, 
ceteris paribus, he will not drink the contents of the 
glass. We may explain why X did not drink his wine on a 
certain occasion by reporting that X had a certain 
propositional attitude property: “He believed that there 
was poison in it.”  
 Certainly, there are disanalogies between CP and the 
classical sort of empirical theory that postulates 
unobservables, and articulates generalizations regarding 
the behavior of those unobservables, in order to explain 
observed data. CP implies that rational beings possess 
propositional attitude states (properties). When we 
utilize CP to predict and explain the behavior of others, 
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what we are doing is projecting onto others an 
explanatory system experienced firsthand in our own case. 
We know that our own belief and desire states or 
properties explain our behavior, and we project ourselves 
into other persons’ situations, asking ourselves what we 
would believe and desire, and what we would do, if we 
were in that situation.42      
This sort of projective practice, based upon first-
person experience, does not resemble classical 
theoretical explanation. It does not involve unobservable 
entities, and the generalizations of CP bear little 
resemblance to the generalizations of a typical empirical 
theory. When someone suggests what the generalizations of 
CP might be, the suggested candidates are always 
instances of principles of practical rationality, such as 
if X believes that p only if q, and if X desires that p, 
then, ceteris paribus, X will try to bring it about that 
q. The generalization mentioned above, involving the 
poisoned wine, may be seen as an instance of such a 
principle of practical rationality: if X desires to live, 
                                                 
42 The suggestion that CP is “projective” in this sense has been made 
by Robert Gordon (1986). Stephen Stich (1983: ch.5) has also made 
remarks to this effect. The so-called simulation theory has been 
developed from Stich’s idea. 
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and believes that he will live only if he does not drink 
poisoned wine, then, ceteris paribus, X will not drink 
poisoned wine. Because such principles are close to being 
analytic truths definitive of rationality, they are far 
from being informative empirical generalizations.   
CP’s projective character, and its lack of the usual 
sort of empirical generalizations, suggests that it is 
unwarranted to call CP an empirical theory. However, it 
seems harmless enough to admit that CP is a theory of 
some kind. So long as we keep in mind the differences 
between CP and classical empirical theories, I have no 
objection to adopting the ubiquitous “theory” terminology. 
Given that we admit CP to be a theory, albeit of a 
special sort, our next question must be: are there any 
good reasons for thinking that CP is an inadequate 
theory? 
 Surely, all parties must acknowledge that CP works 
pretty well as an everyday system for explaining and 
predicting the behavior of normal, rational persons. We 
rely upon this system constantly, and it seldom fails us. 
One factor that philosophers have cited as an inadequacy 
of CP is the failure of belief attributions utilizing 
propositional that-clauses to index accurately the causal 
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roles of internal states. The most intuitive way to see 
the alleged problem is to note that the that-clauses 
utilized by users of CP to characterize the internal 
states of beliefs do not always capture unambiguously the 
way the believer conceives of his situation.  
 Take Kripke’s example of the unfortunate Pierre, who 
thinks that ‘London’ and ‘Londres’ refer to two different 
cities (Kripke 1976). He believes that the city referred 
to by ‘Londres’ is pretty, but he believes that the city 
referred to by ‘London’ is not pretty. By using the 
familiar that-clauses of CP, we can attribute to Pierre, 
without evident mistake, both the belief that London is 
pretty and the belief that London is not pretty. Yet 
Pierre suffers no internal, psychological contradiction. 
The internal states that will actually explain his 
behavior and his reasoning are more finely individuated 
than that-clauses can accurately specify. CP thus seems 
to fail to capture the explanatorily-relevant 
psychological contents of beliefs with perfect accuracy. 
 But the fact that that-clauses fail to capture the 
psychologically relevant contents of beliefs with a 
perfect lack of ambiguity fails to show that CP is 
fatally inadequate. What is the purpose or function of CP, 
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anyway? It seems that the function of this theory of 
practice is the explanation and prediction of the normal 
behavior of ourselves and other persons who may properly 
be considered rational. And how often is it that the 
ambiguities latent in that-clause attribution cause any 
serious interference with this purpose? Not often at all. 
We can usually determine from the context what the 
psychologically relevant content of someone’s belief is, 
even if we cannot assign a that-clause that perfectly 
pins down such content. The ambiguity of that-clause 
attribution is perhaps a minor inadequacy of CP.43 
 Churchland’s definition of EM also implies that CP 
could be replaced by a neuroscientific theory. A critic 
might well inquire whether it is really possible for a 
neuroscientific theory, or any other kind of theory, to 
perform CP’s function as well as, or better than, CP. 
Perhaps CP is disanalogous to other so-called “folk 
                                                 
43 The inadequateness of CP has been pressed in another form. It has 
been argued that CP fails utterly to explain or predict the behavior 
of very young children, neurologically damaged persons, or persons 
with bizarre doxastic systems (Stich 1983: ch 4; P. Churchland 1986: 
223). Indeed, in such cases we are hard-pressed to characterize the 
contents of mental states by means of that-clauses at all. But is 
this necessarily an indictment of CP? It is hard to see why. CP can 
fairly be taken to be a system for the prediction and explanation of 
the behavior of normal persons, old enough and similar enough to 
ourselves that we are comfortable treating them as rational. There 
is no reason to expect such a system to work in the case of abnormal, 
non-rational subjects. 
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theories” in that it explains facts that cannot be 
equally well, or better, explained by some other theory. 
The eliminativist argument that CP is replaceable, and 
likely to be replaced, seems to depend heavily upon the 
comparison between CP and other purported “folk 
theories.” It is basically an argument by analogy: CP is 
similar to other folk theories that have proven false and 
been replaced; therefore, it is likely that CP too, will 
prove false and be replaced. 
 It seems to me, the claim that the entire notion of 
a folk theory is so vague that comparisons among various 
supposed folk theories are of dubious value. The many 
things that have been called folk theories are very 
different from each other. The argument for the 
elimination of CP based upon an analogy between CP and 
“other folk theories” that merit elimination strikes me, 
accordingly, as extremely weak. It seems that what CP 
says about propositional attitudes seems even more 
unlikely to prove false. Daniel Dennett (1987: 39) has 
argued that CP could not be replaced by any other theory 
because it captures certain unique and important 
generalizations. According to this line of argument, CP 
describes certain objectively real patterns or 
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regularities in the fabric of reality, that cannot be 
detected otherwise than by categorizing reality in 
intentional terms (by seeing persons as having states 
that refer to, or are about, their environment). Any 
explanatory framework other than CP misses something, 
according to this line of argument; CP is necessary in 
order to describe reality and in order to explain all the 
facts. 
 The argument that CP captures certain important 
generalizations and enables us to make otherwise 
impossible predictions is advanced in support of the 
prediction that no other theory will prove adequate to 
take CP’s place. It does seem, then, that when we view 
creatures as rational, patterns and regularities in their 
behavior become visible that would not otherwise be 
detectable. Instead of merely seeing physical objects 
reacting to physical forces, we see episodes of inferring, 
perceiving, detecting, calculating, and other intelligent 
activities. Rational creatures, rather than just 
responding to stimuli, can respond to the meaning or 
significance of stimuli in the light of their own 
interests. Failing to take regard of this fact does, it 
seems, result in a significant loss of explanatory and 
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predictive power. No other sort of theory could replace 
CP. CP just is the conceptual framework in terms of which 
persons are rational beings or cognizers, and without 
this conceptual framework certain facts are inaccessible. 
Someone may think that it is just an empirical question 
whether CP turns out to be replaceable by some other 
theory or not. We must simply wait and see if future 
neuroscience, or some other future theory, turns out to 
be powerful enough to explain all that CP explains, and 
more. But I believe it is wrong to look at the issue in 
this way. The question is not an empirical one so much as 
a conceptual one. CP is the descriptive/explanatory 
framework that takes us to be rational persons and 
cognizers. Any significantly different theory could not 
explain the rational actions that CP describes and 
subsumes, because, without CP’s concepts and vocabulary, 
there would be no rational actions to explain. 
 So far, I have argued that there are good reasons 
for thinking that CP is not an ordinary empirical theory; 
that it is not inadequate for its purposes, and that it 
could not be replaced by anything else. Churchland’s 
definition of EM, as applied to CP, is dubious. When 
eliminativists actually argue for the thesis that 
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propositional attitudes deserve elimination, what they 
say generally has little to do with how well or how 
poorly CP works for its humble, everyday purposes. 
Arguments for EM tend to proceed from considerations 
having to do with the naturalistic reduction of theories 
and theoretical entities.  
 Could CP possibly prove false? Fodor has expressed 
very nicely the spirit behind the argument that CP could 
not be possibly proven false: 
 
Even if [CP] were dispensable in principle, that 
would be no argument for dispensing with it … What’s 
relevant to whether commonsense psychology is worth 
defending is its dispensability in fact. And here 
the situation is absolutely clear. We have no idea 
of how to explain ourselves to ourselves except in a 
vocabulary which is saturated with belief/desire 
psychology. One is tempted to transcendental 
arguments: What Kant said to Hume about physical 
objects holds, mutatis mutandis, for the 
propositional attitudes; we can’t give them up 
because we don’t know how to. (1987: 9-10) 
 
 
Indeed, there is something very odd and paradoxical about 
the idea that CP could prove to be false. What evidence 
could possibly show CP to be false? Recall that we are 
taking CP to be not only an explanatory and predictive 
calculus, but also the conceptual framework or 
descriptive vocabulary in terms of which persons are seen 
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as rational beings and cognizers. Whether CP could prove 
false is, accordingly, the question of whether it could 
turn out that persons are not rational beings, not 
cognizers, after all. It can seem that persons are just 
obviously rational beings, and that this is a truth too 
fundamental to be seriously questioned. Yet, we must 
acknowledge that to a certain kind of radical 
eliminativist it seems obvious that any theoretical 
framework, other than that of fundamental physics, could 
prove to be false. According to such an eliminativist, it 
could very well turn out that there were no such 
phenomena as rationality, intelligence, and cognition. 
The eliminativist claims that those terms derive their 
meanings from a theory that may be a thoroughly false 
description of reality. Perhaps, when we look at human 
beings, we ought to see physical particles responding to 
physical forces; perhaps that sort of description is the 
only true description. Perhaps, to look at human beings 
and to see episodes of perceiving, inferring, theorizing, 
and so on, is just wrong; the vocabulary in which these 
descriptions are couched may simply not be getting at any 
real phenomena. 
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 I take it to be true that many different 
vocabularies, at many different theoretical levels, might 
all provide correct descriptions of reality; the radical 
eliminativist is one who takes it to be the case that 
only one vocabulary, that of fundamental physics, can 
give a true and correct description of reality. I defend 
the idea that CP couldn’t possibly prove to be false, in 
the sense that we could not conceivably turn out not to 
be rational beings. 
 Quine has taught us that no theory taken in 
isolation is conclusively falsifiable, and that no theory 
is immune from revision (Quine 1951: 40-43). We can 
always save our favorite theory from elimination by 
altering some other part of the theoretical network. Any 
theory can, in principle, be revised or abandoned, or 
held inviolate. Let us suppose that Quine is correct 
about this. Then, if CP is a theory, what seems to make 
it different from other theories is that it is one we 
would be extremely reluctant to give up. Faced with 
giving up CP, or with giving up some other cherished 
theory, it seems we would give up the other theory. 
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4.5 CONCLUSION 
 
 
By rejecting NCC we can in fact arrive at a 
sustainable, defensible and rewarding account of mental 
causation. The new conception of causation that has 
emerged is strengthened by a theory of intentional action 
that I will endorse in the last two chapters. A series of 
experiments (Knobe 2003a; Mele 2001; Malle & Knobe 1997; 
Mele & Moser 1994) demonstrate that our ordinary practice 
in attributing intentional action in particular cases, 
and our practice of attributing reason explanations, can 
actually be influenced by normative considerations. This 
result suggests that normative considerations may 
actually be playing a role in the concept of intentional 
action and reason explanation. 
Our chief aim in Chapters Five and Six is, therefore, 
to present a convincing case for the conclusion that 
normative considerations actually play a role in the 
fundamental competence underlying people’s causal 
attributions. Then, the widely held belief, one that 
mental causation should be understood as something like a 
scientific hypothesis, or the other that mental causation 
should be grounded on a purely naturalistic relation 
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between events, should be discarded. Our ordinary 
practices of attributing mental causation have an 
essential normative element – they are concerned not only 
with what is the case but also with what ought to be the 
case.  
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CHAPTER 5 
INTENTIONAL ACTION AND NORMATIVE CONSIDERATIONS 
 
 
While there is a disagreement among people 
concerning how to analyze the concept of intentional 
action, everyone seemingly agrees that the distinction 
between intentional and not-intentional44 action plays an 
important role in our collective folk psychology. 
 According to the usual account we have some 
independent ground of what it means for an action to be 
intentional: an action is intentional when it is done for 
a reason. However I will show in this chapter that 
without taking moral considerations, the usual account 
                                                 
44 In Mele and Moser 1994, they mention Harman’s sniper (1976). In 
firing his gun, the sniper’s position is knowingly informed to his 
enemy. Even though he does not intend to alert the enemy to his 
presence, he does seems to intentionally alert his enemy. In this 
case they say, he does  
 
accidentally alert the enemy, it is natural to insist that he 
does not unintentionally alert the enemy. Such insistence does 
not entail, however, that the sniper intentionally alerts the 
enemy. There is a middle ground between A-ing intentionally 
and A-ing unintentionally. We locate ‘side-effects actions’ of 
the kind in question on that ground. In so far as such actions 
are not done unknowingly, inadvertently, or accidentally, they 
are not unintentional. In so far as the agent is not aiming at 
the performance of these actions, either as ends or as means 
to (or constituents of) ends, they are not intentional either. 
We shall say that they are non-intentional. (230-231)  
 
Mele and Sverdlik (1996) also claim that there is a middle ground 
between unintentionally Φ-ing and intentionally Φ-ing, namely, non-
intentionally Φ-ing. I am not concerned with this issue in this work, 
though. 
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cannot cover all the categories of intentional actions. 
The thought that people are always starting with a 
judgment that an agent acted intentionally and then use 
it as input to a process that eventually yields, for 
example, a moral judgment, is ungrounded. The correct 
procedure needs in some cases to start with moral 
considerations and then use them to input a process that 
eventually yields a judgment that the behavior in 
question is intentional. This position is similar to the 
one that we saw in causal explanations.  
According to the usual account causal explanations 
count as causal if they are grounded in causal relations. 
However, as argued earlier, the primacy of the 
explanatory practice over the ontological commitment 
reverses the usual account; explanations come first, such 
that an explanation is causal if we accept it as such. 
Here by reinterpreting the notion of causation we regain 
the causal efficacy of the mental. The problem raised by 
the Exclusion Argument, as we already saw, takes a wrong 
point of departure by always beginning with a 
metaphysical notion of causation instead of grounding the 
notion of causation on our explanatory practices. 
Likewise the usual account of intentional actions takes a 
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wrong point of departure when it always begins with the 
notion of intentional actions as actions done for reasons, 
therefore neglecting the point of grounding the notion of 
intentional actions on normative considerations.  
In this chapter I will explain why we need sometimes 
to reverse the usual account of intentional actions in 
order to cover all the categories of intentional actions. 
I will first argue for this point by examining some cases 
on intentional actions, which show that the moral 
qualities of the outcome of a behavior strongly influence 
people’s judgments as to whether that behavior should be 
considered intentional. Here the most important point to 
notice is that people not only rely on their judgments of 
action’s being intentional to make moral judgments, but 
the contrary is true as well – i.e. sometimes people’s 
moral judgments influence their ascriptions of 
intentional action.  
In order to show this point I will examine some of 
the views that have been forwarded in the philosophy of 
action literature concerning intentional actions. That 
means, I set the stage by examining some of the problems 
associated with the concepts of intentional action that 
are frequently discussed in the literature on the 
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philosophy of action: lucky actions and unintended side 
effects.   
In section 5.1 I will discuss the so-called Standard 
Account of intentional action and its difficulties. This 
discussion is closely related to the discussion of 
section 5.5, where what I call the Simple View is 
introduced. I will pay particular attention to the view 
concerning the relationship between skill, control, 
foresight and intentional actions (section 5.2), and 
between unintentional side effects and intentional 
actions (section 5.3) with regard to the Standard Account. 
I will then provide an explanation of understanding 
intentional action by invoking and distinguishing 
motivating reasons from normative reasons. Finally, I 
will show that there is a gap between what is required 
for intending to Φ and what is sufficient for 
intentionally Φ–ing by rejecting what I shall call the 
Simple View. I elicit, by rejecting the Simple View, a 
theoretical ground for taking normative perspectives in 
dealing with the concept of intentional actions. 
 
5.1 THE STANDARD ACCOUNT OF INTENTIONAL ACTIONS 
AND ITS DIFFICULTIES 
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The common starting point for theories of 
intentional action is the observation that intentional 
action is action done for a reason. In her groundbreaking 
work Intention (1957), Elizabeth Anscombe expresses the 
thought as follows:  
 
What distinguished actions which are intentional 
from those which are not? The answer that I shall 
suggest is that they are the actions to which a 
certain sense of the question ‘Why?’ is given 
application; the sense is of course that in which 
the answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting.” 
(Anscombe 1957: 9) 
 
 
I will characterize this account as the “Standard 
Account”45:  
[The Standard Account]: An agent Φ-es intentionally 
if and only if she Φ-es for a reason. 
 
The ‘for a reason’ locution implies that what the agent 
did can be explained by citing her reason for acting. The 
explanation, according to this account, will be an 
explanation of a certain sort; it will be an explanation 
of what the agent did from her point of view.46 Thus the 
                                                 
45 Audi also claims that all actions done for a reason are 
intentional (1986: 514). 
46 Anscombe held, following Wittgenstein, that to give a reason for 
an action is not to provide a causal explanation of it. Anscombe 
relied on the justifying function of reasons, as did philosophers 
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Standard Account starts out with the assumption that we 
have some independent notion of what it means for a 
behavior to be performed for a reason and that we can use 
this notion to arrive at an understanding of the 
distinction between intentional and not-intentional 
behavior. 
 We are entitled to infer that Davidson also 
subscribes to the Standard Account. According to him 
someone is the agent of all events for which there is at 
least one true description under which he did something 
intentionally (1971: 46). In another essay Davidson 
indicates that acting intentionally implies acting for a 
reason. He puts it this way: 
  
 [Suppose that the agent’s] action is intentional. We 
 must therefore be able to abstract from his behavior 
 and state of mind a piece of practical reasoning the 
 conclusion of which is, or would be if the 
 conclusion were drawn from the premises, that the 
 action … performed is desirable.47 (1969: 32-33) 
 
 
In other words, in order for an action to be intentional, 
the agent must have in mind a reason, or reasons, which 
rationalize her action as to she performs it. I do not 
                                                                                                                                           
such as Melden. Giving a reason helps us understand why the agent 
did what she did. I will take it to be true, however, following 
Davidson, that the reason for an action is its cause.  
47 The desirability here should be from the agent’s point of view. 
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think that Davidson means that the agent must consciously 
work through a piece of practical reasoning; instead, 
what is necessary is that the reason be present in her 
mind, present from her point of view, and that it should 
play a role in how and why she acts.48  
 However the concept of intentional action comes 
sometimes apart with reason-explanations. The Standard 
Account is challenged by some cases of extraordinary luck. 
The case I will examine in section 5.2 is the case where 
in order for an agent to intentionally Φ, her Φ–ing must 
be the result of a certain amount of skill or control. In 
other words, the claim is that an agent cannot 
intentionally Φ if her Φ–ing was primarily the result of 
luck. In cases where the agent seems not to have enough 
control over the effect of the behavior, people do not 
use the same criteria to decide whether the effect of the 
behavior was intentional. Therefore some people claim 
that an agent cannot intentionally Φ if her Φ–ing was 
primarily the result of luck. The problem is that the 
                                                 
48 Davidson’s position is in fact weaker than the Standard Account 
since Davidson seems to be silent about the issue as to whether 
everything done for a reason is intentional.  
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Standard Account of intentional actions is not able to 
deal with this case. 
 Causal deviance is another similar challenge that is 
traditionally raised against the Standard Account. There 
are cases such that an action was done for a reason, 
however it seems not be taken as intentional because of 
causal deviance.49 In Chapter Six I will show, as in the 
cases involving skill/luck, that the moral qualities of 
the outcome of a behavior in the cases of causal deviance 
strongly influence people’s judgments as to whether that 
behavior should be considered intentional. 
 An unintended but foreseen side effect also gives a 
counterexample to the Standard Account. The unintended 
side effects are not among the things agents can be said 
to bring about intentionally because the effects were not 
done for a reason. I will argue for the claim that the 
account of intentional actions, in some cases, will be 
affected by moral considerations. Now let’s take a look 
at those challenges in turn. 
 
                                                 
49 I will deal with the problem of causal deviance in Chapter Six 
because the problem is closely related to mental causation debate 
itself. 
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5.2 THE CHALLENGE TO THE STANDARD ACCOUNT: 
SKILL/LUCK 
 
 
 The Standard Account is challenged by some cases of 
extraordinary luck. While any Φ–ing that involves too 
much luck to be regarded as intentional, it is possible 
for Φ–ing to be explained using reasons. What this means 
is that there are actions, done for reasons, that are not 
intentional.  
 Consider a case in which an agent is trying to 
perform a behavior and actually does succeed in 
performing that behavior. And now suppose that the agent 
didn’t really have the skill to perform that behavior in 
any reliable fashion, so that ultimately the agent only 
manages to succeed through sheer luck. Harman gives an 
example involving a sniper who shoots a bull’s-eye 
(Harman 1976: 433-34). The sniper is trying to shoot and 
actually does shoot the bull’s-eye, but only succeeds in 
performing the behavior through sheer luck. The point in 
this case is that the sniper didn’t really have control 
over the result; success in shooting the bull’s eye is 
not the result of any relevant skill or control on the 
sniper’s part. The sniper’s success is through luck. In 
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this case, our intuition strongly says that his shooting 
is not intentional. The question is simply whether people 
use the same rule to determine whether a behavior was 
performed intentionally as they use to determine whether 
a behavior was performed for a reason, since according to 
the Standard Account people determine whether a behavior 
is intentional by examining whether it is performed for a 
reason. And the answer is, if the above intuition is 
right, they don’t; an agent cannot intentionally Φ if her 
Φ–ing was primarily the result of luck, a counterexample 
for the Standard Account. 
 What this shows is that it seems intuitively 
plausible that if an agent has no control over the result 
of her Φ–ing, or she luckily manages to Φ, we should not 
say that she intentionally Φ-es. From this consideration, 
some philosophers, for example, Mele and Moser (1994), 
say that when luck plays a role in the success of an 
attempt at Φ–ing, the Φ–ing is generally deemed too 
coincidental to count as intentional, and conclude that a 
relevant amount of skill or control is a necessary 
condition for an action to be performed intentionally: an 
intentional action cannot be the result of luck. 
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 However the issue is complicated, since even though 
Φ-ing was not the result of any relevant skill on the 
part of the agent, there are related cases where people 
often judge that an agent Φ-ed intentionally. In order to 
show this Harman gives another example involving a sniper 
who shoots a soldier. In this case, however, the 
situation changes when the sniper succeeds in shooting 
the soldier even though it is performed by luck. People’s 
intuition is saying that the shooting, if it succeeds, is 
intentional. Harman claims: 
 
The reason why we say that the sniper intentionally 
kills the soldier but do not say that he 
intentionally shoots a bull’s-eye is that we think 
that there is something wrong with killing and 
nothing wrong with shooting a bull’s-eye. (Harman 
1976: 433-34) 
 
 
What the above case shows is that in some cases our 
concept of intentional action is not sensitive to 
considerations of skill, luck, and control. This case 
alone shows Mele and Moser wrong; we should reject any 
analyses of the ordinary concept of intentional action 
that has skill, control or the absence of luck as a 
necessary condition. This case also shows that the 
concept of skill, luck, control does not help to analyze 
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the concept of intentional action. Instead, in some 
special cases, we seem to need to look at the moral 
status of the result of agent’s Φ–ing itself. The two 
examples are structurally similar. However while in the 
former case, we are not able to attribute, for example, 
blame to the agent in question, in the latter we want to 
ascribe blame: in the former case our intuitions tell us 
that luckily bringing-about is not sufficient to justify 
the attribution of intentionally bringing-about; in the 
latter our intuitions say that luckily bringing-about is 
sufficient for intentionally bringing-about. The average 
person’s intuition about the cases concerning the 
features of skill, luck, and control seems to sometimes 
depend on the moral status of the behavior itself. Namely 
moral considerations play a role in people’s intuitions 
whether an agent’s behavior is intentional. In this way, 
normative considerations come in the talk of intentional 
actions, which is the subject of Chapter Six.   
 
5.3 THE CHALLENGE TO THE STANDARD ACCOUNT: 
UNINTENDED SIDE EFFECTS 
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There has been a great deal of controversy in the 
philosophical literature about the role that trying and 
foresight play in the concept of intentional actions. 
Some philosophers think that trying is a necessary 
condition for intentional action (Adams 1986; McCann 
1986); others argue that a certain kind of foresight can 
actually be sufficient even in the absence of trying 
(Ginet 1990). The distinction between these two views 
comes out most clearly in cases of what might be called 
unintended but foreseen side effects. An outcome can be 
considered an unintended foreseen side effect when (1) 
the agent was not specifically trying to bring it about 
but (2) the agent chose to do something that she foresaw 
would involve bringing it about. If trying is a necessary 
condition for an action being intentional, the agent did 
not bring about the side effect intentionally. By 
contrast if foresight is sufficient for an action being 
intentional, the agent brought about the effect 
intentionally. In the latter case then an unintended 
foreseen side effect gives a counterexample for the 
Standard Account; the unintended side effects are not 
among the things agents can be said to bring about 
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intentionally because the effects were not done for a 
reason. 
 Let me consider the following Strategic Bomber case 
of an unintended but foreseen side effect: 
[The Strategic Bomber (SB)]: SB intends to bomb a 
munitions plant as a means to his ultimate end of 
winning the just war, knowing that there is a school 
next door, therefore foreseeing that his bombing 
will bring about civilian deaths as an unwanted but 
unavoidable side effect. (Bratman 1987: ch. 10) 
 
SB acts in pursuit of a certain end – he wants to win the 
just war – and on the basis of a certain belief – that he 
can win the war by bombing a munitions factory. What he 
does can be explained in the “for a reason” sense under 
descriptions like “bombing a munitions factory.” We can 
therefore say he blows up the factory intentionally. His 
behavior, however, cannot be rationalized under the 
description, “killing the civilians,” since killing the 
civilians cannot be explained as something done for a 
reason. If the Standard Account is right, we cannot say 
SB killed the civilians intentionally, because there is 
no explanation of the ‘for a reason’ variety of his 
killing them.  
 Our intuition, however, says that SB seems to be, 
for example, responsible for killing the civilians. Our 
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intuition strongly suggests that he killed them 
intentionally. On the Standard Account, however, this is 
not a conclusion we are entitled to reach. The demand of 
dealing with the cases of unintended side effects 
conflicts with the Standard Account of intentional action. 
On the Standard Account the category of intentional 
actions is quite narrow. If our intuition is right, then 
any criterion for identifying whether an action is 
intentional or not would have to deal with the above case. 
What this seems to suggest is that whether I Φ–ed 
something intentionally depends, sometimes, on whether 
the thing I Φ–ed had good or bad effects, though I did 
not intend to bring them about. The subject of section 
6.2 is to show that the account of intentional action, in 
this unintended side effect case, will be affected by 
moral considerations.  
  
5.4 NORMATIVE/MOTIVATING REASONS 
 
 Let’s take a look at the two notions of reasons, 
normative and motivating reasons.50 This is a distinction 
                                                 
50 One might wonder which of these is at issue in Davidson?s account 
of reasons for actions. Davidson seems to want to use the technical 
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between reasons that merely justify a certain type of 
action, and reasons that explain why an agent performed 
such an action. In the former case, we might speak of “a 
reason for a certain sort of action,” and in the latter 
case “a reason why an agent performed such an action.” 
 The notion of normative reason is one that we 
consider when we speak in favor of, or against, a course 
of action. When we deliberate about what to do, we 
reflect on such considerations as they bear on possible 
action, and if they show that an action should be done, 
we are bound, if we are rational, to act on them. That 
such consideration can obligate us to act is why we call 
them reasons. Sometimes by the expression “an agent’s 
reasons” we are concerned with the normative claims of a 
theory of rational action, so that we might say, for 
example, that all agents have good reasons for 
                                                                                                                                           
notion of a primary reason to speak of the motivating sort of 
reasons, those that are explanatory. However, Davidson not only 
speaks of “a primary (motivating) reason why an agent performed an 
action,” but also of “a primary reason for an action.” In stating 
his first necessary condition concerning primary reasons, Davidson 
speaks of “a primary reason why an agent performed an action,” which 
clearly indicates that what is being characterized is the sort of 
reason that explains why an agent performed such an action. 
Davidson’s second necessary condition, a primary reason for an 
action is its cause, is certainly intended as a correlative 
condition to the first one and concerns these explanatory reasons as 
well, but the terminology he uses in stating the second condition 
fails to make this clear. Maybe he has this in mind when he says the 
second necessary condition: “R is a primary reason why an agent 
performed the action A only if R caused A.” 
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cultivating their talents. Maybe what this means is that 
cultivating one’s talent serves as a means to the various 
ends that agents might pursue. It does not follow from 
this, of course, that all agents want to cultivate their 
talent or even that they would agree that cultivating 
their talent is a good thing. When concerned about the 
relation between reasons and actions, to speak of an 
agent’s reasons is to speak of reasons the agent actually 
holds, whether these reasons conform to our normative 
theory of rational action or not. The reasoning in 
question need not meet the standards of our normative 
theory of rational action: the standards which specify 
which ends agents ought to pursue and which actions are 
the most reliable or reasonable means to those ends.  
 Our normative reasons do not only obligate us, but 
motivate us if we are rational, and this talk of 
motivation brings us to the notion of a motivating reason. 
One way to understand motivating reasons is to link them 
with the specific question type that they typically 
answer, “Why did an agent Φ?”. Consequently, it is 
sometimes said that a motivating reason is a reason why.  
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Thus, philosophers often claim that there are two 
different sorts of reasons: reasons for action that have 
a normative bearing on things we might do and reasons 
that explain why we do those things. Yet if we 
acknowledge that agents sometimes act for reasons, i.e. 
act on the basis of normative considerations, then it 
seems that they are motivated by those reasons. Indeed, 
to say that rational agents must have the capacity to act 
for reasons is to say exactly that normative reasons must 
be capable of motivating them, i.e. of being motivating 
reasons.   
 
5.5 THEORETICAL GROUND FOR NORMATIVE 
CONSIDERATIONS 
 
 
 In this section I show that the so-called Simple 
View is false. I will characterize the Simple View as 
follows: 
 
 [The Simple View]: One intentionally Φ-ed only if 
 one intended to Φ. 
 
 
The Standard Account of intentional action entails the 
Simple View. The importance of discussing the Simple View 
on our purpose is that by showing the falsity of the 
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Simple View we have a theoretical ground for normative 
considerations in dealing with the concept of intentional 
actions.  
 Philosophers have tried to give an account of the 
relationship between “intentionally Φ-ing” and “intend to 
Φ.” According to the Simple View in order for an agent to 
Φ intentionally, she must have intended to Φ; one is 
entitled to infer, from the fact that an agent 
intentionally Φ-ed, that she intended to Φ.51 On this 
view there is no difference in scope between the intended 
and the intentional. 
 The Standard Account of intentional action entails 
the Simple View. For if one accepts the Standard Account 
of what is done intentionally, there will be no room left 
over for a distinction between the intended and the 
intentional action.52 On the Standard Account it makes no 
sense to speak of doing something intentionally when what 
the agent does is contrary to what he desires. 
 Audi puts forth the example of the poor shooter who 
attempts to hit a bull’s eye on a distant target (Audi, 
                                                 
51 Adams (1997; 1986) and McCann (1986) hold this view. 
52 The simple view, however, does not necessarily entail the Standard 
Account, since it is possible to associate the intended with the 
intentional and to associate neither with what is done for a reason.  
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1973: 401). Much to his surprise, the shooter hits the 
target, the bull’s eye. Davidson offers a similar case in 
which a person tries to make ten carbon copies on a 
typewriter while doubting that it can be done (1978: 92). 
Again, much to our typist’s surprise, each of the copies 
is successfully made. It is strongly intuitive to some, 
including Audi and Davidson, that in both of these 
examples the agents intentionally Φ-ed. If a strong 
belief requirement, the requirement that S intends that p 
only if S believes that p, is placed on intending such 
that intending to Φ implies believing that one will Φ and 
if there are cases where one intentionally Φ-es even 
though she doubted that she was Φ-ing at the time, then 
the Simple View must be false. 
 Bratman (1987: 113-116) gives a more direct argument 
against the Simple View. In the words of Bratman, “The 
Simple View supposes that there must be a tight fit 
between what is done intentionally and what is intended” 
(119). His argument involves an example of a video game 
in which the player is able to play a missile target game 
with each hand. The game is constructed in such a way 
that one wins if one hits one of the two targets. One 
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cannot, however, hit both targets or else the game will 
shut down. When one hits one of the targets, it is clear, 
according to Bratman, that one has done so intentionally. 
Thus, if the Simple View is correct, one must have 
intended to hit the target. The problem, says Bratman, is 
that one must have intended to hit the other target as 
well. However one cannot have so intended because one’s 
intentions would not be consistent – they would involve 
one in a criticizable form of irrationality. Yet 
according to Bratman, “it seems clear that I need be 
guilty of no such irrationality: the strategy of giving 
each game a try seems perfectly reasonable” (114). Thus, 
the Simple View, says Braman, must be false. 
 There would be gap between what is required for 
intending to Φ and what is sufficient for intentionally 
Φ–ing if the Simple View is false. And I think the 
arguments against the Simple View are persuasive. Then 
the intentional and the intended must be pulled apart. 
What this means is that the boundaries of intentional 
actions are sometimes derived from things that agents do 
not intend to do. Now because of the gap, we must be, in 
some cases, able to treat the case of Φ–ing intentionally 
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as a non-psychological notion. The concept of an 
intention to Φ is entirely a “psychological” concept. 
Intentions are connected with motivating reasons. You 
intend to Φ something only if you view yourself as having 
a reason to Φ it. Intentions are a species of reason for 
acting in the explanatory sense. Since normative 
judgments, seen from third-party perspective, can apply 
irrespective of the psychological state of the agent, we 
will find intentional action applicable in many cases in 
which the agent does not do what she does ‘for a reason’ 
in the explanatory sense of that phrase.53 
 What this consideration shows is that the criteria 
for intentional action must be wide enough to include the 
normative perspectives of third-person point of view as 
well as the psychological perspectives. I take this as 
providing a theoretical ground that we should take 
normative considerations of third-person point of view in 
dealing with the concept of intentional actions. On the 
one hand, an agent does something intentionally if doing 
it was her reason for doing what she did, namely the 
                                                 
53 Third-party perspective because it does not matter whether or not 
the reasons in normative judgments provide the agent with a motive 
to perform the action. 
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consideration that moved her to perform the action. Of 
course, this is an explanation consistent with the 
Standard Account of intentional action. On the other hand, 
people in some cases judge that an agent does something 
intentionally by taking normative considerations on the 
basis of third-party concerns, rather than on the basis 
of how things looked from the perspective of the agent. 
What is done intentionally should, in specific cases, 
accommodate the demand that normative considerations make 
of action, while intending to Φ captures the 
psychological perspective we adopt when we are concerned 
to explain what an agent does in terms of her reasons for 
acting. The notion of intention is captured by agent’s 
explanatory reasons, but the intentional is, in some 
specific cases, turned toward the normative therefore is 
not wholly understood by considering only explanatory 
reasons. While what is intended sides with explanatory 
reason, what is done intentionally sides partly with 
normative reason.  
 
5.6 CONCLUSION 
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 Everyone seemingly agrees that the distinction 
between intentional and not-intentional action plays an 
important role in commonsense psychology (CP). People 
have classified behaviors as intentional or not-
intentional by trying to give an explanation of the 
conception of intentional actions without considering 
more important questions such as normativity. Some 
philosophers, who hold the view that CP is best 
understood as a tool for predicting and explaining 
behavior, suggest that CP is a kind of proto-science. And 
they appear to feel that normative considerations just 
couldn’t be playing a fundamental role. The view that CP 
is a kind of proto-science is, as I argued in Chapter 
Four, ungrounded. I take it that CP is a practice. I 
argued that our explanatory practice should guide our 
ontological commitments.  
 The solution for the problem generated by the 
Standard Account in explaining intentional action is to 
rethink the notion of intentional action. In this chapter 
I show some hints that moral considerations have an 
impact on people’s judgments of intentional action. We 
will see that people’s concept of intentional action is 
bound up in a fundamental way with evaluative questions. 
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I will show, by defining the concept of intentional 
action, that folk ascriptions of intentional action are 
sensitive to normative considerations, not limited to 
moral considerations. Based on this claim, I will argue 
that normative considerations play some role in solving 
the problem of mental causation debate.  
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CHAPTER 6 
NORMATIVE CONSIDERATIONS AND MENTAL CAUSATION 
 
 
 The task of defining intentional action has given 
rise to heated debates in contemporary philosophy. As the 
previous chapter hinted, however, it is not enough to 
fully understand the phenomena of intentional action by 
explaining and analyzing only the agent’s reasons that 
accompany each type of action. We saw some hints that 
normative considerations have an impact on people’s 
judgments of intentional action.  
 In Chapter Five, I argued for this point by invoking 
a theoretical ground for us to include normative 
considerations of third-person point of view in dealing 
with the concept of intentional actions. Then, the 
definition of intentional action should be bound up with 
evaluative questions because the concept of intentional 
action should be sensitive to normative considerations. 
The criteria for intentional action must be wide enough 
to include the normative perspectives of a third-person 
point of view as well as the psychological perspectives. 
 In this chapter I will sharpen this idea by looking 
at recent empirical research and propose to understand 
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intentional action in terms of both motivating and 
normative reasons. I will provide a novel conception of 
intentional action by distinguishing normative reasons 
from motivating reasons. The definition should be 
reflected on both reasons: on the one hand, an agent does 
something intentionally if they were her reasons for 
doing what she did, namely the consideration that moved 
her to perform the action, consideration consistent with 
the Standard Account of intentional action; on the other 
hand, we say normative considerations play a role in 
people’s intuitions whether an agent’s behavior is 
intentional.  
 The proposal recommends itself as being capable of 
dealing with many problems, including the problems raised 
by unintended side effects and lucky actions. More 
importantly, the proposal is able to deal with the 
problem of casual deviance and consequently is promising 
in that it avoids epiphenomenalism of mental properties. 
While the solution for the problem generated by the 
Standard Account in explaining intentional action is to 
rethink the notion of intentional action, the causal 
efficacy of the mental is to be guaranteed by 
reinterpreting the notion of causation.    
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In section 6.1 I provide my definition of 
intentional action. The criterion for intentional action 
I am suggesting straddles the psychological and the 
normative perspectives in order to deal with problematic 
cases. In section 6.2 I address the problem of unintended 
side effects. An empirical research performed by Knobe 
(Knobe 2003a) shows that people’s intuitions are 
influenced by the moral qualities of the side effect 
itself. This intuition is reflected in my definition. 
Section 6.3 deals with the cases involving luck. In this 
case normative considerations also play a role. I show 
one merit of my definition; it explains people’s 
different intuitions on whether an agent performs a 
behavior intentionally when the result seems to be due to 
luck. I also show that my definition confirms the result 
of Chapter Five that skill and control are not necessary 
components of the concept of intentional action. Section 
6.4 is also dedicated to showing that the moral qualities 
of the outcome of a behavior in the cases of causal 
deviance influence people’s judgments as to whether that 
behavior should be considered intentional. We will also 
see the merit of my definition in being able to deal with 
people’s different intuitions on whether an agent 
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performs a behavior intentionally when the result seems 
to be due to causal deviance. In section 6.5 I will 
examine the difference between mental explanation and 
naturalistic explanation. From this consideration I claim 
that because of the justificatory factor in dealing with 
intentional action, it is difficult to see how NCC can be 
true. I argue that NCC is an error due to confusing a 
mental explanation with a purely naturalistic explanation 
between events. I further claim that this insight works 
nicely in the case of causal deviance. Finally I argue 
that NCC is just the result from supposing that there is 
no gap between explanatory reason and justificatory 
reason.  
 
 
6.1 INTENTIONAL ACTION 
 
 
 The distinction between intentional and not-
intentional actions plays an important role in 
commonsense psychology (CP). For example, in ordinary 
situations, the question of whether or not an action was 
performed intentionally can make a big difference in how 
we respond to it. However there is disagreement among 
philosophers as to how to analyze and define the concept 
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of intentional action. The issue of the debate is whether 
moral/normative considerations do affect our application 
of the concept of intentional action. Some people claim 
that moral considerations should not act on our 
ascriptions of intentional action (Butler 1978; Mele and 
Sverdlik 1996). On this view, while we may correctly 
appeal to the fact that an action is intentional in order 
to determine whether the agent in question is morally 
responsible, the converse is not the case; attributions 
of responsibility should not influence our ascriptions of 
intentional action. Others (Bratman 1987; Harman 1976; 
Knobe 2003; 2004; Nadelhoff 2004) claim that the 
ascriptions of intentional action are intimately bound up 
with moral considerations. It may, at first, seem strange 
to take an account of moral considerations as a relevant 
factor as to whether the agent performed the action 
intentionally. However, the latter view has now received 
support in the philosophical literature.  
 I gave, in the previous chapter, some hints that 
with regard to the relationship between unintended side 
effects, skill/luck and intentional action people’s 
intuitions are influenced by the moral status of the 
behavior. I also provided a theoretical ground to include 
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normative perspectives in dealing with the concept of 
intentional actions. This will be confirmed by people’s 
intuitions on the concepts of intentional action, which 
is the subject of the next section. 
 Here I will provide a novel conception of 
intentional action. The conception that considers both 
explanatory and normative perspectives in dealing with 
the concept of intentional action, I argue, recommends 
itself as being capable of solving problems generated by 
the Standard Account of intentional action with regard to 
unintended side effects and lucky actions. More 
importantly for our purposes, however, it provides a way 
of looking at the mental causation debate by successfully 
dealing with causal deviance problems. The conception is 
as follows:  
 
[Intentional action] An agent’s Φ–ing is intentional 
iff either (i) it is done for her motivating reason 
(if it is not the case of luck or causal deviance) 
or (ii) the fact that certain consequences would 
occur was a justifying reason not to perform the 
action. 
 
 
The definition pays close attention to the normative 
considerations as well as motivating reasons. On the one 
hand, an agent’s Φ–ing is intentional if it was done for 
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her motivating reason, namely, the consideration that 
moved her to perform the action. On the other hand, an 
agent’s Φ–ing is intentional if from a third-party 
perspective, the fact that the consequence would occur 
was a “reason” not to perform the action, whether or not 
the reason in the latter sense was one that weighed with 
the agent as supplying a motive not to perform the 
action.54 The notion of “reason” in this account thus 
alternates between an “explanatory” and a “justificatory” 
sense. 
 The difficulty in trying to provide an account for 
intentional actions stems from the task of harmonizing 
the two different perspectives, the psychological and the 
normative points of view. However, the definition I 
provide successfully deals with the difficulty. The 
former perspective comes in when we are concerned with 
understanding what led to a person to do something. The 
condition (i) reflects this perspective. In this case we 
focus on how things looked from the agent’s point of view, 
and in particular, we look for an explanation in terms of 
what the agent thought she was accomplishing in so doing. 
                                                 
54 The agent need not have been aware of the considerations. 
 174
When we are concerned with whether an action is 
intentionally done in some specific cases, however, we 
need to consider a broader standard than we did when we 
adopted the explanatory standpoint. Here the normative 
aspect comes in. The problem is that the broader standard, 
namely, the justificatory standpoint we adopt when we 
focus on this wider class of doings cannot be imposed on 
the basis of the explanatorily motivational standpoint 
the agent could have of what she did. The justificatory 
standpoint cannot rest on features which are 
psychological or motivational to the action, but rather 
must be imposed from outside. The condition (ii) reflects 
just this perspective. The “from the outside” perspective 
may happen to match with the perspective that weighed 
with the agent as supplying a motive not to perform the 
action but we have no reason to expect that the “from the 
outside” perspective is on the same ground as the 
explanatorily motivational perspective. Saying the 
consideration is a reason against performing the action 
is a claim of quite a different sort from saying it is a 
reason I regarded as weighing against my action. The 
third party consideration has a very different status 
from the agent’s “internal” considerations. 
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To say that there is a justifying reason to Φ–ing is 
to say that: 
 
[T]here is some normative requirement that she Φ’s, 
and … that her Φ–ing is justified from the 
perspective of the normative system that generates 
that requirement. (Smith: 95)  
 
 
The perspective of generating those requirements may be 
diverse: it would be from rationality, prudence, or 
morality. Here I am not concerned the issue of whether 
moral perspective can be reduced to rationality 
perspective. All I claim here is that the perspectives 
depend on which societies we live. Therefore there is a 
justifying reason not to buy a lottery ticket if buying a 
lottery ticket is banned in the society, and there may be 
no justifying reason, for example, in an amoral society, 
not to kill an innocent person. This is the reason that 
my criterion for intentional action is not limited to 
just moral considerations but expanded to normative 
considerations. 
 
6.2 UNINTENDED SIDE EFFECTS REVISITED 
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 We saw in Chapter Five that people’s intuitions 
about the cases concerning unintended side effect 
sometimes seem to depend on the moral status of the side 
effect itself. Namely moral considerations play a role in 
people’s intuitions whether an agent’s behavior is 
intentional. In this section I provide a result from a 
recent research to support this point, and take the 
result of the research as an empirical ground for us to 
include normative considerations with regard to 
intentional actions.  
According to the result of Knobe’s research (Knobe 
2003a) people’s intuitions appear to be influenced by the 
moral qualities of the side effect itself. According to 
this research people seem to be considerably more willing 
to say that the agent brought about the side effect 
intentionally when they regard that side effect as bad 
than they are when they regard the side effect as good.  
Knobe (2003a) presents data that are taken to 
support this view. Knobe’s data show an asymmetry in 
people’s judgments. In a case of the side effect when 
people are asked whether the agent brought about the 
outcome intentionally, they are more inclined to judge 
that the agent did bring about the outcome intentionally, 
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if the outcome was perceived as causing a harm. There is 
an asymmetry because people are not inclined to see an 
agent’s action as intentional if the outcome is perceived 
as causing a benefit. This idea is best understood by 
looking at the following examples that Knobe gives: 
 
[Example 1] The vice-president of a company went to 
the chairman of the board and said, ‘We are thinking 
of starting a new program. It will help us increase 
profits, but it will also harm the environment.’ The 
chairman of the board answered, ‘I don’t care at all 
about harming the environment. I just want to make 
as much profit as I can. Let’s start the new 
program.’ They started the new program. Sure enough, 
the environment was harmed. (2003a: 191) 
 
[Example 2] The vice-president of a company went to 
the chairman of the board and said, ‘We are thinking 
of starting a new program. It will help us increase 
profits, and it will also help the environment.’ The 
chairman of the board answered, ‘I don’t care at all 
about helping the environment. I just want to make 
as much profit as I can. Let’s start the new program. 
They started the new program. Sure enough, the 
environment was helped. (2003a: 191)55 
 
 
Now Knobe invites us to ask whether the chairman of the 
board intentionally harms the environment in the first 
example, and intentionally helps the environment in the 
second example. By using the above examples, Knobe wants 
                                                 
55 Methodological objections may be raised against Knobbe's results. 
I will not pursue them here. It is sufficient for  my purposes that 
the results themselves, were they pursued in thought-experimental 
fashion, suggest robust intuitions. 
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to show us that the moral qualities of the outcome of a 
behavior strongly influence people’s judgments as to 
whether that behavior should be considered intentional, 
and actually he concludes that the result indicates that 
people’s concept of intentional action is influenced by 
moral considerations. The experiment shows that people 
are more likely to judge that a morally negative action 
or side effect was brought about intentionally than they 
are to judge that a structurally similar action or side 
effect that is morally positive was brought about 
intentionally.56 
We cannot claim credit for good things we do that we 
merely foresee will follow from our actions; in the 
second case the chairman of the board does not seem to be 
able to claim the beneficial effect. The natural thought, 
then, is that the chairman did not bring about the effect 
intentionally. However, we must be held responsible for 
the bad effects of the actions we foresee. In the first 
example the chairman can be blamed for the effect that he 
                                                 
56 People’s judgments on whether non-side effect actions are 
intentionally done are sensitive to positive moral considerations in 
a way that their judgments of side effect actions are not. In the 
case of unintended side effects we would need to explain why 
negative but not positive moral considerations affect people’s 
judgments concerning action’s being intentional. This is also one of 
the reasons that I gave the definition of intentional action either  
(i) or (ii).   
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foresees but not intended; he brought about the effect 
intentionally. What this means is that whether I did 
something intentionally depends, sometimes, on whether 
the thing I did had good or bad effects, though I did not 
intend to bring them about. This shows that the account 
of intentional actions, in special cases, will be 
affected by moral considerations.57 
 People’s intuition regarding the example is 
reflected in the definition of intentional action I gave 
in the previous section. If the effect is the case of 
unintended, but foreseen side effect, we do not look at 
the agent’s motivating reason to decide whether the 
effect of Φ–ing in question is intentional. Instead we 
need to look at the fact that certain consequences would 
occur was a justifying reason not to perform the action. 
 
6.3 SKILL/LUCK REVISITED 
 
 
 People’s intuitions about the cases involving luck 
are similar to the cases involving unintended side 
effects concerning the issue of an action’s being 
                                                 
57 Then this is a counterexample to the Simple View, a view that in 
order for an agent to Φ intentionally, she must have intended to Φ . 
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intentional. Like the cases we have seen in dealing with 
the problem of unintended side effects, normative 
considerations also play a role in the cases of lucky 
actions in determining whether an agent’s behavior is 
intentional. 
 We saw in Chapter Five that there was a problem in 
the Standard Account of intentional action in explaining 
the actions done with regard to skill/luck. People’s 
intuition regarding Harman’s sniper examples is reflected 
in the definition of intentional action I gave in the 
previous section. If an agent’s Φ–ing is a case of luck, 
we do not look at the agent’s motivating reason to decide 
whether her Φ–ing in question is intentional. Instead we 
need to look at a justifying reason not to perform to Φ. 
 Consider the case of winning a lottery ticket.  
Even though an agent really desires to win the lottery 
and she tries to win and actually does win the lottery, 
people would not say “she won the lottery intentionally,” 
because the success of winning the lottery is through 
sheer luck. Winning the lottery is not the result of any 
relevant skill or control on the agent’s part. The agent 
didn’t really have control over the result of the lottery. 
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People’s intuitions tell us that if an agent has no 
control over the result of her Φ–ing, or she luckily 
manages to Φ, we should not say that she intentionally Φ-
es. 
 Now the definition of intentional action I gave does 
not have any trouble in dealing with this intuition. Just 
ask whether there is any justifying reason not to win a 
lottery ticket. If the answer is “yes,” the agent won the 
lottery intentionally, If “no,” then the agent did not 
win intentionally. And I can claim with confidence that 
there seems to be no justifying reason not to win a 
lottery ticket. 
Let us examine the point in more detail by taking a 
look at a problem that has been provoked a great deal of 
controversy. It is the Analysis Problem No. 16, raised by 
Ronald Butler. The problem is the following: 
 
If Brown in an ordinary game of dice hopes to throw 
a six and does so, we do not say that he threw the 
six intentionally. On the other hand if Brown puts 
one cartridge into a six-chambered revolver, spins 
the chamber as he aims it at Smith and pulls the 
trigger hoping to kill Smith, we would say if he 
succeeded that he had killed Smith intentionally. 
How can this be so, since in both cases the 
probability of the desired result is the same? 
(Butler 1978: 113) 
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In order to solve the Analysis problem, we need to show 
why we refer to the former as an instance of not-
intentional action, and the latter as an instance of 
intentional action. What explains the difference of 
people’s intuition for these two structurally identical 
cases resulted from the different moral status of the two 
cases. The intuition says, as we saw in Chapter Five, 
people are more likely to judge that a morally negative 
action or side effect was brought about intentionally 
than they are to judge that a structurally similar non-
moral action or side effect was brought about 
intentionally. The difference between Brown’s rolling a 
six and his shooting Smith is that while nothing is wrong 
in the former, something is wrong in the latter. This 
difference explains the intuition that Brown did not 
intentionally roll a six whereas he did intentionally 
shoot Smith, even though his chances of success and his 
relevant control over the outcome are the same in both 
cases.  
 The definition I gave explains this intuition in 
Brown’s shooting case. In the event that the agent, from 
the third-party perspective, has a reason not to bring 
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about Smith’s death and yet she brings about his death, 
then, even though the killing was due to luck, we should 
judge that the agent brought about Smith’s death 
intentionally. Even though the agent’s rolling a six in a 
dice game is the same in chance of success as the case of 
shooting Smith, people do not say that the agent brought 
the effect out intentionally. Of course in this case the 
effect is not the result of any relevant skill on the 
part of the agent, and there is no problem of dealing 
with this case since it does not in any way conflict with 
normal people’s intuition. In order to use the definition 
of intentional action I gave, however, we need to ask the 
following questions, “is there any justifying reason not 
to roll a six?” and there seems to be no justifying 
reason not to roll a six in the dice game. Then the 
action in question is not intentional. 
 One merit of my definition is the fact that it 
explains the different intuitions on whether an agent 
performs a behavior intentionally when the result seems 
to be due to luck. I use the word “seems” because 
people’s intuitions vary on whether the case in question 
as one involving luck or not. According to Peacocke 
(1985), an agent who makes a successful attempt to hit a 
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croquet ball through a distant hoop intentionally hits 
the ball through the hoop even though the chances of 
hitting are extremely low. Some people, including me, do 
not agree with Peacocke. The possibility of the 
disagreement shows that sometimes it is not clear whether 
the case should be dealt with the lucky action. 
 Now the definition of intentional action I gave does 
not have any trouble dealing with this intuition. For 
example, consider Davidson’s typewriter example that we 
saw in Chapter Five. If someone says that the typist’s 
action is not intentional, as opposed to most people’s 
intuition, my definition is able to follow her rationale; 
she is dealing with the result of the agent’s action as 
being involved with luck. According to my definition if 
it is the case with luck, we need to ask whether there is 
a reason not to make ten copies, and the answer seems to 
be “no,” therefore the action is not intentional.58 
However, people’s intuition strongly suggests that the 
agent intentionally made the ten carbon copies. What this 
means is that the case in question is not a case with 
                                                 
58 The case, in fact, however, need to be analyzed in the following 
way: whether there is a reason not to make ten copies, and the 
answer, here, is “yes” because the agent actually doubts that she 
will do. 
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luck; in this case people put more interest in the 
question “whether it is done for the agent’s motivating 
reason” than the question “whether there is a justifying 
reason not to perform the action.” Peacocke’s intuition 
that the agent did hit a croquet ball intentionally seems 
to result from his emphasis on the fact that it is done 
for her reason, and so it is intentional, than on the 
fact that the case in question is one where luck is 
involved.  
The solution of the Analysis Problem and Harman’s 
sniper example, we saw in Chapter Five shows, that skill 
and control are not necessary components of the concept 
of intentional action. I showed that my definition of 
intentional action is able to deal with these cases, 
where normative considerations sometimes trump 
considerations of skill, luck, and control when people 
make judgments concerning actions’ being intentional. An 
action’s being intentional depends, in the above cases, 
on the answer to the question, “is there any justifying 
reason not to Φ?”. 
 
6.4 CAUSAL DEVIANCE 
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 In this section, I will show, as in the cases 
involving skill/luck and unintended side effects, that 
the moral qualities of the outcome of a behavior in the 
cases of causal deviance strongly influence people’s 
judgments as to whether that behavior should be 
considered intentional. I claim that in order to decide 
whether the effect of an action is intentionally done in 
the case of causal deviance we need to take account of 
normative considerations.  
 Common examples of deviance are two-fold, depending 
upon what portion of the causal chain gets attention. The 
first type of deviance, which is called primary deviance59, 
raises a problem about a relatively direct connection of 
the causal sequence between the motivating mental state 
that is supposed to cause an action and the bodily 
movement that is supposed to be the action. Another type 
of deviance commonly discussed, secondary deviance, 
locates the problematic event after the bodily movement 
has occurred. Primary deviance is thought to undermine 
the very possibility that a bodily movement can count as 
                                                 
59 This is Mele’s terminology. See Mele and Moser 1994. 
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an action60 in contrast to secondary deviance that 
apparently undermines the intentional status of an action 
but allows for the possibility of not-intentional actions. 
Some varieties of primary deviance, however, have 
encountered problems with the possibility of 
counterexamples where events caused and rationalized by 
mental states do not count as actions. 
 Davidson (1973: 79) provides an example of primary 
deviance. There is the case of the rock climber who wants 
to rid himself of the weight of his partner and believes 
that loosening his grip on the rope would do that. And 
his recognition of that so unnerves him that it causes 
his hand to tremble in such a way that he loosens his 
hold. Despite the fact that the movement of the climber’s 
hand is caused by the want and the belief, the agent did 
not, according to Davidson, loosen his hold 
intentionally.61 While an appropriate belief/desire pair 
of intentional attitudes may rationalize the event, some 
would be reluctant to say that the event of loosening his 
hold counts as an intentional action as well as an action. 
                                                 
60 Now in the cases of primary deviance our focus is changed into 
intentional movements, not intentional actions. However my main 
point works in these cases also. 
61 I will claim that actually the case in question is intentional. I 
will provide a counterexample to Davidson’s view later in this 
section.  
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This case counts as a typical case of basic deviance of 
causal sequence between the motivating mental states and 
the movement of the climber’s hand. 
 Before we turn to the example of secondary deviance, 
let us examine why Davidson thinks that the case in 
question is not intentional. Davidson claims that in this 
case “he never chose to loosen his hold, nor did he do it 
intentionally” (1973: 79). However, what’s the reason for 
Davidson to say that he did not loosen his hold 
intentionally? Davidson seems to think that it is not 
intentional because there is no right connection that 
must obtain between mental antecedents and bodily 
movement for action to count as intentional.  
Davidson says:  
Beliefs and desires that would rationalize an action 
if they caused it in the right way – through a 
course of practical reasoning, as we might try to 
saying – may cause it in other ways. If so, the 
action was not performed with the intention that we 
could have read off from the attitudes that caused 
it. (1973: 79)   
 
Davidson claims that the belief/desire pair did not cause 
the action in the right way. Maybe this is enough for him 
to say that the action in question is not intentional. If 
this is right, however, Davidson seems to claim that 
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every primary case of causal deviance is not intentional, 
and this seems to be incorrect in many respects.  
 Davidson may claim more than this. As I mentioned in 
Chapter Five, Davidson, following the Standard Account in 
a way, gives a necessary condition for action to be 
intentional; namely the agent must have a reason that 
rationalize her action. If there is no reason for the 
agent to Φ, then it is not intentional. Davidson may 
think that the climber’s loosening his hand was not 
intentionally done because the climber did not have any 
reason that he loosened his grip. 
 Let us now return to the example of secondary 
deviance, also discussed by Davidson. Here a man tries to 
kill someone by shooting him (1973: 78-79)62. However, his 
shot misses his victim by a mile, but makes a herd of 
pigs stampede, which in turn tramples his target to death. 
Although the victim’s death was caused by an appropriate 
belief/desire pair, we would not say that the would-be 
sniper intentionally killed the victim.63 
                                                 
62 This is an example of Daniel Bennett’s (Bennett 1965). 
63 I claim that this case is also intentional. 
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 In order to deal with the cases of causal deviance I 
argue that we need to look at the justifying reason.64 In 
Davidson’s example of trying to kill someone by shooting 
him, bringing about the effect of “killing someone” was 
the man’s reason for shooting. However, there is a 
deviance between the shooting and the event of killing. 
Because of the deviance Davidson is saying that the man 
did not kill the victim intentionally. However in the 
cases of causal deviance, like the lucky actions and 
unintended side effects, in order to see whether the 
victim’s death was done intentionally we need to ask a 
                                                 
64 In fact, there has been widespread belief that answering the 
problem of causal deviance adequately is tied directly to the 
theoretical task of providing necessary and sufficient conditions 
for the identification of an intentional action. This seems to 
follow from the fact that the Standard Account may characterize the 
intentional action in terms of its causal features. And if we take 
the Davidsonian route that the explanation of action for a reason is 
a kind of causal explanation, then one can provide a list of the 
necessary and sufficient conditions for identifying an event as an 
intentional action on the condition that one can identify the causal 
conditions required for a chain of events to produce an intentional 
action. However, we have seen several cases of countering the 
Standard Account of intentional action. 
  Others, for example Armstrong (1973), deal with the cases of 
causal deviance in a way that reasons, if they are to rationalize, 
must cause action “in the right kind of way.” However the effort has 
turned out to be unsuccessful. Causing an action in the right kind 
of way is to produce the effect by the right kind of causal route. 
This solution was also what Davidson followed one time. He tried to 
solve the problem by saying that the psychological antecedents that 
bring about action must cause the action “in the right way” if it is 
to count as intentional movement (1973: 78-79; 1978: 87). Davidson, 
however, acknowledged that there is some difficulty with attempting 
to solve the problem of causal deviance by using the locution “in 
the right way.” He said that it not only hardly gives any insight, 
but actually the search for looking for the meaning of the phrase 
“in the right way” turns out be an insurmountable task. 
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question, “was the fact that death would occur a 
justifying reason not to perform the shooting?”. If the 
answer is “yes,” then it was done intentionally. If “no,” 
it’s not intentional. Then, the death may be intentional 
on the condition that there is a reason not to perform 
the shooting that results the death. 
 Let’s take a look at Davidson’s climber again. 
Despite the fact that the movement of the climber’s hand 
is caused by his belief/desire pair, it seems not, 
according to Davidson, to be an intentional bodily 
movement. Rather, it is a purely accidental bodily 
movement that happens to match the climber’s motivating 
mental states. However, the fact that if he loosens his 
grip, then his partner would fall and it would cause him 
to a death, seems to be enough of a reason, from a third-
party perspective, against loosening his grip. If it 
shows that the action that follows from the belief/desire 
pair, regardless of causal deviance or not, should not be 
done for whatever reason, we are bound, if we are 
rational, not to act on it. This is the case where we 
have a justifying reason not to loosen his grip. Despite 
the fact that the causal route was deviant we seem to 
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want to say, contra Davidson, that the climber’s 
loosening was an intentional movement. 
 If you are not sure about the intuition about the 
loosening of climber’s being intentional, just take a 
look at Wilson’s example of the weightlifter (Wilson 
1989: 152). Like the climber’s case this is also a case 
of primary deviance. As Wilson sets up the example, a 
weightlifter’s intention to lift a very heavy weight 
causes him to become nervous, and that state of agitation 
provides just the nervous energy necessary for him to 
succeed in lifting the weight. That is, his accidentally 
produced state of nervousness is a crucial causal factor 
in his successful lifting of the weight. If the story 
ends here, there is no causal deviance. However, suppose 
the weightlifter should not be nervous, nor intend to get 
nervous, because studies have shown that getting nervous 
would sap his strength rather than enhance it. And also 
suppose that everybody, including the weightlifter, knows 
the result of the studies. Then the causal route from 
intention to action was deviant because it was not a 
route which the lifter intended, nor believed would be 
successful. He may never have lifted a weight that way 
before, and he may never do it again. None of these 
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things prevent the agent’s intention to lift a very heavy 
weight from causing the lifting of the weight. And none 
of these things undermines, in the slightest, the claim 
that his lift was an intentional action, which, according 
to my definition, it surely was.65 I said that one of the 
notable features of my criterion for intentional action 
is that it is not limited to just moral considerations. 
And this is a merit because it is able to deal with 
Wilson’s weightlifter very easily. The question to be 
asked in this case is, “is there any justifying reason 
not to lift the weight by using nervous energy?”. And in 
this case the answer is “yes,” making the lifting 
intentional.  
 Now imagine Davidson’s climber again, but there is 
only this difference: the climber is holding some baggage 
instead of his partner. Now, the question to be asked in 
order to decide whether the movement in question is 
intentional, is “do we have a justifying reason, from a 
third-party perspective, for the agent not to loosen his 
grip?”: is the fact that the baggage would fall if he 
loosens his grip a justifying reason not to loosen his 
                                                 
65 In fact, what the example of the weightlifter suggests, I think, 
is that the type of causal route from an intention to a bodily 
movement is simply irrelevant to the movement’s being intentional. 
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grip? Here people’s intuitions may depend on what the 
baggage may have, or maybe something else. If, for 
example, it has a bomb to be able to kill innocent people, 
then this gives a enough reason not to loosens his grip 
and the climber’s loosening is said to be intentional. 
However, we can also imagine lots of cases that there is 
no justifying reason not to loosen his grip. In these 
cases the resulting movement is not intentional66. 
 The climber’s case shows that people’s intuitions 
may also be different in the case of causal deviance. One 
merit of my definition, like the cases of lucky actions, 
is the fact that it explains the different intuition on 
whether an agent performs a behavior intentionally when 
the result seems to be due to causal deviance. If I, as 
opposed to Davidson’s intuition, am right, then the 
climber’s example suggests another counterexample to the 
Standard Account that we saw in Chapter Five; loosening 
his hold was not done for a reason but it seems to be 
taken to be intentional.67   
                                                 
66 I will call this case C2, while I am calling the original climber’ 
case Cl. These two cases will be used in the next section when I am 
arguing against NCC. 
67 Davidson’s second example that borrows from Bennett is not a 
counterexample to the Standard Account, though. This is the case 
that shooting was done for a reason but the effect of the shooting 
is, if I am right, also intentional. However, if Davidson’s 
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6.5 NCC AND MENTAL CAUSATION DEBATE REVISITED 
 
 
 As I mentioned in Chapter Three, in the case of 
mechanistic explanations where the why-question is 
interpreted as a request for a mechanism that we may or 
may not be able to provide, any response to the why-
question also provides information that can adequately 
answer the how-question. In mental explanation, however, 
we do not expect the same pattern of interchangeability 
between why- and how-questions.  
 In this section I will examine the difference 
between mental explanation and naturalistic explanation 
with regard to the why- and how-questions. From this 
consideration I claim that because of the justificatory 
factor in dealing with intentional action, it is 
difficult to see how NCC can be true. I argue that NCC is 
an error due to confusing a mental explanation with a 
purely naturalistic explanation between events. I further 
claim that this insight works nicely in the case of 
                                                                                                                                           
intuition is right, then this case is a counterexample to the 
Standard Account. With regard to the climber’s case, loosening the 
hold was not done for a reason and it’s not, according to Davidson, 
intentional, therefore the case is not a counterexample to the 
Standard Account, either.   
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causal deviance. Finally I argue that NCC is just the 
result from supposing that there is no gap between 
explanatory reason and justificatory reason.  
Now consider the following questions:  
 
(1a) Why did Brutus stab Caesar?  
(1b) How did Brutus stab Caesar? 
 
 
The answer to the first question may be something like 
“He stabbed Caesar because he wanted to end the tyranny.” 
Let us suppose the following: An instantiation of the 
property M, Brutus’ wanting to end the tyranny, causes an 
instantiation of the non-mental property N, Brutus’ 
stabbing Caesar. Now Brutus’ stabbing is causally 
explained by his wanting to end the tyranny. However, for 
someone like Jaegwon Kim, this picture is not enough to 
give an explanation. He thinks that the instance of M is 
there, because of M’s physical realization base, P. He 
thinks that we need to provide how the event came about 
by providing a mechanism connecting N and P. However, I 
argue that this is an error due to confusing a mental 
explanation with a purely naturalistic explanation 
between events.  
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 In order to see the difference between mental and 
naturalistic explanation consider the following:  
 
(2a) Why did the house catch on fire?  
(2b) How did the house catch on fire?  
 
 
In the case where the why-question is interpreted as a 
request for a mechanism that we may or may not be able to 
provide, any response to the why-question also provides 
information that can adequately answer the how-question. 
To formalize the sentence “A house did catch fire”68 by 
using Davidson’s apparatus69, it will be: “There is an 
event that is a firing of a house.”70 What the logical 
paraphrase seems to suggest, is that (2a) and (2b) seek 
an explanation about the existence of an event, and the 
natural way to explain this is to present details of the 
                                                 
68 It should be “The house” instead of “A house.” It does not, 
however, make any difference for the purpose of the argument here.  
69 The received view is that “folk-psychological” explanations of 
action are causal and one reason for accepting it is logical form. 
Davidson has argued that action-sentences have a logical form that 
involves quantification over events. 
70 Davidson’s contribution in the issue of logical form of an 
ordinary action sentence like “Brutus stabbed Caesar” is the defense 
that it has the logical form of an existential generalization. 
According to Davidson, the logical form of the sentence, “Brutus 
stabbed Caesar”, is an existential generalization:  
 
 (∃x)(Stabbed (Caesar, Brutus, x)) 
  
This states that there is something that is a stabbing of Caesar by 
Brutus. Davidson claims that the thing or things that are related to 
Brutus and Caesar by this sentence – the things over which the 
sentence quantifies – are events. 
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event’s causation, that is, its coming to be: events come 
into existence because they are caused by other events.  
 In mental explanation, however, it is not the case 
that we expect the same pattern of interchangeability 
between why- and how-questions. Brutus stabbed Caesar 
because he wanted to end tyranny. Meanwhile, Brutus’ 
wanting may have been realized by numerous ways. It may 
be realized by expressing his anger toward tyranny in 
public speech, or by striking a table hard in front of 
him, and so on. Kim’s asking of M’s physical realization 
base is just to ask something further, namely, “how it is 
realized.” 
 In fact NCC is just the result of some philosophers, 
including Kim and Davidson, asking this further thing. 
Kim may expect some kind of causal mechanism to answer 
the question (1b), “How did Brutus stab Caesar?,” 
therefore connecting Brutus’ stabbing with the 
realization base of Brutus’ wanting to end the tyranny. 
However as we saw in Chapter Three, the causal relations 
between mental properties or between the mental and the 
physical do not depend on causal relations between the 
properties that realize them. Which microproperties 
realized Brutus’ wanting to end the tyranny depends on 
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how his wanting was made (by expressing his anger toward 
tyranny in public speech, or by striking a table hard in 
front of him). But the effect is indifferent to how it is 
realized. The answer to the question (1b), “How did 
Brutus stab Caesar?,” does not adduce causal information 
that explains the occurrence of an event, for we are 
citing certain actions of Brutus by using a knife or by 
slashing or some other ways. And the answer to the how-
question here does not answer the why-question; Brutus’ 
action of slashing, for instance, does not answer the 
question “why did Brutus stab Caesar?” 
 Asking the how-question is just to further 
presuppose that how-questions and why-questions do not 
make any difference in mental causation. This holds only 
in the case of a purely naturalistic explanation between 
events. Despite the fact that the questions expressed by 
(2a) and (2b) were equivalent due to receiving the same 
kind explanation as answers, questions (1a) and (1b) do 
not receive the same answers. The fact that the answers 
to the how-questions give some information on the answers 
to the why-question works only for a purely naturalistic 
relation between events.  
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 This insight, so far discussed, works nicely in the 
case of causal deviance. Let’s take a look at Davidson’s 
climber case (C1) and the revised case (C2). The two 
cases are exactly the same except that the climber in C2 
is holding some baggage instead of his partner. As you 
remember, while in C1 the climber should not act on his 
belief/desire pair because there exists a reason not to 
act on it, there seems to be no such reason in the latter. 
While the climber’s loosening in C1 was an intentional 
movement despite being causally deviant, the resulting 
movement in C2 may not be intentional even though the 
fact that the movement of the climber’s hand is caused by 
his belief/desire pair; it may be a purely accidental 
bodily movement that happens to match the climber’s 
intention. 
 Now the why- and the how-questions are treated 
differently in two cases. In case C2 the two questions, 
 
 (3a) Why did the climber loosen his grip?  
 (3b) How did the climber loosen his grip? 
 
 
do not make any difference because the answer is found by 
simply referring to “becoming unnerved.” The question 
(3a) does not require any further explanation than this. 
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This means we treat the two questions in the case (C2) of 
not-intentional action the same as in the case we deal 
with a naturalistic explanation between events. If not-
intentional, there is no sense to ask further beyond the 
why-question, since we expect the same pattern of 
interchangeability between the why- and how-question, and 
those two questions do not make any difference. In order 
for us to ask further, the action in question should be 
intentional. 
 The answer to the why-question in C1, which is 
intentional, however, does not answer the how-question. 
Answering the question “why did the climber loosen his 
grip?” simply by referring to his state is not sufficient 
since it does not capture the point that the climber has 
a normative reason not to loosen his grip. This point, 
NCC cannot deal with. NCC never deals with reasons not to 
Φ. NCC does not explain why the climber should not have 
loosened his grip, nor concern normative requirements 
working in this case (C1) of causal deviance.  
 
6.6 CONCLUSION 
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 The problem of mental causation results from some 
unwarranted metaphysical assumption: the Principle of 
Nomological Character of Causality (NCC). However, there 
is little reason to understand causation in the manner 
required to make NCC work. I mentioned in the first part 
of this work that the assumption of NCC is responsible 
for the problem of mental causation. If we reject NCC, we 
don’t need to worry about finding some explanations 
relating intentional explanations to physical 
explanations, as far as the intentional explanations are 
informatively fruitful. Burge puts this point as 
following:  
 
We determine the nature of causation, and the sort 
of laws or lawlike generalizations that accompany it, 
by scrutinizing actual explanations in psychology 
and ordinary discourse. If there turned out to be no 
clear sense in which mental events fell under 
predicates that are uncontroversially physical, then 
it would seem reasonable to count mental events 
nonphysical. As far as I can see, there is no reason 
to be anything but relaxed in the face of this 
possibility. I see no powerful, clearly articulated 
reason for worrying about the existence of mind-body 
causation, or the gaplessness of chains of physical 
events, if this possibility were realized. What 
counts in support our belief in mind-body causation 
is the probity of mentalistic explanations. As long 
as they are informative and fruitful, we can assume 
that they are relating genuine events, whatever 
their metaphysical status. (1992:38-9) 
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The motivation for the demand for laws in action 
explanations stems at least in part from the fact that 
the laws cited in explanations are the laws that subsume 
events in naturalistic causal relations. By rejecting the 
idea that causal explanation is causal because it is 
grounded in natural causal relations, the motivation for 
requiring laws in explanations disappears. I claim that 
this is the reason why we need to pay attention to our 
practice and explanatory strategies. 
 By rejecting NCC we can in fact arrive at a 
sustainable, defensible and rewarding account of mental 
causation. The primacy of explanatory practice over the 
ontological commitment reverses the usual account 
according to which causal explanations count as causal if 
they are grounded in causal relations. However, 
explanations come first, such that an explanation is 
causal if we accept it as such. By reinterpreting the 
notion of causation we regain the causal efficacy of the 
mental.  
 The causal efficacy of the mental is not derived 
from the underlying subvenient properties alone because 
the causal relations between mental properties or between 
the mental and the physical do not depend on causal 
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relations between the properties that realize them. The 
causal pattern at mental levels, which can occur only in 
certain circumstances, is not governed by the causal 
patterns at the lower levels since it cannot be explained 
by the non-intentional realizing properties which do not 
consider matters happened in the context or circumstances. 
 We looked to a theory of intentional action for help 
in answering the problem of mental causation. I 
approached the issue of intentional action not by looking 
into the metaphysics of mind, but by focusing on the role 
that normative considerations play in our actual 
explanatory practices in determining whether an action 
was performed intentionally. I conclude the criteria for 
intentional action must be wide enough to include the 
normative perspectives of a third-point of view as well 
as the psychological perspectives. 
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